On priorities

While I've pointed out the absurdity of yet another round of anti-coalition scaremongering, it does seem clear that any discussion between the NDP and the Libs will instead involve a confidence and supply arrangement. And that may well be for the best, as it maximizes the policy outcomes the NDP can expect to generate from an agreement. 

That said, in determining which priorities should be given precedence, it's worth keeping in mind what can realistically be achieved in that type of arrangement - particularly in light of the dynamics it would create between the parties involved. So let's look at a few of the criteria by which we can evaluate possible points of agreement - and which options might best fit within a deal.

• Public Benefit - Needless to say, the core consideration for anything the NDP requests needs to be a tangible benefit for people. While this might seem obvious, remember that the Libs once considered it a good idea to keep the Harper Cons in power in exchange for partisan progress reports on stimulus spending. The NDP hopefully knows better than to pursue process points over substance - but in case there's any doubt, it needs to view the contents of a policy deal as embodying the belief that political choices can improve people's welfare. 
• Immediacy - Any supply agreement will necessarily be for a limited period of time, with a risk that Justin Trudeau will see an opportunity to call an election early no matter what time period is agreed on. And that means whatever concessions the NDP can win will need to be capable of implementation within a period of a year-plus. That likely rules out anything which would require starting any major program design or public consultation from scratch without a fairly well-understood end goal. And so while a basic income or electoral reform would make for worthwhile demands on the merits, they may not be practical as core components of a supply agreement. 
• Durability - That said, there's also reason for concern if any agreement fails to have a lasting impact. For example, while improved pandemic benefits are rightly an important consideration for now, there's surely little value in committing to support a government past the point when they may cease to be necessary. This may be where the NDP's past success in pushing for Medicare, the Canada Pension Plan and Petro-Canada serves as a precedent as to what's possible. And while there may be limits on the structural change the Libs are willing to accept, the NDP should be keeping an eye on ensuring that the effects of any agreement last beyond the Parliament in which it's reached. 
• Acceptability - Of course, any demand made by the NDP is futile if it's beyond what the Libs can be pushed to accept. And while the Libs aren't setting up any particularly strict lines at the moment, there's a real risk that they'll see options to stay in power by other means (particularly by daring the Cons to bring them down) if the price for a supply agreement is seen as too high.
• Differentiation - By the same token, however, the NDP surely wants to be able to claim justified credit for the results of any agreement, rather than facing any plausible argument that the Libs would have done the same if they'd had a majority. And there may be particular value for the NDP in being able to claim to have pushed the Libs to action in an area where they'd otherwise proven reluctant to live up to their promises or stated principles. 
• Progressivity - Finally, different isn't necessarily better - so it matters which types are chosen for emphasis. While platform development always includes some effort to be everything to everyone, the terms of a supply deal will be taken as the ultimate declaration of the NDP's priorities. And it would be a waste of the balance of power to use it to pursue policies which tend toward political gimmickry rather than the expression of supporters' values.  

Not surprisingly, the main goals mentioned by Jagmeet Singh since the election (action on housing, dropping litigation against Indigenous children/providing compensation, and climate action) can meet each of the above criteria depending on the steps chosen. But even on those topics, the nature of any agreement may make a world of difference: indeed, a housing plan oriented toward subsidies for purchasers could easily fail the public benefit, differentiation and progressivity tests. 

Conversely, the best option may be one which isn't at the forefront of Singh's current messaging. The Libs have already put some effort into determining what a national pharmacare program could look like, meaning that it's as "shovel-ready" as any national benefit program is likely to be. But they've abandoned any commitment to following through or funding it, presumably due largely to industry pressure. 

That means the NDP can be the driving force behind a crucial national program which would carry both individual and systemic benefits, and which the Libs would have little reason to oppose directly (even if they haven't been willing to spend their own political capital implementing it). 

With pharmacare (ideally coupled with public-sector pharmaceutical capacity) along with a substantial contribution to a climate change plan (say, redirecting the value of fossil fuel subsidies to the NDP's proposal for a Civilian Climate Corps and green infrastructure investments?) as the centrepieces, there would then be room to add further elements which are either more limited in duration, or more distant in implementation. 

