Wednesday Afternoon Links

Miscellaneous material for your mid-week reading.

- Nora Loreto points out the thousands of deaths known to have been caused by the spread of COVID-19 in Canadian hospitals - and the virtual certainty that the numbers available to date represent a significant undercount. Allan Massie discusses the spread of COVID-19 through the majority of the attendees at a party where every guest was fully vaccinated. Vincent Del Guidice reports on Idaho's stark rise in cases among babies and toddlers. And Don Braid calls out the UCP for axing even the most uncontroversial and necessary of public health measures to limit COVID transmission. 

- Scott Gilmore argues that we're past being able to rely on rewards and bribes to try to get people vaccinated, and need to start instead limiting holdouts' access to the "normal" they claim to value as long as they make it needlessly more dangerous. 

- David Wallace-Wells writes that a climate breakdown happening at an unforeseen speed is leaving us with the choice to either adapt or die (while still needing to limit the amount of damage to be taken into account). And the Globe and Mail's editorial board rightly recognizes that there's no point in banking on liquified natural gas exports which are far from viable both environmentally and economically. 

- Finally, Tom Parkin writes that the Governor-General has a legitimate role to perform in determining whether an election call is necessary where the prime minister relies on laughable assertions of non-confidence. And Andrew Jackson points out that the Libs may not be on the safe ground they're expecting in trying to plunge Canada into a mid-pandemic election. 

Visionless

Shorter Trudeau Liberals last month, trying to justify shutting down Parliament and setting up a game of Parliamentary chicken over a throne speech:

It's absolutely vital that we talk about VISION! And LONG-TERM PLANNING! And a FRESH MANDATE FOR CHANGE!!!

Shorter Trudeau Liberals now:

On second thought, this is no time for vision and planning.

On obstructionism

I'll give Yaroslav Baran credit for explaining in this thread how Parliament's standard procedures have been modified over the summer. But it's hard to see how that offers any justification for the Cons' contrived outrage over Parliament being "shut down".

In essence, the process boils down to two elements.

First, it's possible for the government to advance and pass legislation in special sessions - but only with all-party consent. To the extent a single party disagrees with a bill moving forward, it has the ability to withhold consent, bringing that process to a halt.

In other words, under the special order they're determined to criticize, the Cons can singlehandedly prevent the passage of any legislation which they don't believe should be approved through an adapted procedure.

And if there's a need to pass legislation which can't secure all-party agreement? That would lead toward what Baran inexplicably describes as a "loophole", being...a return to the normal Parliamentary procedure in full, with MPs being required to attend in person in order to conduct business.

Baran is right that in that event, MPs wouldn't be able to comply with social distancing rules. But that's exactly why it's been necessary to develop alternative procedures in the first place (over the Cons' consistent refusal to cooperate), rather than clinging to the assumption that Parliament has to function exactly as it has in the past. And it's nothing short of asinine to complain about the risks of meeting in person, while simultaneously bleating that anything other than that means Parliament has been forcibly "shut down". 

Of course, the Cons' utterly unconstructive response to the question of how Parliament can best operate in a pandemic mirrors their similarly obstructive position on how the federal government should respond to COVID-19 generally. And Canadians who have had to do their best to be constructive through a period of uncertainty and unfamiliarity should expect better from the official opposition than to stomp their heels and refuse to do anything of the sort.

On private determinations

Paul Willcocks has previously pointed out why there's reason for skepticism about Andrew Scheer's attempt to play both sides as to whether or not the Cons will try to limit access to abortion. But it's worth looking at a case study as to how the Harper Cons flouted any distinction between private member's bills and government bills when it suited their purposes.

Bill C-377, designed to impose reporting requirements on unions which don't apply to any other organization, was never included in any Con election platform. It was introduced as a private member's bill by Russ Heibert to make use of an advantageous draw in the order of priority, while avoiding the scrutiny that applies to government bills.

But the Senate returned it to the House of Commons with amendments. And at that point, the Cons made clear that it was Stephen Harper, not any MP acting on behalf of any constituents, who was dictating what to do with the legislation - and moreover that reintroducing it as a government bill was on the table:

Despite this being a private member’s bill, the Prime Minister’s Office has been moved to issue a statement.

