This is why we can't have even minimally acceptable things

Here we go again. And somehow, the latest round of hysteria includes the Cons learning nothing from the failure of their attacks on coalitions or other forms of inter-party cooperation in the past, while the defence of a principle which has always enjoyed strong public support is getting weaker with time.

So let's once again be clear. We would be better governed if our political parties spent more time figuring out how to accomplish the goals they profess to share (or at least can view as mutually agreeable), rather than engaging in constant efforts to prove the other guys unfit for office (which ultimately succeed only to the extent of proving all parties right in that assertion).  

And for the NDP in particular, the politics and principle couldn't align much more cleanly: keep in mind that it was Jack Layton's defence of cooperation, and work to offer examples in practice, that helped shake voters out of their default allegiances to produce the party's best result ever. So even if it may be worth clarifying the facts on the ground, that needs to be coupled with a statement that a willingness to work across party lines to get results is a far more desirable attribute in both an opposition party and a prospective government than a refusal to consider anything of the sort. 

On echoes

Plenty of commentators have pointed out the symmetry between this year's election and that of 2008 in terms of low voter turnout and general dissatisfaction with the outcome on the part of all parties. But it's worth noting the similarities between the two campaigns and their aftermath on the part of the NDP in particular.

2008 was treated as a golden opportunity for Jack Layton and the NDP to improve their standing. But even with the most popular leader among the national parties, a well-run campaign, and seemingly uninspiring or downright self-destructive competitors, the NDP ended up with...a small increase in the percentage of the popular vote due to declining overall turnout; a slightly improved seat count which fell far short of the party's number of targeted ridings and left it in fourth place in the Parliamentary standings; and punditry which questioned Layton's strategy of running for the position of Prime Minister, and asked whether he might have hit his ceiling as the party's leader. 

Sound familiar?

Needless to say, it was for the best that Layton was able to continue applying his experience and popularity to the cause of building the NDP for another election cycle. And any attempt to treat the replacement of a generally popular and able leader as a cure-all is as misguided now as it would have been in 2008. 

Indeed, the next election cycle may well match 2011 as one in which a leader with strong recognition and approval is a particularly potent force. 

The Cons look to be deciding whether or not to push Erin O'Toole out the door for making even token efforts toward moderation. And any review process and leadership campaign on their end raises a real possibility of schisms within the party, an extreme shift to the right which could disqualify them as a perceived alternative government, or the Cons' version of Michael Ignatieff's saviour complex and lack of self-awareness. 

Meanwhile, Justin Trudeau's negative impressions figure to be thoroughly baked in at this point, meaning that voters may be primed for change by the next (hopefully non-pandemic) election. Yet unlike some commentators, I'd have to see it as unlikely that he'd be pushed without wanting to leave - or that he'll choose to leave government without pursing another shot at a majority as long as there's any hope of winning one. 

To be clear, there's plenty the NDP needs to reckon with as a result of the campaign. Among others, those include the need for clearer and more ambitious policy (an area where I'll again point out COVID response as an obvious lost opportunity), as well as concerns being raised about a centralized campaign which spent plenty in the pursuit of a relatively small number of ridings, yet had difficulty converting those into seats. 

But the fact that there's room to learn lessons doesn't mean it's time to throw out the work the NDP has already done. And it shouldn't come as any surprise if the path of slow progress leading to a breakthrough is one the NDP can navigate again. 

[Edit: fixed typo.]

On narrow targets

At this stage of the federal election campaign, the seemingly wide range of outcomes is entirely an artifice of a first-part-the-post system with multiple parties contending for seats. Barring a drastic change in the last week of the campaign (which will likely need to overcome votes already locked in as well as significant inertia), we figure to see the Libs and Cons relatively close to each other in the popular vote, with the NDP a relatively strong third in what would be a minority Parliament in all but the most extreme possible outcomes.

The most significant point of uncertainty looks to be the Bloc - which seemed to have fallen from its earlier support levels earlier in the campaign, only to have ticked upward more recently. And as the campaign has played out it's worth wondering whether the NDP may have limited its ability to capitalize on opportunities - in Quebec in particular, and to some extent across the country.

On the Quebec front, the NDP has been explicit about limiting its focus to 6-10 ridings. And while it might be understandable not to launch a high-resource offensive into all of the terrain included in the 2011 Orange Wave, it has to be a disappointment to treat even seats which the party held in 2015 as secondary considerations.

After all, the result is that voters who have supported the party under multiple past leaders will perceive the lack of attention even after party finances have stabilized. And even in the ridings which are specifically targeted, the sense of limited aspirations from a strategic standpoint is particularly dangerous for a campaign based on asking voters to dare to imagine more than the status quo. 

Moreover, there's reason for concern about the same phenomenon playing out across the country and setting a ceiling on party support which caps the plausible seat count in double digits (again lower than levels the NDP has already reached), and limits the prospects of pushing aside either of the Libs or the Cons.

There is reason for optimism that the NDP is back on its 2000s trajectory of building from one election cycle to the next, including by being able to close its campaign strongly in close seats. But if the NDP wants to be able to put its ambitious platform into effect, it needs to be no less daring in the seats it contests - and it will be a severe disappointment if an opportunity to make far larger gains is lost to an overly cautious campaign plan. 