It remains to be seen exactly how willing the Libs are to pursue a more formal arrangement. But there's room for both the NDP and the country to benefit immensely if they can be pushed to do so - and after an election campaign where an immense amount of energy was spent to accomplish very little, it would be for the best if some well-selected pressure now can remind people what effective cooperation can achieve. 

Tuesday Morning Links

This and that for your Tuesday reading.

- Peter Eavis points out how U.S. CEOs are only seeing their exorbitant pay soar even further due to Donald Trump's tax giveaways. Kara Swisher interviews Anand Giridharadas about how "philanthropists" are bribing the public with small parts of the obscene concentrations money they've extracted from society at large.

- James Kurz highlights how the Trudeau Libs and a number of provincial governments are basing their climate policy on the perverse hope that Canada will fall far short of doing its share to avert the global climate crisis. Barry Saxifrage points out the distinction between the balance of Canada which is somewhere close to meeting its Copenhagen targets, and Alberta and Saskatchewan which are entirely undoing any progress - though it's worth noting that the federal government has chosen to emphasize continued oil development rather than administering a system capable of reaching our national targets. And the Associated Press reports on the deforestation of the Amazon which is only making matters worse.

- Meanwhile, Mia Rabson reports on the Greens' odd position that they're eager to see new fossil fuel infrastructure built as long as any development is done on a sufficiently nationalistic basis. Michael Laxer calls out the Cons for a literal scorched-earth policy on climate change. And Andrew Coyne offers a reminder that the only argument against carbon pricing is bare climate denial.

- Finally, Christo Aivalis offers an apparently-necessary reminder of the legitimacy of coalition governments:

On partial answers

Having posted earlier on the message we should expect from our opposition leaders when it comes to ensuring change, let's make clear exactly what Justin Trudeau has now said - and most notably, what he hasn't said.

“There are no circumstances” under which the Liberals would prop up Harper should the Tories emerge with only a narrow plurality of seats, Trudeau said Tuesday in his strongest statements to date on the possibility of a Tory minority.
...

NDP Leader Tom Mulcair has long maintained that his goal is to ensure Harper doesn’t win government. He has also said he would be willing to work with the Liberals to ensure that happens.

Although he has said he would be “willing to work with others,” Trudeau has already rejected the notion of any formal coalitions, including with the NDP.

On Tuesday, he sidestepped the question of whether he would support a NDP minority.

Which means Trudeau's answers to the two questions I'd raised now look to be as follows:

A. Will you commit to voting non-confidence in Stephen Harper at the earliest opportunity?

Not exactly. Trudeau's promise is to not vote confidence in a Harper government - but that's different from committing to vote non-confidence, leaving open the possibility the Libs might again simply sit on their hands rather than voting one way or the other. But it's at least something more than Trudeau had offered before.

But then we get to...

B. Will you commit to voting confidence in a government led by the leader of a current opposition party at the earliest opportunity?

Not at all. And this is just as crucial a decision point as the first question: if the Libs fail to offer support for an alternative government, then we could well end up in the second election campaign the Cons seem to be hoping for - with Harper continuing to hold power on a caretaker basis for lack of anybody able to take power.

Which is to say even if one takes him at his ever-changing word, Trudeau has a long way to go before committing to the basic process needed to ensure a change in government.

On simplified procedures

Following up on this post, let's also note how the right answer from Canada's opposition parties could combine with the seeming agreement between the major party leaders as to the "most seats first" principle to take nearly all of the guesswork out of a post-election minority Parliament.

Again, the range of possible outcomes absent some consensus between the parties as to what should happen next would be virtually infinite. The Cons would be entitled to hang onto power without meeting Parliament for an extended period of time, and could play all kinds of games in seeking to avoid votes even after reconvening it. And even if Stephen Harper stepped down willingly, there would be potential for mischief and confusion among the other parties: would anybody want to see the result if, say, Justin Trudeau followed a distant third-place finish by declaring that he wouldn't support anybody else, but would be willing to govern if somebody else propped the Libs up?

But "yes" answers from the NDP and Libs to the two questions would resolve effectively all of those issues, particularly if it was taken as agreed that the first (and follow-up) chance to govern would go to the party with the most seats.