We continue to support union transparency and the principles of the bill, which will be returned to the House as part of the normal process.
As per Parliamentary convention, we expect that the Senate will respect the will of the House of Commons should the Bill be returned to the Senate.

A Conservative source tells the Canadian Press that the bill will now be reintroduced as a government bill.

That didn't happen in the House of Commons. But it did eventually happen in the Senate, as Harper's Cons broke the Senate's rules to retroactively reclassify C-377 as a "government bill" to allow it to be rammed through in the final session before the 2015 election:

The government has powerful tools to push forward on "government business" — important legislation such as budgets. But C-377 falls under "other business" because it is a private member's bill from a Conservative backbench MP.

Carignan wanted to have C-377 declared a government bill so that he could force it to a vote. The problem is that it clearly isn't government business. The government itself introduced it as "other business."

A government motion would have retroactively redefined C-377 as a government bill. This was the motion Speaker Housakos declared was against the rules and undermined the traditions of the Senate.

By overruling Housakos, government senators can now use tools intended for government bills to push forward a private member's bill that many have warned is unconstitutional.

In light of that background, what does Scheer have to say about anti-choice legislation?

Scheer’s efforts to clarify his views on abortion just made things murkier. “I will not re-open this debate and I will oppose any plan to re-open this debate,” he told reporters.

But he also said Conservative MPs would be allowed to introduce legislation limiting access to abortion. And to vote for restricting access, if that was their personal view. And while he would expect cabinet ministers to vote against limiting access, he wouldn’t demand they do.

So Scheer's supposed acceptance of the continued availability of abortion is limited to personally opposing a move to "re-open" debate. But that can be done by any MP introducing a private member's bill. And Scheer has signalled his willingness to permit that step within a party which exercises strict control over those bills in the first place - meaning that he'll be providing tacit approval even if he feigns public dismay.

And once that step has been taken? Scheer won't demand that any of his MPs vote to preserve the right to abortion access. And based on his own words, any step after the first one has been left open.

There's thus every reason for concern that Scheer will follow his predecessor's playbook. And any promise to leave the Cons' dirty work to private member's bills should only be taken as a reminder that they've used that mechanism to grease the skids for controversial legislation before.

Update: And Scheer's declaration that he'll use the Senate as a tool to exercise strict partisan control certainly doesn't help matters.

On shows of confidence

As British Columbia's MLAs decide how to respond to the Clark Libs' latest attempt to avoid the results of an election which plainly showed that voters wanted change, let's offer this reminder.

In 2008, Stephen Harper's Cons established that they held the confidence of Parliament through a vote on a throne speech which made no mention of austerity, nor of kneecapping the Cons' competition.

After introducing a fiscal update which ran contrary to that basis for claiming confidence, Harper then used the earlier vote as his excuse to shut down Parliament and escape a vote of non-confidence which would otherwise have brought down his government.

In other words, the throne speech vote has to be based not merely on agreement with some words (including in this case ones which the Libs deliberately refused to utter when they had a chance to try to earn support), but confidence that approving them is worth being stuck with Christy Clark evading any democratic accountability. And on that standard, there's no reasonable choice for any non-Lib MLA to do anything but vote for change.

Monday Morning Links

Miscellaneous material to start your week.

- Jordon Cooper writes that the Saskatchewan Party's slash-and-burn budget confirms that for them, the poor don't matter. CBC reports on the devastating effect the budget will have on municipalities, while Courtney Markewitch reports that Saskatoon's city council is fighting back. And Joel Senick notes that the planned shutdown of the Saskatchewan Transportation Company is another area where the Wall government may be on shaky legal ground.

- Tom Parkin examines how the Trudeau Libs are substituting meaningless buzzwords for coherent policy and campaign promises. Rob Gillezeau and Jeffrey Ansloos highlight Trudeau's empty words when it comes to First Nations issues in particular. And Campbell Clark warns about the risks of the Libs' plans to undermine the role of Parliament.

- John O'Kane reports on Douglas Hoyes' research showing how bankruptcies are increasingly the result of income inequality.