[Edit: fixed typo, wording.]

#Elxn44 Roundup

The latest from Canada's federal election campaign.

- PressProgress takes a look at the housing plans on offer - finding the NDP's plan to be the best of the major parties, but still falling short of ensuring the right to housing is met. Jonas Goldman, Anna Jessop and Aline Coutinho examine the climate change and environmental policies of the three main contenders. And John McNally and Mohsina Atiq connect the two issues by highlighting how housing affordability is vital to an effective climate plan. 

- Meanwhile, Ian Young reveals how the extreme rise in housing prices in Vancouver can be traced substantially to foreign capital. 

- Rosa Saba examines the weaknesses in Canada's Employment Insurance system - along with the need for stronger action to protect unemployed workers than is currently on the table. 

- Larry Savage offers a needed reality check for people pitching strategic voting, concluding that it fails miserably in its stated purpose of defeating Conservatives while often diverting votes toward undeserving Liberals. 

- Paul Wells theorizes that successful federal election campaigns have tended to focus on benefits for voters, rather than appeals to values. 

- Finally, Enzo DiMatteo reflects on Jack Layton's determined optimism, and its continued relevance in an election where so much bandwidth is being used trying to persuade people to accept less than what's possible. 

On history repeating

With the Libs floundering in an election campaign where they considered themselves entitled to waltz into power and the NDP making a push toward the top of the party standings, commentators haven't been able to avoid some comparison to 2011. But that's always come with a caveat - that Justin Trudeau is no Michael Ignatieff.

To which we should ask: are we sure he isn't?

On a closer look, there may be more similarities to the Libs' position today and their standing ten years ago than has yet been discussed. And voters should be at pains to avoid the same mistakes that resulted in our missing out on the best Prime Minister Canada never had due to a save-the-furniture-and-torpedo-the-NDP campaign by the Libs.

In both cases, let's start by examining what happened in the election cycle before the one at issue. In 2008, the Libs under Stephane Dion took their usual rigid position against any cross-party cooperation. Even in the midst of an economic meltdown, Dion considered it more important to keep the NDP out of any power-sharing coalition than to replace Stephen Harper in responding to the crisis. 

But circumstances changed after Harper held onto power, then used an economic calamity as an excuse to try to attack his political opponents. And with the Libs lacking any framework for cross-party cooperation, the NDP stepped into the breach and facilitated an agreement which would have created a Lib-NDP government supported by the Bloc to replace Harper's toxic Cons.

Michael Ignatieff signed onto that agreement, if only begrudgingly. But once Dion was removed and Ignatieff assumed the Libs' leadership, he decided he didn't want to be in charge under conditions which required another party's support. So instead, he left Harper (and his antisocial judgment) in power to rebuild from the economic crisis, without requiring any accommodations for any other party's input. 

By 2011, Ignatieff had to wear that decision while having no record of accomplishment to point to. And so instead of forcing voters into a binary red door-blue door choice, he opened up the opportunity for the NDP's message of pragmatic cooperation to position it as one of the primary contenders for government. And we'll never know for certain how much strategic voting based on the Libs' past results may have contributed to the Cons' majority - though it's highly likely that Jagmeet Singh would have been one of the NDP candidates to beat out a Con competitor if not for a coordinated effort to back a Lib who ended up in third place.

Let's then look to the parallels in more recent events. While Justin Trudeau was able to hold power in a minority Parliament in 2019, he stuck to his party's refusal to discuss formal support arrangements, instead choosing to engage in Harper-style brinksmanship. And that could have led to serious problems if there had been any trouble getting support behind a response to the COVID-19  pandemic when it hit in 2020.

Fortunately, that didn't prove to be a meaningful issue. All parties were willing to work on at least some urgent measures - and more significantly, Singh and the NDP made abundantly clear that they were willing to maintain confidence in the Libs as long as they worked toward supporting Canadian people and implementing the types of promises which had been put on hold during Trudeau's term of majority government.

Like Ignatieff, Trudeau decided that cross-party support wasn't enough: he wanted to be able to unilaterally shut down investigations, and pivot his entire government's direction on a dime if he saw the opportunity to to do. And so he called an election which he thought would hand him a majority.

Needless to say, that hasn't happened. And there may be a couple of associated reasons for it.

Most importantly, anybody voting based on policy has had nothing but reason to be wary of Trudeau. It never made sense to try to run on promises which could have been kept in the existing Parliament. And the Libs' insistence on an unaccountable majority has only opened the door for skepticism that the result would be another Chretien/Martin attack on Canada's social supports.

But there's another aspect of Trudeau's choice which doesn't seem to have received much attention. If one buys into the Libs' raison d'etre that the essence of politics is the pursuit of power, then there can be no less defensible choice than to deliberately abandon power which one is already in a position to exercise. 

Both Ignatieff and Trudeau tried to justify their choices with the claim that they'd be better positioned to secure more power later on by choosing not to govern in the short term. But both have left Canada to problematic government in the midst of a crisis - and both have given voters reason to view them as less than prime ministerial in repudiating the opportunity to show what they could do with the title.