If a majority of MPs in the House had resolved to vote down the Harper Cons at the first opportunity, there would be no purpose to any attempt to drag out the process. And if the opposition parties had agreed that the leader of the party with more seats would receive at least the initial opportunity to become PM with the other's support, then there would be no fear of post-election games in determining who (if anybody) could win the confidence of the House - leaving any post-election negotiations to the question of what policies to pursue after a throne speech had passed and a new government was in place.

Unfortunately, we can't take for granted what the answers would actually be. But it's well worth seeing if we can get the parties promising change to at least agree on a clean process to achieve it.

On basic questions

The National Post's editorial board offers the latest reminder as to how confidence is won and lost in Canada's Parliament. And it only highlights the need for our candidates - particularly those promising change - to offer a clear indication as to their post-election plans.

But while it's worth discussing what types of agreement might be possible between various combinations of opposition parties, there's one set of questions which doesn't require any agreement at all. So let's see what our opposition leaders and candidates have to say about these:

A. Will you commit to voting non-confidence in Stephen Harper at the earliest opportunity?
B. Will you commit to voting confidence in a government led by the leader of a current opposition party at the earliest opportunity?

Obviously, the answer to A should be abundantly clear for anybody offering change from the Cons. And since the answer to B may well determine whether the Governor-General can expect to find a replacement after a vote against the Cons, we'll have reason to be wary about anybody who's more interested in scoring points against another opposition party than making a clear statement on it.

Juxtaposition

On the one hand, there's what Canadian voters actually want...

(N)early 60 per cent of respondents support the idea of two or more parties forming a coalition government, if no party gains a majority of seats in October’s election.

And this:

By a margin of almost two-to-one, the voters of today would send Mr. Harper packing in favour of a coalition.

And this:

More than two-thirds of Liberal and NDP supporters favour the idea of the parties forming a coalition in the event of a Conservative minority in the Oct. 19 election, according to a new poll by Forum Research.

Of Liberal supporters surveyed, 68 per cent support a coalition, while 75 per cent of NDPers favour the idea –– about half of all Canadian voters.

And on the other hand, there's what Justin Trudeau is pretending we want:

Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau says his party is always open to working with other parties on passing legislation, but he believes Canadians aren't looking for coalition government at this point.

When asked about the possibility of joining forces with the New Democrats to take power from the Conservatives, Trudeau said on Tuesday that "Canadians aren't interested in formal coalitions."

No word yet on what two-thirds of his own party's supporters should be considered if not "Canadians". But if Trudeau is going this far out of his way to mislead people as to what they want from their parties now, we have all the more reason to doubt that he'll be any more accurate or honest if he gets to decide who governs in a minority Parliament.

On settled issues

As Dan Gardner points out, Stephen Harper is continuing to misrepresent the nature of Canada's system of government. But he's nonetheless made a noteworthy concession in doing so:

PM: HERE'S THE QUESTION THOUGH. UM IS IT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION TO MAKE THAT WHICHEVER PARTY ENDS UP, IF WE'RE IN A MINORITY SITUATION, WHICHEVER PARTY ENDS UP WITH THE MOST SEATS SHOULD FORM THE GOVERNMENT?

SH: Yeah that's my – that's I think how conventionally our system works and for good reason and that's – that's my position. Obviously our view is we're going to win and we're going to win strong. Ah but ah my position has always been if we win the most seats I will expect to form the government and if we don't, I won't.

PM: SO EVEN AS THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, IS YOU'RE JUST A COUPLE OF SEATS BEHIND, YOU WOULDN'T TRY TO FIGURE OUT A WAY TO –

SH: No. No.

PM: YOU WOULD RESIGN.

SH: Yeah. Well I would not serve as prime minister. No I think you – you have to have the most seats in Parliament to go to the governor general and that's – you know, in this country in our system, we have what's called a Westminster style system, um and we don't – we don't, you know, elect a bunch of parties who then as in some countries, get together and decide who will – who will govern. We ask people to make a choice of a government. And so I think that the party that wins the most seats should form the government.

Now, the Cons have a history of turning their campaign promises into something far short of enforceable commitments once it counts. And so I'd still be concerned about the prospect of Harper trying to move the goalposts if it suits his interests.