- Kathleen Lahey studies (PDF) the gender impacts of tax policy, finding in particular that both cuts to progressive taxes (including income and corporate taxes) and joint tax laws serve only to advantage wealthier men.

- And finally, Scott Price summarizes the attacks on labour coming soon from Brian Pallister's Manitoba PCs.

Wednesday Morning Links

Miscellaneous material for your mid-week reading.

- Miles Corak reviews Branko Milanovic's new book on the complicated relationship between globalization and income inequality. Dougald Lamont examines the current state of inequality in Canada. And Matthew Yglesias takes a look at research showing that inequality and social friction can be traced back centuries based on the income levels associated with particular last names.

- David Macdonald and Daniel Wilson study the appalling levels of poverty among indigenous children. And Kristy Kirkup follows up by talking to First Nations leaders about the poverty facing their members (both on and off reserve), while CBC notes that resource-sharing with First Nations leads to reduced poverty rates.

- Alex Himelfarb rightly points out the importance of an open and inclusive process to discuss electoral reform. But Neil MacDonald writes that the Libs appear to have stacked the deck to prevent that needed conversation from happening, while Alison documents Marc Mayrand's warning as to how much time will be needed to implement a new electoral system. 

 - Chris Hall reports that the Libs are still stalling on anything to do with C-51, as now even a first set of changes which wasn't supposed to require extensive consultation - including the implementation of any oversight - is being delayed.

- Finally, Kady O'Malley reports that the Libs are planning to put Parliamentary business entirely in the hands of Justin Trudeau and his cabinet.

Thursday Morning Links

This and that for your Thursday reading.

- Rosemary Barton discusses why it's in Canada's best interest on the global stage to work on building strong multilateral institutions (including the UN) rather than counting on bluster to make a difference. But Gus van Harten notes that we're instead signing onto trade deals including the TPP which transfer power from governments of all types to the corporate sector. And Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood examines what's at stake in the TPP in particular, while Susan Delacourt questions why such a major agreement is shrouded in secrecy rather than being subject to any meaningful public assessment.

- Marc Lee rightly criticizes Stephen Harper for taking wholly undue credit for greenhouse gas emissions reductions caused entirely by economic downturns and provincial action. 

- Ned Franks tells Abbas Rana that a Con defeat on a throne speech will mean the opportunity for another party to form government rather than another election. But Bill Tieleman adds a twist to the possibility of the Cons trying to cling to power despite an inability to win majority support in the House of Commons by wondering whether they might seek to hold a leadership convention rather than reconvening Parliament. (And I'd note the risk is greater than Tieleman himself identifies, since for all Harper's spin about "most seats wins" there's theoretically nothing stopping him from following that path based strictly on incumbency no matter what the election result is.)

- Meanwhile, Andrew Mitrovica writes that the media has long been used as a tool for dispersing propaganda - even if the Cons are somewhat more blatant than their predecessors in valuing it as nothing more than that.

- Finally, Karl Nerenberg follows up on the Munk debate, including by pointing out Justin Trudeau's continued lack of an even remotely reasonable explanation for backing the Cons' terror legislation - even as his melodramatic attempt to change the dubject was somehow treated as a victory for him.

On caretakers

Since there's been plenty of talk lately about caretaker governments and their duty to exercise restraint, I'll raise one question as to the appointments made the last time a new federal government took office.

The day he and his Cabinet were sworn in, and two months before Parliament convened following the 2006 federal election, Stephen Harper announced the Senate appointment of Michael Fortier. And while there was plenty of outrage over Harper's first (if far from his last) breach of a promise not to appoint unelected Senators, I don't recall there being any serious question raised as to whether the appointment also went beyond what a new government leader could do before confirming his support in the House of Commons.

That said, it's worth asking the question now: should any major appointments by a new minority government be deferred until after it's established that it can win a vote of confidence in Parliament?

On simplified procedures

Following up on this post, let's also note how the right answer from Canada's opposition parties could combine with the seeming agreement between the major party leaders as to the "most seats first" principle to take nearly all of the guesswork out of a post-election minority Parliament.