In turn, voters will need to recognize that a leader who has abandoned his post isn't likely to recover support in the midst of an election campaign. And particularly given Singh's work following in Jack Layton's footsteps as a leader determined to use every bit of influence available to provide for what Canadians need, we should be eager to take up the opportunity we missed in 2011 to see how that mindset plays out in government.

#Elxn44 Roundup

News, notes and commentary from Canada's federal election.

- Heather Scoffield comments that there's reason for hope in this election based on the options available to voters. Jaime Watt concludes that Jagmeet Singh is ideally positioned to provide aspirational leadership in an election where voters are more interested in future plans than a referendum on the past. And Singh writes about the influence of Jack Layton's enduring legacy. 

- Bruce Anderson writes about the many unknowns thus far in the campaign, as well as the readily-available prospect of change. And Campbell Clark discusses how the Libs are the primary loser in calling an election without a purpose or shape. 

- Amir Barnea wonders why we're not hearing more about immensely popular wealth taxes - which are of course central to the NDP's budgetary plans, but being ignored by other parties dedicated to facilitating the accumulation of wealth. And Nick Falvo offers his breakdown of the NDP's housing platform. 

- Finally, Lori Lee Oates argues that we can't allow parties to green-wash their way through the election as the immediate consequences of a climate breakdown become clear. 

On clear positions

What should have been considered an entirely uncontroversial bit of news - that, like his predecessors, Jagmeet Singh has publicly stated that he's not interested in putting a Con government in power - has instead given rise to a truly impressive display of projection and selective amnesia. So let's set the record straight.

No, it's not accurate to say "but Jack Layton would never have done that!". To the contrary, Layton did it as well, releasing this passage in his own book when he was still leading the NDP and strategizing about post-election options:

I was not about to participate in any scheme cooked up by the Bloc and the Conservatives that would put the country in the hands of Stephen Harper.

And it's even more preposterous to suggest that it's "rare for a party leader to take options off the table so early in an election cycle".

The previous three federal election cycles have all been marked by the Libs trying to lay the foundation for their strategic voting racket by loudly trumpeting a refusal to countenance any post-election coalition with the NDP, even if the result was to leave Stephen Harper in power. And at every opportunity, they've indicated after the fact that they didn't mean a word of that spin.

Similarly, while the Cons have regularly run on multiple incorrect and unprincipled claims (that the party with the most seats governs, and that coalitions of any kind are illegitimate), they've never held to those positions when they've perceived any hope of seizing power by discarding them.

If there's any difference between the NDP's position and that of competing parties, it's that the NDP can be counted on to base its level of willingness to cooperate with other parties on reasonable principles, and to follow through on its commitments. And Singh is rightly upholding that well-established tradition.

Juxtaposition

Some parties and leaders recognize the stakes in determining how to manage a minority Parliament:

I asked Mr. Duceppe what he thought would happen if the prime minister refused to accept such an ultimatum. He replied that a government defeat so soon after a general election meant the Governor General would have to turn "to one of us" to form a government. We both knew that meant Stephen Harper and his Conservatives. I asked Mr. Duceppe if he could accept such an eventuality. He was not only clear that he could, but he would.
...
Realizing immediately the full magnitude of what was at stake, I knew I had to walk away. I was not about to participate in any scheme cooked up by the Bloc and the Conservatives that would put the country in the hands of Stephen Harper.

And some, well...

With three months until Canadians vote in the next federal election, Green party leader Elizabeth May says her big hope for the final result is a minority government over which she can exert some influence.

In fact, May thinks that influence could even get the Conservatives to drop their dyed-in-the-wool opposition to carbon taxes if it means the difference for them between governing or spending more time in opposition.

"People change their minds when they see the dynamic of a way a Parliament is assembled and maybe think, 'Killing carbon taxes isn't such a good idea if the only way I get to be prime minister is by keeping them,' " May says.
...
Federally, May says she could support a minority government of any party but only if that party is serious about acting to stop climate change.

"We will negotiate with anyone, we will talk to everyone, but we won't compromise on climate action," she says.

Meanwhile, let's keep in mind that it's a single vote of confidence following the 2008 election that gave Stephen Harper the ability to stay in office rather than facing the consequences of pushing to exacerbate an economic meltdown with cuts and political attacks.

May might well be able to get the Cons to say they'll change their position on climate policy for the purpose of taking power. She'd have far less leverage in getting them to follow through when they have the option of running away from Parliament.

On history repeating

I haven't yet commented much on Ontario's provincial election campaign - and readers interested in the race will find plenty of noteworthy observers on the blogroll.

That said, it's worth noting the parallels between this campaign and a couple of the NDP's other recent breakthroughs.

To start with, Ontario's 2018 election seems to be offering an answer to one of the more interesting hypotheticals about the 2011 federal election.

In that campaign, the NDP started out well behind the Cons and Libs - but with an experienced and trusted leader who was able to contrast his own image against that of two self-perceived frontrunners who spent most of the campaign attacking each other (or three in Quebec).

By the end of the race, Jack Layton had emerged as by far the most popular of the federal leaders, including by winning over a strong plurality of Quebec voters and expanding the NDP's potential voter pool from coast to coast to coast.

But he reached that position only well into the campaign. As a result, the Libs maintained some residual support from voters accustomed to their being the default alternative to the Cons - particularly in Ontario where strategic voting campaigns based on past electoral results actually helped the Cons win three-way races. And the result was Stephen Harper's one and only majority government - albeit challenged by a strong NDP opposition.