But Harper seems to have conceded publicly that the range of interpretations as to what happens if no party holds a majority involves only a contest as to the relative importance of the ability to win a majority in the House of Commons as compared to a party's claim to a plurality of seats - suggesting that he at least isn't willing to defend the other mechanisms he could use to cling to power no matter how resounding an election defeat his party faces. And while it hopefully won't be necessary to point back to that acknowledgement, Harper's public position now should make it clear to the Governor General and the public that Harper would have no legitimacy whatsoever if he tries to reverse course later.

On changed messages

Paul Wells highlights the major change from the Cons' messaging in 2011 compared to today, as the party which spent years doing nothing about obsessing over (and demonizing) the possibility of a coalition has suddenly gone mum except in front of the most partisan of crowds. But it's worth noting that there's another factor beyond those mentioned by Wells which might explain the change - and it involves the message backfiring to some extent the first time it was used.

Wells notes - as confirmed by the polling set out here - that even at worst, roughly half of the Canadian public supported the prospect of a coalition to oust the Harper Cons. And that held true through the 2011 election campaign - even though the governing party was using all of its resources to attack the idea, the apparent default alternative did everything in its power to repudiate any cooperation, and the only strong defence of a coaltion came from a party broadly perceived as an afterthought.

By the end of the campaign, of course, the NDP was seen rather differently. And its success in convincing voters that a willingness to cooperate represented change for the better (rather than some abomination against the inherent nature of politics) forced at least some observers to recognize that discussing a coalition wasn't so toxic after all. 

Unfortunately, the Libs still haven't learned their lesson. But if the Cons are no longer pretending it's a winner for them, that's probably an admission worth noting - and it likely signals an opportunity worth taking not only for the opposition parties, but also for voters primarily concerned with replacing Harper.

On transitions

Bob Hepburn makes clear that while the Libs may still be in denial about the importance of cooperating to remove the Harper Cons from power, their best friends in the media are under no such illusions. But the most noteworthy contribution to Canada's discussion about post-election options comes from Aaron Wherry - particularly in highlighting what factors have, and have not, been taken into account in determining who gets a chance to form government:

(A) Progressive Conservative government in Ontario in 1985 was defeated in the legislature and replaced by a Liberal government that had signed a governing accord with the NDP caucus. Interestingly, it is recounted in this piece for Canadian Parliamentary Review that when the defeated premier, Frank Miller, tendered his resignation with Ontario’s lieutenant-governor, he advised that an alternative was prepared to govern: “It would appear that the Honourable Leader of the Opposition is able to gain the confidence of the House at this time.”

The lieutenant-governor of the day, John Black Aird, then issued a statement to explain the change:

In my capacity as Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario and as the representative of Her Majesty the Queen in Ontario, I have this day asked Mr. David Peterson to form a government, he having assured me that he can form a government which will have the confidence of the Legislative Assembly for a reasonable length of time.

On the advice of counsel with whose opinions I agree, I have advised Mr. Peterson that the agreement between the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party, a copy of which had been delivered to me, has no legal force or effect and that it should be considered solely as a joint political statement of intent and that the agreement cannot affect or impair the powers or privileges of the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario nor of the members of the Legislative Assembly.

Wherry goes on to note that there are also two precedents in which alternative governments might have had the opportunity to form government without the consent of the incumbent: the federal Parliament in 1980 when other parties did not seek the opportunity to replace Joe Clark's PCs (who had already won a confidence vote), and again in 2004 when no confidence vote was brought against Paul Martin's Libs. And there's one example of a party actually finishing second in seats and forming government over the objections of the incumbent which had lost a confidence vote (that being Saskatchewan's legislature in 1929).

But the review of the historical record suggests a few points to keep in mind. The Governor General actually holds a great deal of discretion in determining what factors matter in assessing an incumbent's request for dissolution and/or the right to continue governing - with a previous confidence vote and a signed agreement encompassing a majority of representatives being less than determinative (if significant at all) on their own. And the transition process (like so many other aspects of our system of governance) relies in substantial part on the good faith of the leaders involved in assessing their prospects of winning Parliament's support, which we can't take for granted from Harper.

All of which means that we shouldn't consider a seeming defeat for the Cons - whether the loss of a majority or a drop in the party standings - to completely close the door on Harper clinging to power. And we should thus stay motivated to make sure the electorate's verdict leaves Harper and the Governor General no choice but to allow for a transfer of power.