Again, the range of possible outcomes absent some consensus between the parties as to what should happen next would be virtually infinite. The Cons would be entitled to hang onto power without meeting Parliament for an extended period of time, and could play all kinds of games in seeking to avoid votes even after reconvening it. And even if Stephen Harper stepped down willingly, there would be potential for mischief and confusion among the other parties: would anybody want to see the result if, say, Justin Trudeau followed a distant third-place finish by declaring that he wouldn't support anybody else, but would be willing to govern if somebody else propped the Libs up?

But "yes" answers from the NDP and Libs to the two questions would resolve effectively all of those issues, particularly if it was taken as agreed that the first (and follow-up) chance to govern would go to the party with the most seats.

If a majority of MPs in the House had resolved to vote down the Harper Cons at the first opportunity, there would be no purpose to any attempt to drag out the process. And if the opposition parties had agreed that the leader of the party with more seats would receive at least the initial opportunity to become PM with the other's support, then there would be no fear of post-election games in determining who (if anybody) could win the confidence of the House - leaving any post-election negotiations to the question of what policies to pursue after a throne speech had passed and a new government was in place.

Unfortunately, we can't take for granted what the answers would actually be. But it's well worth seeing if we can get the parties promising change to at least agree on a clean process to achieve it.

On practical changes

One of the main attacks on the NDP's election platform has been the question of what support there is for the constitutional change required to abolish the Senate. But it's worth distinguishing between the relatively limited constitutional role actually mandated for the Senate which requires following the constitutional amendment formula, and other past practices and historical expenses which should be subject to change in relatively short order based on existing Senate precedents.

On that front, let's take a closer look at Kady O'Malley's criticism of Thomas Mulcair:

(F)or the time being – and, most likely, at least, the short to medium-term political future – the Senate will continue to exist. As the Supreme Court has made supremely clear, changing that reality via abolition would require the unanimous consent of the provinces, which has thus far appeared elusive
That means it will continue to have a role in the legislative process, no matter how many baleful glances an incoming NDP government might aim in its general direction.

Contrary to Mulcair’s comments this week, that role is not, in fact, to simply sit quietly and wait for the House of Commons to send over a stack of bills for automatic approval, but to review – and, if it should see fit, amend, and in some instances, vote down – legislation, including, but not limited to, proposals put forward under the aegis of a duly elected government.

On the most basic level, that necessitates, at the very least, the designation by the government of a senator to do precisely that: introduce bills that have been passed by the House of Commons — a role traditionally undertaken by the Leader of the Government in the Senate, the post that Mulcair has now pledged not to fill.

Without at least one sitting senator — newly appointed, or recruited from the current selection — to serve the emissary of the executive, bills duly passed by the House of Commons would simply pile up outside the Chamber like so much undeliverable mail.

Once those bills were added to the Senate to-do list, of course, it would be left to the occupants to decide how – and when – to proceed with government business, which is typically shepherded through the pipeline by the Senate government leader.

In the absence of such a taskmaster, it’s not clear who, precisely, would set the daily schedule.

It's true that the post of Leader of the Government has historically existed and has been incorporated into current Senate rules and practices, with one of the responsibilities including the management of the government's agenda. But unlike the bare existence of the Senate, those rules and practices are subject to change without any necessity of getting into discussion of the constitution.

Moreover, there's ample precedent for legislation being considered by the Senate in the absence of a formal connection (partisan or otherwise) between the bill's sponsors in the House of Commons and the Senate. Bills introduced by NDP, Green, Bloc or independent MPs who lack a partisan link to the Senate which pass in the House are already regularly brought before the upper chamber and dealt with in accordance with its standard legislative review process.

To date, that's generally been the result of senators agreeing to sponsor individual bills on a one-off basis. But when the track record suggests that the Senate customarily doesn't stand in the way of at least reviewing legislation duly passed by the House, there's no reason to think the upper chamber will suddenly see itself as having the right to systematically ignore legislation passed by elected representatives when it reflects a government's agenda rather than private members' bills.

It could be that a process to ensure that an NDP government's bills proceed will be the result of one Senator volunteering to serve as a primary liaison for the executive without seeking the title (and added pay/expense) that comes with the formal Leader of the Government post. Or it could be that government bills would be introduced and managed through some other system - which could involve agreement between the NDP and one or more Senators, or simply an institutional choice among Senators themselves. But the most likely outcome of the NDP's plan would be for the Senate to recognize its responsibility to facilitate the passage of government legislation - as has happened in the past when an opposition party has retained a majority in the Senate, and thus the theoretical ability to obstruct the elected government's agenda.

