Prepare for a fight

As part of an obvious effort to lay the groundwork for the Cons' strategy following the next election, Tom Flanagan is the first Con-friendly source to put in writing what I've suspected for some time: that Stephen Harper's plan to cling to power at all costs may include refusing to resign even after what would be considered an election loss by any rational standard, then refusing to convene Parliament so as to avoid the inevitable vote of non-confidence:

First (unlikely but possible), the Liberals might win a plurality of seats, i.e., fewer than a majority but more than any other party. In that case, Stephen Harper could attempt to stay on as Prime Minister, as Mackenzie King did in 1925 even though the Conservatives won more seats in that election. But such a course seems unlikely in light of recent precedents and statements by Mr. Harper himself about the importance of “winning the election” – i.e., getting the most seats – in order to form a government.

Another scenario (more plausible, according to all recent polls) is that the Conservatives may win a plurality of seats. In that case, Mr. Harper would certainly attempt to continue as Prime Minister, even if his party had lost seats and the Liberals had gained. He has every right to do so, as by convention he remains Prime Minister until he resigns, and he would have no reason to resign unless defeated in the House of Commons.

At that point, the crucial question becomes, how many seats do the Liberals and NDP hold together? If together, they have a majority (155 or more), their position will be dominant as long as they agree to work together, because they can defeat the government on a confidence vote and force the Prime Minister’s resignation.

However, Mr. Harper would still have cards to play. As long as he remains Prime Minister, he has what game theorists call the first-mover advantage. For example, he does not have to ask the Governor-General to summon Parliament right away (Joe Clark waited four months after the 1979 election before meeting Parliament).

If he chose to play for time, Mr. Harper could try to break up the Liberal-NDP alliance by making a better offer to one or the other.

So with Flanagan obviously setting out the Cons' position, let's respond with a couple of points worth keeping front and centre.

First, if Harper indeed runs the next election on the idea that he needs a majority to beat back an inevitable coalition, then he'll lack any legitimacy whatsoever in trying to cling to power as that coalition forms. And the precedents for maintaining executive continuity don't offer the slightest bit of justification for a Prime Minister who's facing an obvious non-confidence vote to cling to power by refusing to allow Parliament to exercise its democratic authority to vote him down.

And second, it's entirely legitimate for a government to retain power with the support of democratically-elected Bloc MPs - as the Cons themselves did in 2006 and 2007. And particularly if the alignment in the House of Commons after the next election includes an NDP/Lib coalition on one side and the Cons on the other - with either requiring the support of the Bloc to govern - then there will be no reason whatsoever to favour the Cons' demand to stay in power based on concerns about the Bloc's influence.