On cautionary tales

I've previously offered my take on why all opposition parties - including the Libs - should and will ultimately vote the Harper Cons out of power when given the chance. But I'll note that Don Lenihan's argument toward the same conclusion actually offers a reminder why there's reason for concern.

Whatever lesson one wants to take from C-51 and Eve Adams (among so many other stories), one can't claim for a second that they offer examples of Justin Trudeau and company valuing the support of progressive voters over cynical measures to appease the right. And there's been no evidence that the Libs have learned much in the meantime.

Of course, it would be for the best if the Libs decided that they should consider a "storm of anger...among friends and allies" as reason to think carefully about a choice. But in light of their track record, I wouldn't hold my breath - meaning that our best hope to get the Libs on board probably lies in political calculations rather than any newfound concern for progressive principle.

On trust issues

Susan Delacourt's take on what we should expect to see happen if there's a minority Parliament following this fall's election covers most of the bases. But it's worth expanding on one point:

It’s true that Harper, by constitutional convention, would have first shot at forming a government if the Conservatives win the largest number of seats. But there’s a hurdle Harper has to leap first: he has to win a vote of confidence in the House of Commons.

Try as I might, I can’t imagine how that would happen.
...
The extra-long campaign was clearly designed to drain the bank accounts of the opposition parties, making them reluctant to kick off another campaign immediately after this one. But that reality also could create a powerful incentive for them to work together — to deny Harper a confidence vote and make the case to the Governor General for a coalition or an accord instead of another election.

Delacourt rightly recognizes that the Cons' attempt to bleed the other parties dry represents a reason for them to cooperate with each other rather than leaving any ambiguity as to how stable the parliamentary arrangements will be. (And that applies no matter how desperately Justin Trudeau claims that the option isn't on the table.)

But it's worth noting that it also represents a reason not to cooperate with the Cons, even to the extent of letting a throne speech pass.

After all, we know from 2008 that Stephen Harper is perfectly willing to call or demand a second election in short order if it suits his political purposes. And if part of his plan is to catch the other parties without sufficient resources to run another campaign, then it would be outright folly to leave him with the ability to pull the plug and call an election at any time - an option which would be available to him if he gets a single vote of confidence.

In contrast, for all the questions about policy gaps between the NDP and the Libs, both parties could surely agree on the need not to hold another election immediately. And even if there were no other basis for cooperation, that factor alone might be the tie-breaker in determining whether Harper is left at the controls.

On cooperative options

I've previously excoriated the Libs for the connection between their refusal to talk about cooperation with other parties and their complete lack of any idea what they supposedly stand for. And nothing in the campaign to date changes that analysis.

By the same token, I'll give credit where due to Elizabeth May for being up-front about her test for support for a new government. And it's particularly noteworthy that the conditions - most notably the repeal, rather than tweaking, of C-51 - are ones which the NDP will be far better positioned to meet than any other potential governing party.

That said, I'll also point out that in her effort to blur the lines between the opposition alternatives, May distinctly rewrites some history:

Trudeau has already said he won’t form a coalition government. But May said that’s just election politics, and that math at the end of election night may be more convincing to Trudeau and Mulcair.

“He doesn’t want to be a junior player to Mulcair in the midst of an election campaign. If the roles were reversed and Trudeau was ahead in the polls, Mulcair would be saying no coalition,” she said.

The apparent theory that the senior partner in a coalition would support the possibility and the junior one would oppose it is rather hard to square with the parties' positions in 2008 and (pre-Orange Wave) 2011 - and as May's wont, serves to give Trudeau an excuse that he's done nothing to deserve. 

 

In fact, the parties' track record is this. The NDP is open to cooperation to replace the Cons with a better government no matter what the party standings say, while the Libs have refused to acknowledge the possibility at every turn. And between that reality and the policy conflict which seems to have arisen between the Greens and the Libs, May's declaration only serves to confirm that Canadians wanting change should ensure that the NDP is in a position to deliver it - with Green support if necessary.

Saturday Morning Links

Assorted content for your weekend reading.

- Robin Sears discusses the hubris behind the Cons' early election call, while Tim Naumetz notes that the extended campaign is just one more issue where the Cons are offside of the vast majority of the public. And the Guardian comments on the reasons for optimism that we're nearing the end of Stephen Harper's stay in power.