That said, it's fair enough to note that if all of the current Senators adopt the position that they're unwilling to work with the NDP (or indeed any government), then something would need to be done to move government legislation through the upper chamber. At that point, Mulcair would have two key options.

First, he could break at least part of the logjam with his own appointments in response to that radical change from the Senate itself. But note that any plan to appoint new senators in the near future would itself fall short of giving the NDP enough votes to actually pass legislation if the remaining Cons and Libs insist on obstructing.

Alternatively, he could highlight the obstruction of unelected Senators to rally support for abolition. And if unelected Con and Lib Senators alike consider themselves entitled to prevent an elected government from doing its job in numbers sufficient to prevent Mulcair from passing any legislation, then the case for constitutional change will become much more compelling even to the premiers who might have their own political reasons to reject it when that conflict doesn't yet exist.

Wednesday Morning Links

Miscellaneous material for your mid-week reading.

- Ian Welsh discusses how our problems with poverty and inequality arise out of artificial scarcity:

We either already have excess capacity or we have the ability to create more than people need of all necessities.

This includes housing, food and clothing.  We still have enough water, globally, if we are wiling to be smart about how we use it, and in those areas where there are geographical problems they can be solved, in general IF we are willing to be a bit flexible in how we grow our food.
...
We are also short of security.  This is another artificial shortage, though harder to fix.  But most countries which have been destroyed recently were destroyed in large part because of outside intervention: whether Western, Eastern or Jihadi.  We are in a cycle of blowback after blowback, with the first step being to stop doing things that will cause devastation.

Education is unequally spread throughout the world, but this is another problem which is solveable: we have the books, which cost cents to reproduce, the telecom networks are almost everywhere, and we can train the teachers. If we wanted to spend more money on teachers and less on finance, we wouldn’t have a problem.
...
Oh, and the shortage of spare time for so many; with the shortage of work for others?  Completely socially constructed.  We are doing too much of the wrong kinds of work, and too little of the right kinds of work, and those choices are also social.

Scarcity in the end goods humans need most is almost always, in the modern world, artificial: a social choice.

- Thomas Kochan writes about the importance of a new living wage norm in ensuring a more fair economy, while recognizing that any change will need time to take effect. And the International Labour Organization studies the connection between inequality, economic stagnation and a reduced labour share of income.

- Jeff Sallot rightly points out that blowing things (and people) up is not a solution to a humanitarian crisis. And Mitchell Anderson writes that one of the main factors exacerbating the refugee crisis in the Middle East is climate change which the Cons refuse to try to fight.

- Michael Plaxton examines the caretaker convention which is supposed to limit the exercise of power by a government whose support can't be demonstrated. And Kady O'Malley rightly challenges the spin that "most seats" is the only relevant question in determining which leader gets a chance to form government. But Leonid Sirota wonders whether agreement among the leaders who are in a position to seek the confidence of the House of Commons might itself change the conventions as they stand.

- Finally, Warren Bell reminds us of Robocon as another scandal which should ensure people are motivated to vote out the Harper Cons. And of course, that abuse of democracy is particularly important given the likelihood that Harper and company will try to cheat in yet another election.

On settled issues

As Dan Gardner points out, Stephen Harper is continuing to misrepresent the nature of Canada's system of government. But he's nonetheless made a noteworthy concession in doing so:

PM: HERE'S THE QUESTION THOUGH. UM IS IT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION TO MAKE THAT WHICHEVER PARTY ENDS UP, IF WE'RE IN A MINORITY SITUATION, WHICHEVER PARTY ENDS UP WITH THE MOST SEATS SHOULD FORM THE GOVERNMENT?

SH: Yeah that's my – that's I think how conventionally our system works and for good reason and that's – that's my position. Obviously our view is we're going to win and we're going to win strong. Ah but ah my position has always been if we win the most seats I will expect to form the government and if we don't, I won't.