The great what-if for the NDP was thus what would have happened if the 2011 campaign had lasted just a couple more weeks. And we may be getting our answer. 

This year, Andrea Horwath's campaign is following in Layton's footsteps. She too was largely ignored at the start of the campaign as two highly-flawed parties and leaders tried to run only against each other; she too has expanded the NDP's potential voter pool far beyond what most outside observers anticipated; she too has managed to see an already-positive reputation improve in comparison to her opponents.

But after making her move in the polls somewhat earlier in the campaign, Horwath has had enough time for voters to get comfortable with the concept of an NDP victory. And yesterday's effective concession by Kathleen Wynne means that late-deciding voters will have no doubt as to which party is actually running to provide an alternative to a Doug Ford government.

For another historical precedent, that suggests David Climenhaga might be right on the money in his long-standing comparison to Alberta's 2015 election - right down to the divided and unpopular right-wing party whose only apparent late-campaign move is to hope that voters will defer to corporate insiders in casting their ballots.

Of course, there are still some important obstacles in Horwath's way - particularly the uncertainty as to the efficiency of her party's support. But it looks entirely plausible that Horwath's wave may have crested at the right time where Layton's fell just short.

Saturday Morning Links

Assorted content for your weekend reading.

- David McGrane writes about Jack Layton's five great fights - and how they continue to provide an essential framework for social democrats.

- Rupert Neate reports on London's "ghost towers", which include tens of thousands of high-end homes sitting empty in a city facing a severe housing crisis. Ann Pettifor comments on the absurdity of pretending that more private construction will solve the lack of housing in light of that reality. And Matt Bruenig offers his take on how to work real estate into a social wealth fund.

- Meanwhile, Jacky Davis discusses how creeping corporatism and austerity are eating away at the UK's National Health Service. 

- Blake Eligh points out that low-income families lack for healthy food only as a result of availability issues rather than preferences. And José L. Peñalvo, Frederick Cudhea, Renata Micha, Colin D. Rehm, Ashkan Afshin, Laurie Whitsel, Parke Wilde, Tom Gaziano, Jonathan Pearson-Stuttard, Martin O’Flaherty, Simon Capewell and Dariush Mozaffarian have studied how prices and subsidies can make a difference in ensuring healthier food is affordable.

- Finally, Alex McKeen and Victoria Gibson report on the pervasive culture of sexual harassment in Canadian politics. And A.H. Reaume highlights why whisper networks to distribute warnings about ongoing misconduct fall far short of creating the safe and inclusive system we should want.

Leadership 2017 Links

The latest from the NDP's federal leadership campaign following Jagmeet Singh's impressive first-ballot victory.

- Paul Wells discusses how Singh's youth and optimism fit with the NDP's history and self-image. Jeremy Nuttall interviews Brian Topp about some lessons Singh can take from Jack Layton - including his apparent plan to engage first and foremost in party-building in the lead up to the next election. Bill Tieleman suggests that Singh is Justin Trudeau's worst nightmare as a magnet for young and suburban voters (with Alex Ballingall also exploring the prospect), while John Doyle theorizes as to how Singh communicates with the public.

- Tim Harper discusses how Singh will be the first leader of a major federal party to be able to speak from experience about racial profiling. Drew Brown looks at Terry Milewski's appalling first interview of Singh as a prime example of how the media will need to learn to cover a non-white leader. And Susan Delacourt looks to the history of woman leaders at the federal level to warn against taking a single precedent as a sign that equality is at hand. 

- Christo Aivalis points out how Niki Ashton changed the campaign by pressing all of the candidates to talk about progressive principles and policies. And Dylan Robertson interviews Ashton about her view of the campaign.

- Nora Loreto examines a few policy areas where the NDP should focus in the lead up to the 2019 election. And Kristy Kirkup reports on Singh's appointment of Guy Caron to lead the NDP in Parliament in the interim.

- Finally, Althia Raj talks to several key figures in the campaign as to how Singh emerged with his first-ballot win.

On discriminatory treatment

Following up on this post, let's take a look at Tom Parkin's other recent post which offers plenty of food for thought. Parkin's view broadly matches Guy Caron's position on Quebec's treatment of people who wear niqabs - but seems to me to fall short of making the case for deferring to Quebec's politicians when it comes to basic principles of inclusion and nondiscrimination.

At the outset, Parkin and Caron both disagree on the merits with legislation such as Bill 62 denying service to women based on what they wear. So the argument boils down to whether there's a particular reason to hold back in discussing harmful legislation - or offer artificial "respect" to a view which is both wrong in policy, and based in part on discriminatory intent - because of the nature of the body which has passed it.

And the NDP hasn't established a strict standard along similar lines before. For example, it worked on banning the mining and sale of asbestos in the face of a unanimous resolution of the National Assembly to continue the industry, and before any Quebec politician spoke out on the same side of the issue.

In addition to being on the right side of history on the merits, that action wasn't apparently seen as problematic based on the application of the Sherbrooke Declaration (PDF) - and certainly doesn't seem to have affected Jack Layton's strategy for building bridges in Quebec.