- The Ottawa Citizen makes the case for better economic management than we've been able to expect from the Harper Cons. And Alan Freeman weighs in on the costly frivolity of the Cons' latest tax credit scheme.

- And for commentary on this week's debate which goes beyond surface impressions, the Guardian analyzed the debate as it happened. The CCPA offered up some issues which deserved discussion, while Vice followed up on a number of the issues raised in the debate itself. And Ian MacLeod debunked Stephen Harper's preposterous claims about C-51.

- Althia Raj points out there was relatively little talk of a coalition or other forms of inter-party cooperation. But it's worth pointing out that it was the Cons who assumed it was a winning issue in the past - signalling that their lack of interest in mentioning it signals that they no longer see it as a winning issue. 

- Jane Hilderman discusses the connection between a health democracy and a healthy society:

(T)he imbalance between those who contribute to our democracy and those who the report finds are "checking out" is a stark one — in the 2011 federal election there was a 36% gap between the cohort with the highest turnout (ages 65-74) and that with the lowest (ages 18-24). Meanwhile the political process now repels more citizens than it attracts, particularly young Canadians. As a consequence our political system is becoming less representative, leading to inequalities between Canadians who participate and those who do not. The failure of many Canadians to contribute to our political life — or to see it as a way to make meaningful change — should serve as a warning sign to anyone interested in our society's well-being.

The challenge is that a majority of Canadians no longer feel politics is serving them. If a majority of Canadians no longer felt the healthcare system had their best interests in mind, its legitimacy would begin to crumble. The same goes for our politics. If the majority of Canadians are withdrawing from the political process, the health of our democracy is in peril.

- Meanwhile, Ralph Surette is right to highlight the Cons' contempt for Canada's democratic institutions. But I will note that it makes sense for the opposition parties to focus on the problems which voters experience directly to make clear that those abuses have wider implications.

- Finally, Joseph Heath comments that our political system has seen its priorities almost entirely reversed, with the substantive decisions of legislators and political parties now seen almost solely as a means to the end of electoral outcomes rather than the other way around.

On end goals

We can fully expect Canada's election campaign to feature plenty more talk about possible coalition outcomes - which are favoured by the public, and may represent the best way to ensure the Cons' replacement if Stephen Harper again tries to cling to power. And as I've noted before, there remains little reason to take the Libs seriously in their threats not to cooperate.

But I'll take a moment to answer the latest excuse as to how the Libs are trying to present themselves as a party of change while needlessly ruling out what may prove to be the only way to get there - that being in a junior role in a coalition might be a fatal blow to the party.

Back when a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats after the UK's 2010 election, I had this to say about the difference between what the Lib Dems negotiated for and what the NDP has pursued in past election cycles when it's sought to be the junior coalition partner:

Particularly during the 2008 coalition discussions, the NDP has consistently made clear that its top priority has been securing positive policy outcomes. And in order to reach those, it's been willing to trade off any expectation of top cabinet positions such as deputy Prime Minister, as well as to work in structures where its goal of electoral reform isn't on the table.

In contrast, the two largest benefits for the Lib Dems in their agreement seem to have little to do with substantive policy. Instead, Nick Clegg's appointment as deputy PM and the promised referendum on an alternative vote model look to be the main carrots for the Lib Dems in an agreement loaded with conservative policy priorities with only a modicum of mitigation for the worst off.

In other words, a party negotiating from a third-place position doesn't have a lot to gain merely from pursuing cabinet positions rather than policy accomplishments, particularly if it has no clue what it wants to achieve once it gets a seat at the cabinet table. And the subsequent annihilation of the Lib Dems offers evidence in favour of that argument.

But a third-place party which has a genuine policy vision will find few better opportunities to see it brought to life than in at the negotiating table and the cabinet table alongside a party seeking which needs its support to win a majority in Parliament.

Now, it's true that it's possible to support legislation on a case-by-case basis without a more formal coalition. But if anybody's needlessly confusing the issue, it's the party which is prematurely ruling one of those options out in the absence of anything even remotely approaching a defensible reason.

Moreover, a coalition which signals the availability of a stable alternate government to the Governor General forms an important subset of the cooperation options which can usefully be pursued - placing a significant onus on the Libs to provide a better explanation than they've deigned to provide so far.