PM: SO EVEN AS THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, IS YOU'RE JUST A COUPLE OF SEATS BEHIND, YOU WOULDN'T TRY TO FIGURE OUT A WAY TO –

SH: No. No.

PM: YOU WOULD RESIGN.

SH: Yeah. Well I would not serve as prime minister. No I think you – you have to have the most seats in Parliament to go to the governor general and that's – you know, in this country in our system, we have what's called a Westminster style system, um and we don't – we don't, you know, elect a bunch of parties who then as in some countries, get together and decide who will – who will govern. We ask people to make a choice of a government. And so I think that the party that wins the most seats should form the government.

Now, the Cons have a history of turning their campaign promises into something far short of enforceable commitments once it counts. And so I'd still be concerned about the prospect of Harper trying to move the goalposts if it suits his interests.

But Harper seems to have conceded publicly that the range of interpretations as to what happens if no party holds a majority involves only a contest as to the relative importance of the ability to win a majority in the House of Commons as compared to a party's claim to a plurality of seats - suggesting that he at least isn't willing to defend the other mechanisms he could use to cling to power no matter how resounding an election defeat his party faces. And while it hopefully won't be necessary to point back to that acknowledgement, Harper's public position now should make it clear to the Governor General and the public that Harper would have no legitimacy whatsoever if he tries to reverse course later.

Sunday Morning Links

This and that for your Sunday reading.

- Louise Arbour's interview with The House includes both her compelling criticisms of both the Cons' terror bill, and the Libs' failure to stand up against C-51. And the Canadian Press reports on Justin Trudeau's continued fecklessness, as he won't even take a position on whether the bill is constitutional after having ordered his party to support it.

- Crawford Kilian writes that while it's too late to atone for the death of Alan Kurdi, we should have no hesitation in making sure the same doesn't happen to other people we can help. Doug Saunders highlights three mistakes we're too prone to make in answering the needs of refugees. And Susan Delacourt rightly notes that voters can be more than spectators in ensuring that refugees find a home.

- But of course, it's also worth looking back to see how the current crisis came to pass. On that front, Lee Berthiaume reports that it was the Cons who passed the rule which they now point to as an excuse for denying entry to Kurdi's relatives (and which continues to operate as a barrier to Syrian refugees). Bruce Johnstone points out that the refugee crisis merely reflects the Cons' general dearth of will to assist anybody and a lack of competence, while Martin Lukacs writes that Kurdi's case is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the damage the Cons have done.

- Elly Alboim notes that the refugee crisis represents a clear test as to whether our political parties are willing and able to respond to important new events in the course of a campaign. Chantal Hebert points out that the Cons aren't the least bit interested in learning from their mistakes, or indeed deviating a word from their existing anti-humanitarian script. And Robin Sears sees that line of attack as the epitome of heartless and mindless message control at the expense of people's lives.

- Finally, Andrew Coyne reminds us that there are many questions as to what will happen in the aftermath of an election result which leaves any room for interpretation - which should serve as motivation to make sure Stephen Harper has absolutely no argument to remain in power.

On transitions

Bob Hepburn makes clear that while the Libs may still be in denial about the importance of cooperating to remove the Harper Cons from power, their best friends in the media are under no such illusions. But the most noteworthy contribution to Canada's discussion about post-election options comes from Aaron Wherry - particularly in highlighting what factors have, and have not, been taken into account in determining who gets a chance to form government:

(A) Progressive Conservative government in Ontario in 1985 was defeated in the legislature and replaced by a Liberal government that had signed a governing accord with the NDP caucus. Interestingly, it is recounted in this piece for Canadian Parliamentary Review that when the defeated premier, Frank Miller, tendered his resignation with Ontario’s lieutenant-governor, he advised that an alternative was prepared to govern: “It would appear that the Honourable Leader of the Opposition is able to gain the confidence of the House at this time.”

The lieutenant-governor of the day, John Black Aird, then issued a statement to explain the change:

In my capacity as Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario and as the representative of Her Majesty the Queen in Ontario, I have this day asked Mr. David Peterson to form a government, he having assured me that he can form a government which will have the confidence of the Legislative Assembly for a reasonable length of time.