But is there something different in the combination of political and public views about the niqab? There, one has to ask whether any position is likely to hold up in the face of scrutiny. 

Needless to say, the prime example on that front is the federal Bill C-51 - which was viewed as a political slam-dunk for the Harper Cons until they ran into principled opposition from the NDP. Within months, Canadians had turned against the bill and the government which introduced it, while rewarding the party which had the backbone to speak up.

To be sure, there's no guarantee that public opinion would similarly change on Bill C-62. But it's dangerous to assume that public opinion is set in stone, particularly when one side of an issue hasn't been given a full hearing on the merits. And there's plenty of reason to doubt that the politics of exclusion in Quebec are as much a winner as they're assumed to be.

Key precedents include both the Parti Quebecois' fall from power as it tried to run on its Charter of Values, and the fact that the top two vote shares in 2015 federally (covering 62% of the popular vote) went to parties which opposed the Cons' attempt to discriminate against people who wear a niqab.

Moreover, there's an obvious opening to introduce new policies based on NDP values to Quebec's political scene.

It's undoubtedly for members of the new Quebec-based party to decide what their priorities are, and the federal party should pay close attention one way or the other. But I'd suggest some of the most important opportunities for the NPD-Quebec involve areas where it's possible to stand apart from the existing parties - and Bill 62 is one example where unanimity among current politicians may not match the public mood, particularly if there's a distinct choice on offer.

And that could lay the groundwork for what I'd hope will be the NDP's long-term plans to retake progressive terrain from the Libs.

In 2015, the difference in the effect of the niqab issue between the Libs and the NDP arose from the fact that the former was never challenged as the loudest voice on the side of opposing discrimination, while the latter hadn't yet spoken up on similar cultural issues. But that effect could be reversed if there's a link between a federal NDP and a Quebec counterpart which both take a forceful position against discrimination, while the Liberal brand is split from one level to the other. 

To conclude, there's always reason for skepticism about the political choice to stay silent in the face of false conventional wisdom. And even from the standpoint of political calculation, the NDP is likely better served confirming that voters who care about minority rights can count on it, rather than answering fundamental questions with an awkward silence or a jurisdictional dodge.

On banked support

A couple of weeks back, I examined the role of endorsements in the federal NDP's leadership race. Now, I'll take a quick look at where the current fund-raising numbers and distribution stand - and how they figure to relate to the NDP's previous leadership campaigns.

The closest comparison to this campaign is of course the 2012 leadership race. There, the final fund-raising totals for the candidates who stayed in the race ranged from Niki Ashton's $86,806.70 (from 1,163 contributors) to Tom Mulcair's $522,788.00 (from 3,482 contributors). And the contributor numbers ranged from Ashton's 1,163 to Martin Singh's 7,965. 

But of course, the final numbers weren't known when people actually voted. And there were some noteworthy changes over the home stretch of the campaign: Mulcair overtook Brian Topp as the top fund-raiser after trailing in the previous quarterly report, while Singh drastically increased his number of donors even while raising relatively little compared to the pre-convention numbers.

In general, total donations proved to be a strong indicator of voting support. (In contrast, donor numbers were far less reliable, with Singh's total serving as the obvious outlier.)

The connection between donations and votes was even stronger in the 2003 campaign: then, every candidate's vote share was within 1.5% of his or her fund-raising share. So there's certainly some precedent to suggest that NDP vote totals may closely track donations.

What's more, as I've noted, the connection between fund-raising and voting outcomes could be stronger this time out since there's far more room to convert an advantage in fund-raising capacity into campaign outcomes. 

In 2012, it's possible that Mulcair in particular could have raised more than he did. But a $500,000 spending limit provided him with no particular incentive to raise substantially more than that amount. 

In contrast, with the spending limit tripled this time around, the ability to raise more money can lead to a far stronger campaign operation. And with candidates needing to reach voters over multiple separate voting windows, a campaign's financial resources may be particularly crucial when members make their final decision.

So how much attention should we pay to fund-raising - particularly when it may conflict with some other normally-reliable indicators?

Since this time there actually is a meaningful difference in how the race projects based on various factors, I'd be surprised if the first ballot doesn't end up somewhere in the middle. 

We certainly shouldn't look at the 2003 precedent and assume Jagmeet Singh's vote share will match his proportion of funds raised, particularly given the poll results released so far. But nor should we ignore either the importance of Singh's fund-raising lead as an indicator of support, or his ability to use donations to change the course of the campaign. And that advantage may be especially important if the race comes down to the wire. 

Leadership 2017: The Quebec Question

Don MacPherson has joined the many commentators whose main take on the federal NDP's leadership race is to zero in on how Quebec voters might react to Jagmeet Singh's Sikh background and head covering. And Adam Radwanski has rightly challenged the pundits' consensus to some extent.

But (as noted in part by Ian Capstick) the narrow issue of Singh's religion misses a much bigger picture as to the considerations facing the NDP in Quebec. And there may be a case for any of the four candidates in the race as the best-positioned to build support.

With that in mind, let's take a look at a few theories as to what's necessary for a federal leader to win Quebec support, and how the current leadership candidates stack up.