In sum, if there is a reason for the Liberal Party to exist other than inertia, that reason should offer a justification to work with others - as well as the promise of building the party in the future through the accomplishments achieved under the coalition. We should then expect the Liberals to be able to articulate what they'd want to pursue (under a coalition or otherwise) if they do end up as the third party in a minority Parliament - and to be willing to work with the NDP and others to get it done.

On the other hand, if the Liberal Party is so confused about its own reasons for existence as to have no idea what values or policies are important enough to make cooperation worthwhile, then it's hard to see what Canadian voters could possibly have to gain by keeping it around. And so the more the Libs whine that they'd be doomed if they tried to work with anybody, the harder it is to escape the conclusion that they're broken beyond repair either way.

Change for the better

It seems so long ago when it was conventional wisdom that no party in contention for government in Canada would dare talk about cooperating to get things done, no matter how many voters wanted to see it happen.

But if there was any doubt that the NDP can change Ottawa's underlying assumptions, we can put that to rest.

On cooperative priorities

As part of their new "Hope and Wild Flailing" campaign theme, plenty of Libs are looking for any pretext - however lacking in reality - to attack Tom Mulcair. And Mulcair's latest comments on a coalition offer the latest flimsy excuse. So let's look at how there's still a huge difference between the NDP and the Libs when it comes to a willingness to talk about coalitions - but how Mulcair could do far better by working with the NDP's longstanding willingness to cooperate.

To start with, let's look at the obvious distinction between the parties' respective stances.

Trudeau's position has been to declare that he is "unequivocally opposed to any sort of coalition". In other words, if one believes Trudeau's public statements (and once again, we shouldn't), the Libs don't care what kind of terms they could agree to on policy, cabinet positions or any other area, but are opposed to cooperating with any other party as their lone inviolable principle. And if that means propping up the Harper Cons, that's a result Trudeau is happy to accept.

In response to that position, Mulcair is now saying that he's not going to talk any more about a coalition in the period leading up to the election:

On était prêt à mettre beaucoup d’eau dans notre vin, parce que notre priorité est de nous débarrasser de Stephen Harper. M. Trudeau a dit qu’il serait peut-être prêt à travailler avec le NPD, à condition que je n’en sois plus le chef. J’ai soulevé le projet à quatre reprises. À un moment, on se lasse. C’est fini ces histoires-là. On regarde l’électorat et on leur dit que s’ils veulent du vrai changement, ça passe par le NPD. C’est dorénavant le seul propos que l’on tiendra là-dessus.

So the Libs have stated their bare refusal to even consider talking about any coalition, and have indeed stated that they'll never accept one in any shape or form. And in response, the NDP has said it won't bother continuing to make an offer that's been rejected.

Which isn't to say that I agree with that choice.

In fact, it should be clear that the period leading up to the election isn't the point where any deals would be reached in any event (since pre-election collusion along the lines of the Red Green pact has never been on the table). Instead, coalition discussions would happen only after the party standings are determined in October. And I'm at a loss as to why Mulcair is backing off any preparation for that discussion as the election approaches.

As I've pointed out before, any party presenting itself as focused on ending the Harper Cons' stay in power should be zeroing in on why that goal is important, rather than leaving any room for implication that working together isn't worth the effort. In the "change" versus "more of the same" argument that will ultimately determine whether the Cons cling to power, it doesn't serve the public interest to hint that there are circumstances where a party would turn down an opportunity for change.

Moreover, as has been clear for some time, a strong majority of voters - and particularly the ones likely to be choosing between the NDP and Libs as their options - prefer a coalition to the alternative. So it's hard to see why Mulcair would be backing off of his predecessor's strong stance that a narrow-minded focus on false majorities and resulting refusal to cooperate represents part of the broken Ottawa that the NDP is trying to fix. And indeed, a departure from that party-first mindset represents part of the change that voters are most likely to prefer even in choosing among their opposition alternatives.

In sum, Mulcair's stance is far from the outrage that the Libs' spin machine wants to present it to be, and in fact leaves open the possibility of a later coalition which Trudeau has repeatedly tried to shut down. But it does involve needlessly forfeiting what should be an important issue for the NDP and for the broader political scene alike.

[Edit: fixed typo, wording.]