On the advice of counsel with whose opinions I agree, I have advised Mr. Peterson that the agreement between the Liberal Party and the New Democratic Party, a copy of which had been delivered to me, has no legal force or effect and that it should be considered solely as a joint political statement of intent and that the agreement cannot affect or impair the powers or privileges of the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario nor of the members of the Legislative Assembly.

Wherry goes on to note that there are also two precedents in which alternative governments might have had the opportunity to form government without the consent of the incumbent: the federal Parliament in 1980 when other parties did not seek the opportunity to replace Joe Clark's PCs (who had already won a confidence vote), and again in 2004 when no confidence vote was brought against Paul Martin's Libs. And there's one example of a party actually finishing second in seats and forming government over the objections of the incumbent which had lost a confidence vote (that being Saskatchewan's legislature in 1929).

But the review of the historical record suggests a few points to keep in mind. The Governor General actually holds a great deal of discretion in determining what factors matter in assessing an incumbent's request for dissolution and/or the right to continue governing - with a previous confidence vote and a signed agreement encompassing a majority of representatives being less than determinative (if significant at all) on their own. And the transition process (like so many other aspects of our system of governance) relies in substantial part on the good faith of the leaders involved in assessing their prospects of winning Parliament's support, which we can't take for granted from Harper.

All of which means that we shouldn't consider a seeming defeat for the Cons - whether the loss of a majority or a drop in the party standings - to completely close the door on Harper clinging to power. And we should thus stay motivated to make sure the electorate's verdict leaves Harper and the Governor General no choice but to allow for a transfer of power.

The secret platform

It never figured to take long for the Cons to start making up numbers for lack of any legitimate criticism of the NDP's platform - and Jason Kenney has charged into the breach. But it's worth noting the source of many of the supposedly-costed items, which consist of NDP MPs' committee reports.

To be clear, committee reports represent an important contribution in Parliament's governance of public policy. And what makes them stand out is that fact that they offer independent review by representatives tasked with assessing particular issues - who can then be expected to reach their own conclusions on the optimal solutions for those issues in a vacuum.

But because reports are necessarily focused on specific areas of review, they can't generally be taken as a statement of the decisions which a party might make in balancing competing priorities. And that's exactly where voters normally have reason to look to a party's platform as an integrated set of policy choices for the next term of office - and to ignore any attempt to let opposition parties treat committee reports as a substitute.

That said, there is one exception which is only highlighted by Kenney's stance.

It's well-known (and recently confirmed) that due to the meddling of Stephen Harper's PMO, Conservative caucus members - MPs and Senators alike - don't have the freedom to conduct independent reviews of legislation or policy choices that we'd expect from the rest of our parliamentarians. And so it's probably fair to treat the Cons' committee reports as reflecting Stephen Harper's judgment - a conclusion which is only reinforced by his right hand man in saying he consideres other parties' representatives' reports to be party policy.

That means that Harper is on the hook to answer for, say, the proposals from his Senate caucus to pursue government certification of imams, or to gut the CBC. And the opposition parties may want to take a far closer look at the Cons' committee reports as the campaign progresses - since no less a figure than Jason Kenney considers them to be part of his party's platform.

On biased decisions

It shouldn't come as much surprise that the Duffy trial has revealed that the Harper Cons sought to make the Senate as subservient to the PMO as the Cons' trained seals in the House of Commons:

Mr. Rathgeber said the PMO staffers’ handling of the situation was all too familiar and speaks to a “culture of invincibility” among some of the PMO staff.

“It’s shocking, but it validates everything I’ve ever said about their modus operandi. They have no ethical, or sometimes legal, boundaries and I would say without any doubt that a Senate report into expenses is a higher level of improper interference but that level of micromanagement goes on in House of Commons reports all the time,” he said.

Opposition members have long alleged that since the Conservatives have had a majority on every committee since 2011, no committee report is tabled until the PMO signs off on it.

“There is no part in the Ottawa bubble that they think is beyond their reach or their ability, quite frankly, to manipulate or control,” said Mr. Rathgeber.