The Native Son

One of the cardinal rules of Canadian politics (and one at least arguably consistent with the results of every federal election dating back 150 years) is that no national leader without substantial Quebec connections beats out another national leader with more substantial roots in the province.

Of course, there are a couple of recent examples which might challenge the theory. In 2004, Stephen Harper's Conservatives managed to top Paul Martin's Libs in the Quebec vote count - though both were far behind Gilles Duceppe and the Bloc. And in 2011, Duceppe saw his party's Quebec-centred message fall to pieces in the face of Jack Layton's surge of support - which again might be distinguished based on one's view of Layton's Quebec connections, and/or the question of whether provincially-based parties such as the Bloc require a separate line of analysis.

If NDP members accept this theory while seeing Quebec success as the primary concern in a new leader, the result isn't merely to rule out Singh as an option, but to turn the campaign into a coronation for Guy Caron. (Again, Peter Julian was the one other candidate who might have made a claim to sufficient links to Quebec to benefit from the rule - but he's now out of the race.)

That said, even taking this theory at its highest, Quebec roots can only be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for winning over voters: just ask Stephane Dion, Tom Mulcair, and others who were each merely one among multiple candidates on the stage with Quebec roots. And with Justin Trudeau not looking to leave the scene anytime soon, the NDP can't expect to secure any advantage on this front alone.

Any vote based on the native son theory would thus require not only considering it to be accurate, but viewing Caron as a sufficiently strong option to wrest the title of Quebec's favourite son away from Trudeau. And it doesn't offer a basis for distinction among the remaining candidates: to the contrary, it would imply that if Caron doesn't win the leadership, the NDP may as well focus elsewhere for want of a reasonable hope of challenging the Libs in Quebec.

Needless to say, I'd hope leadership voters will have a much more optimistic view of the NDP's prospects than that (as Layton did when he built up his own connection to Quebec). Which brings us to...

Le Bon Jack

The 2011 Orange Wave offers a rare example of a leader managing to win a plurality of Quebec voters and majority of seats by appealing to them over a leader based in the province. And there's little doubt that Layton's persona was a crucial part of that success.

If members are looking for the candidate who can most plausibly mirror Layton's political skills, then Charlie Angus likely has the best claim to the title. In addition to being stylistically similar to Layton, he's also done the most to match Layton's organizational skills in building up membership and fund-raising support under the radar.

That said, after winning the NDP's leadership Layton put in a large amount of effort to build up both his personal recognition and his comfort level in Quebec over a period of nearly a decade. And it took four election cycles before he was finally able to break through with more than a single seat.

Angus might project to have a reasonable chance to develop as Layton did. But it's far from certain whether leadership voters will want to allow that much of a development phase. And members focused on holding and winning seats in the near term may have reason to wonder about his ability to speak to Quebec voters by 2019.

The Movement Leader

Meanwhile, if French language skills in particular are going to be an issue, then Niki Ashton looks to be the next-strongest candidate after Caron. And while her most favourable model won't find many federal analogues (aside from arguably the Bloc), she can point to the provincial scene as offering some useful examples to follow.

It's been well documented how a single popular leader connected to a movement which sees itself as underrepresented in politics can drastically change Quebec's political landscape - with prominent recent examples including the rise of the ADQ and its evolution into the CAQ over the past decade-plus.

Of course, the precise groups of voters who have shifted allegiances to back those parties probably aren't among the ones likely to turn to Ashton in the near future. But the latest example of a movement turning into a political force is one which could very plausibly rally behind an Ashton-led NDP: Quebec Solidaire has been hitting new heights in provincial polling due in no small part to the arrival of student leader Gabriel Nadeau-Dubois as one of its spokespersons.

Ashton may not start with the level of public familiarity Nadeau-Dubois has earned in Quebec. But there's a case to be made that her plan for a national movement can work with and incorporate the same activists who seem to be transforming the province's provincial scene.

The Precedent Setter

If all of the other candidates can point to Quebec precedents for a plan to build up NDP support, Singh may have to look further afield. But he figures to be able to adapt the strategies which have helped break down barriers before.

In particular, it's questionable that numbers which refer to a personal trait rather than a particular leader can be expected to hold up if they clash with perceptions of that candidate. It's one thing for poll respondents to express a view based on only one attribute, particularly if they're not frequently exposed to people who share it; it's quite another to make a decision about a person for whom that attribute is just one part of a well-developed persona.

On that front, I'll point to Charles Franklin's look at similar polling in the U.S. - which shows the largest jump in willingness to vote for any particular trait arising after John F. Kennedy became the first Catholic President. And while the numbers which would have influenced Kennedy's candidacy start from a higher baseline, that may be based in part on more friendly wording (i.e. emphasizing that the candidate is qualified and of the same party as the respondent.)

To the extent there is a need to change minds about whether a single characteristic affects one's ability to lead, the first step in changing minds will be to call out and challenge whatever embedded assumptions may otherwise have resulted in any discomfort. And Singh is already doing a stellar job on that front (with a particular emphasis on connecting to Quebec voters).

But even among voters who aren't won over by messages about Singh's background in particular, the best way to challenge preconceived assumptions about the leadership of a person wearing a head covering is for a leader to be effective while wearing a head covering. Which means that NDP members who otherwise recognize Singh's strengths shouldn't see perceived public opinion about his religion as a meaningful reason to vote against him.