Working across the aisle

Among the other lessons learned from Alberta's recent election, let's point out one more with implications for the federal scene.

While the main opposition parties recognized that they were too far apart in their general policy orientation to justify a formal coalition, both the NDP and the Wildrose Party were happy to point out some of the areas which were ripe for cooperation as part of their criticism of the governing PCs.

In other words, neither tried to pretend that there was no room to discuss post-election cooperation, nor to claim that some areas of disagreement or personal differences rendered it futile to even talk about shared interests. And both were rewarded with improved seat totals - while the majority-or-bust PCs were severely punished.

Which raises a couple of questions for discussion.

How different would the Alberta election have looked if either of the main opposition parties had taken the position that it was prepared to accept continued Prentice government if the alternative was working across party lines?

And if even the Wildrose Party can find areas of common ground with the NDP as part of a shared goal of achieving a change in government, how in the world can the federal Liberals keep a straight face while pretending that cooperation is impossible?

Choosing the wrong side

Following up on this morning's column, let's note that there's another area where the Libs are stubbornly sticking to a previous position whose underpinnings have been even more thoroughly destroyed.

The Libs have been at pains to at least offer the perception of changing their direction from nearly everything done by both Stephane Dion and Michael Ignatieff as leaders. But the common theme of arrogantly ruling out cooperation with other parties continues to lie at the centre of the Libs' messaging - even though it failed miserably in both of the last two federal elections, and looks downright absurd now that the Libs are at third place in the federal seat count.

And now, any argument as to political convenience or public opinion is also out the window. 60% of the public is onside with the idea of a coalition, leaving plenty of room for voters to support multiple members of a potential coalition while winning enough seats to topple the Cons. And that's in the absence of anybody making the obvious connection between the Libs' (however vapid) theme of doing politics differently and any actual willingness to do so.

But apparently, a dogged determination to leave Stephen Harper in office if they can't have sole power for themselves is so fundamental to the Libs' worldview that they're willing to cling to it even when virtually none of their supporters favour it. And the strong majority of voters who want to see a change in government may fall short of that goal due solely to the Libs' entrenched position until they first send Justin Trudeau a message he can't ignore.

On guesswork

Shorter Bob Rae:

Some people actually believe voters deserve a meaningful idea what political parties plan to do before choosing between them? That's crazy talk.

The democratic alternative

Some time ago, I put together this list of principles worth considering when talking about structured cooperation between political parties. And consistent with Ian Gill's own warning about his lack of connection to party structures, his proposal for a secret pre-election pact manages to fail on nearly every front.

But while there's some reason for question about Gill's intended direction, the bigger issue is his presumption that we need our political parties to drag us there. So let's clarify the options available to Canadians who want to further an "ABC" agenda in the lead up to this fall's election.

While our votes are necessarily limited to choosing from among the options available to us in our home riding, every other form of political involvement can be done wherever and for whichever party an individual sees fit.

Is your priority to donate to and volunteer for the candidate with the strongest perceived likelihood of defeating a Con in your home riding? You're welcome to do so and organize others to join you. And you can be pretty well assured that whichever candidate you ask to support won't turn you away.

Are you enough of a party loyalist to want to make sure your efforts elect a candidate of your partisan stripe? You can choose which candidate and riding you help out with - whether local or not.

Or are you enough of an anti-Harper activist that you don't care who you're helping or where, so long as you maximize your marginal contribution to defeating Con MPs? Again, you don't need a party operative's approval (or worse yet, a backroom deal) to determine where your efforts are best applied.

And with all of those options available to every Canadian, there's absolutely no need for parties to strike hidden deals, declare candidates to be sacrificial lambs, or alienate core supporters by telling them they're supposed to direct their efforts toward electing adverse parties.

If enough people share the viewpoint that defeating as many Cons as possible is the top priority, they have the capacity to seek out what appear to be the most important ridings and systematically tilt the balance in favour of opposition parties. (And while the same option may not be available for actual voting purposes, a strategy based on working to persuade people now will have far more impact than yet another hastily-assembled vote-swapping scheme.)

So the message shouldn't be to hold your nose and do as you're told based on a backroom deal to divide up volunteer efforts. Instead, everybody has the opportunity to influence the election in a way that allows them to hold their head up high. And we should be encouraging progressives to get in the habit of doing just that.