“The fact that Parliament is supposed to be independent from the government and is supposed to be a check on the government is completely perverted in their view. They don’t see Parliament, either the House of Commons or the Senate, as being a check on executive power. They see the government caucus as an extension of PMO communications and their rubber stamp.”
...
Mr. Beardsley said that near the end of his time in the PMO he could see a shift toward the office “tightening up” and becoming more proactive in its “micromanagement” of issues. He has looked through the emails himself and considers them proof of what was speculated about the change in management under the succession of chiefs of staff leading up to Mr. Wright.

Nor should it come as much surprise that the Cons' political direction has been based on developing excuses to reach a desired outcome, rather than actually applying rules as they stand.

But it's worth highlighting what that combination means for one of their primary attacks on the NDP.

Remember that the only decision-making body which has claimed to find a problem the NDP's parliamentary offices is the uber-secretive Board of Internal Economy - a committee of MPs with a Con majority.

The NDP has gone out of its way to have somebody evaluate its actions other than MPs acting as puppets for the PMO. And the Cons have refused any such neutral assessment.

So let's ask: is there any reason to think the BOIE's Con members operated under anything other than the PMO's instructions in sitting in judgment of a political opponent? And if not, shouldn't the Duffy scandal tell us everything we need to know as to whether that judgment is based on anything more than Stephen Harper's politically-motivated orders?

On delay tactics

Following up on this post, let's look in a bit more detail as to how the Cons might try to make excuses for a delay in this fall's expected federal election - and why they might be happy to use the more questionable means to do so.

As noted in the previous post, the fixed election date set in October was set by an act of Parliament, and could easily be changed through the same process given the Cons' well-whipped majorities in both chambers. So why then might Stephen Harper prefer to ignore or flout legislation rather than changing it?

Let's start by asking what factors might stand to work in the Cons' favour during a campaign whenever it arises.

From an issue standpoint, there doesn't seem to be much room for doubt that barring some miraculous, pork-based turnaround on the economy, the Cons' lone remaining perceived strong point is security. Their only extended stay atop public opinion polls in the last few years came about in the wake of security concerns last fall. And if they do decide to delay the election, I'd expect that plan to be based on either the hope that somebody will hand them a crisis to be seen responding to, or the expectation that they can manufacture a threat.

But given that the Cons' message (embodied in C-51 among other actions) that democratically-elected officials can't be trusted with security, I'm not sure they'd want to send the message that Parliament should make the call as to what trumped-up threat would explain a delayed election. Nor would they likely want to saddle their MPs with having to explain votes against the same election date they previously approved.

Instead, any decision to delay the election would fit best with the Cons' expected core message if it's made solely by Stephen Harper, coupled with the theme that Canadians should take his word for what's best for them.

Of course, there would surely be a backlash against a decision to delay an election that way. But I'm not sure the Cons would much object to that: in fact they'd likely point to easily-foreseen protests as evidence of instability to rationalize the delay after the fact, and also focus further public attention on the Cons' issue of choice.

Again, it will likely be some time before we see whether Harper decides to follow his own law. But it's not hard to see how a legally-dubious executive action to ignore it could fit into the Cons' wider strategy - and we should be prepared to make sure that course of action isn't rewarded.

On rewriting

There's plenty of justified outrage over Stephen Harper's unelected Senate lapdogs choosing to tear up the Parliamentary rule book to force through an attack on unions in the form of Bill C-377. But I'm wondering whether the procedural move used to end debate might itself affect the validity of the bill.

On that front, is there any precedent for a bill becoming law after being passed as a private member's bill in one chamber, but as a government bill in the other given that both chambers have specific rules governing the review and approval of each type of bill?

And if not, isn't there an argument to be made that even if C-377 passes on the Cons' artificial terms in the Senate, it then won't have been approved at all in the House as a government bill?

(Meanwhile, I'd also be curious as to what other procedural options are available if the Senate opposition wants to push back against the holding of a vote. But hopefully those are under close examination already.)

On democratic blockages

I've previously pointed out a few of the worrisome ways in which the Cons might try to cling to power after the next federal election even if they'd stand to lose any fairly run confidence vote.

But let's add one more which the Cons have now publicly sanctioned: security "slippage" which has the potentially convenient effect of preventing MPs from voting in Parliament.