Conclusion

In sum, I don't see much basis to single out any one of the leadership candidates for a different test in evaluating how Quebec voters are likely to respond.

Each will face a great deal of work to be done - and some daunting historical precedents to overcome - in winning over voters in Quebec and across Canada. And for each, the strengths which help to connect and win over NDP members should be effectively the same factors which contribute to the NDP's success down the road.

Leadership 2017 Links

The latest from the NDP's federal leadership campaign.

- The Canadian Press reports on Pat Stogran's official campaign launch. And Alex Ballingall highlights Stogran's criticism of Justin Trudeau's empty-suit governance, while Jeremy Nuttall focuses on his message about challenging politics as usual.

- Charlie Smith interviews Peter Julian about his "just transition" energy policy and its appeal to MPs from Quebec and elsewhere. Niki Ashton writes about the importance of economic justice - both as a campaign theme, and a focus for activism. Ben Leeson talks to Guy Caron about his plan for the NDP to set a different path and deliver on the change promised (but not delivered) by the Trudeau Libs. And Liam Casey reports on Charlie Angus' continued work to ensure a safe home for the Kashechewan First Nation in the wake of another evacuation.

- Tom Parkin argues that there's a need for the leadership candidates to tell a stronger story as to how many Canadians are being left behind by economic structures designed to benefit the few.

- And finally, Ian Capstick talks to Libby Davies about her experience working with Jack Layton as the NDP's leader, as well as her hopes for the new candidates to match both his authenticity and his interest in working with others.

Leadership 2017 Candidate Profile: Charlie Angus

If Peter Julian's leadership campaign has been surprising in its relatively push toward controversy, Charlie Angus may be defying expectations in the opposite direction - as the punk rocker has been the most serene figure in the race so far.

Strengths

Rather than spending much of the first two debates on a soapbox, Angus has thus far positioned himself as the comparatively happy warrior of the leadership campaign. His interjections so far have been measured, upbeat and personally compelling compared to those of his competitors - and members looking for an attitude and tone reminiscent of Jack Layton's leadership may find it in Angus.

Meanwhile, even while choosing not to deal much with policy specifics for the moment, Angus has proven comfortable dealing with whatever issues come up - at least as long as he's able to respond in English.

Weaknesses

One of the key questions for Angus at the start of the leadership campaign was his strength in speaking French. So far, he's been functional in reading prepared statements while struggling with quick responses - and it will be worth watching whether Angus can improve his communications over the course of the campaign.

The more lasting issue may be the flip side of Angus' choice to punt on policy for the moment. If his personal appeal falls short, there currently isn't much else for his campaign to fall back on in seeking to win over potential supporters. And each of Angus' main areas of advocacy (First Nations, ethics and poverty) is being targeted by at least one other candidate, leaving a risk that Angus might not be seen as the voice for a single key policy theme.

Key Indicator

Angus' personal appeal looks to be the crucial factor in the end. But in a campaign of violent agreement where few candidates will be under the microscope (and there may not be much distinction in approval/disapproval to monitor), I'll be watching early on for examples of institutional support which might provide him the resources to take advantage of positive perceptions later.

In particular, if Angus can assemble some support from within organized labour and/or Jack Layton's previous NDP team, that will take him a long way toward pushing for a Layton-style result - and he may be the one candidate with a chance to win a first-ballot majority.

Key Opponent

In order to get there, however, Angus would almost certainly need a strong majority outside of Quebec. And that's where the strength of Peter Julian's campaign may be critical: Julian is likely both the candidate in the best position to hold Angus short of an early-ballot victory, and the one who most stands to benefit if early-ballot Quebec support for other candidates ends up being divided up later on. 

Plausible Outcomes

Best-case: First-ballot victory based on personal appeal
Worst-case: Moderate first-ballot finish and little subsequent growth for want of a clear campaign theme

Leadership 2017 Links

A few notes worth a look in advance of today's youth-focused debate...

- Kyle Duggan reports on Pat Stogran's imminent entry into the race. And The View Up Here features an extended interview to introduce Stogran as a candidate, while CTV offers a shorter interview.

- Anishinabek News examines Charlie Angus' focus on First Nations issues. Robert McCarthy offers an endorsement of Niki Ashton. And Jean-Philippe Langlais takes note of Guy Caron's analysis that the Libs' underwhelming budget only highlights the need for a progressive economic vision, while Tereza Verenca reports on Peter Julian's disappointment in the delay on housing in particular. 

- Lawrence Martin theorizes that the NDP needs to stick to what he perceives to be Jack Layton's script. But in addition to his questionable reading of the 2015 campaign, he noticeably omits Layton's track record as a progressive activist from any explanation of what led to his success.

- And finally, Nora Loreto offers her take on the campaign, while Eric Grenier previews the debate.

On historical context

Twice before, the federal NDP has been in roughly the same position it holds now, emerging from an election with a relatively high historical seat count that was nonetheless disappointing due to the expectation that a seasoned and respected leader could have done better.

After the 1988 election, Ed Broadbent stepped aside as leader. And under a new leader in 1993, the NDP lost official party status - while watching the Liberals form a majority government and Reform take control of Canada's policy agenda.

After the 2008 election, Jack Layton stayed on as leader. And the result was the 2011 Orange Wave, which finally fulfilled (and indeed exceeded) Layton's hopes from the previous election.

Needless to say, it's not hard to see which of those precedents the NDP should be hoping to follow in the lead up to 2019.

And a similar pattern can be seen at the provincial level in the case of experienced leaders who have had to decide whether to stay on after disappointing results.

Allan Blakeney remained the Saskatchewan NDP's leader after being annihilated in 1982, won the popular vote in 1986 and positioned the party to form government in the ensuing election. (In contrast, Lorne Calvert's quick departure after his defeat in 2007 led to disaster in 2011.) 

While Dave Barrett may not have returned to power after losing it in 1975, he was able to improve his party's position in 1979 and mostly hold those gains in 1983 - unlike Bob Skelly in the subsequent election.

Meanwhile, the only readily-apparent example of NDP meaningfully improving its position an election cycle after shedding a high-profile leader comes from Manitoba in 1981, when Howard Pawley was able to do better than Ed Schreyer had done four years earlier. But even in that case, Schreyer had stayed on as leader until being offered the position of Governor General. 

Finally, the best-case scenario with a new leader might be that of Darrell Dexter - who didn't build much on Robert Chisholm's vote share in 2003, but eventually managed to build up support and win power in 2009.

To be clear, the above isn't to say that there's never a time to move on from a leader. But it's well worth keeping in mind that there can be a real cost to letting a single election's result dictate a party's future - and numerous precedents in which an experienced leader has had plenty more to offer after one disappointment.

Unblocked

In response to the apparent return of Gilles Duceppe to federal politics, I'll offer a quick rerun on the state of the Bloc Quebecois:

Once the 1995 referendum was in the rear-view mirror, however, the Bloc recognized that it would need to stand for more than sovereignty alone. And so it developed a strategy of running hard against the government of the day (which was always its strongest Quebec opponent) and serving as an opposition on behalf of Quebec alone.

That strategy was highly effective at stoking frustration against sitting governments. But in the last few election cycles, it proved somewhat vulnerable when competing opposition parties entered the picture: in 2006 the Cons did better than anticipated as the Bloc hammered away at Lib scandals, and in 2008 the Libs managed to gain ground as the Bloc launched its culture war against Stephen Harper.
...
In effect, the Bloc has always succeeded by overwhelming a single national opponent which bears the burden of government in a one-province, one-front battle. But there's no way they're avoiding a multi-front challenge in 2015 - and starting from a tenth of their former caucus size and a dwindling membership will only make that challenge all the more difficult.

It's true enough that Duceppe at least figures to offer a more credible face for the Bloc than any alternative during an election campaign - which figures to improve the party's chances of surviving to fight another day.

And it may be that the Bloc can completely revamp its previous strategy to counter a popular opposition party which can both launch effective critiques against the sitting government, and offer an alternative. But I don't see much having changed since 2012 to suggest that the Bloc will ever again be the broad-based opposition party it was for nearly two decades - and if the strongest leader still in the Bloc ranks can't gain back some ground this year, the party's end may well be nigh.

On complexities

Bruce Anderson writes that as some of us have long suspected, a true three-party federal race is developing which will create some new complications for the Cons and Libs alike. But it's worth pointing out one area where the Cons are in much worse shape than they've ever been.

Before the 2008 and 2011 elections, the Cons managed to render Stephane Dion and Michael Ignatieff radioactive with voters - with those leaders' approval ratings running far below the Libs' party polling results. And over the course of the campaign, an expected convergence between those numbers led to a natural decline for the Libs, while Jack Layton's personal popularity couldn't make up the gap for the NDP.

But now, while the NDP and the Libs are on an equal starting point in terms of popular support, their leaders are also well ahead of Harper (with Mulcair rating as very much liked and Trudeau roughly neutral) - meaning that the inevitable campaign focus on leadership will work to the Cons' disadvantage this time.

Put another way, to the extent the Cons have normally relied on a desperately unpopular Lib leader to lower his party's support level throughout a campaign, Trudeau isn't quite the punching bag his predecessors were. If priority one for the Cons has been to turn Trudeau into Dion or Ignatieff, that job isn't yet done.

Yet to the extent the Cons have counted on the NDP to face an insurmountable deficit in voter support which can't be made up by the public's favourite leader, that's no longer a plausible assumption either. (On that front, note that not only is the NDP higher in the polls than at the start of any recent election campaign, but Mulcair is also far more popular now than Layton ever was at the same point in any election cycle.)

So the public's appetite for change is large enough for the Cons to face serious challenges from two parties and leaders with more appeal than their own. And it doesn't look like there's anything the Cons can do to undermine either of the plausible alternatives without substantially benefitting the other: a more pointed attack against Mulcair and the NDP will only help Trudeau and the Libs, and vice versa.

Based on that conundrum, I'd think the Cons might be best off taking their chances with something truly novel for the Harper cadre: a campaign primarily oriented toward a positive case for more of the same to expand their own voter universe (however slightly) and working toward favourable splits, rather than the usual plan based on relentless attacks against a single perceived opponent. But it doesn't look like the formula which has worked in the past is going to have the same results this time.

[Update: fixed wording.]