The easy (solution) is to give MPs the great protection that electors have -- a secret ballot. Now, that would put the cat amongst the pigeons. The rule would remain that the government would only be obliged to resign on a budget matter or one accepted as a "confidence" motion. And what's the argument against this again?Now, Mair's argument is itself somewhat inaccurate. Parliamentary votes are recorded regardless of whether or not a particular MP follows the party line, and there are circumstances where MPs do wind up voting contrary to orders. (Indeed, one of the best indicators as to how a party treats a plurality of views can be found in its handling of whipped votes.)
It has been pointed out that under this option, we won't know how our MPs voted. But we only know that under our present system because the MP must always vote as he is told.
If we, as a society, consider that regular people ought to be able to cast their votes free from outside pressure, promises of rewards, and penalties, why would we deny that same protection to those we elect to speak for us?
The more important point, though, is Mair's calculation as to the relative priorities of top-down and bottom-up influences on MPs. In his view, it's worth trading off the ability of Canadian voters to hold MPs accountable for their votes in Parliament if that means simultaneously removing the power of party leaders to do the same. And I can certainly see reason to wonder whether the net result would be an improvement on the status quo.
But it's worth asking just what that trade-off means. Have we really reached the point where we're better off sacrificing our own ability to make informed decisions about our MPs in the hope that they'll produce better results if they don't have to answer quite as directly to party leaders? And if so, then isn't there some serious need to change the party system for its effects both inside and outside of Parliament?
In addition, there are serious questions as well as to what results would come of secret-ballot voting in Parliament. Isn't it likely that such a system would make party leaders all the more controlling at the candidate nomination stage in an effort to ensure party loyalty when it comes time to vote? And wouldn't such a system be ripe for manipulation by candidates who could get elected promising to vote one way in order to put themselves in a position to secretly vote the opposite?
Fortunately, there are some means available to restrict party leaders' ability to impose discipline from on high without simultaneously eliminating any ability on the part of citizens to hold legislators to account for their votes. And I for one would much prefer to be able to reward any legislator who casts his or her vote in favour of such an effort - rather than having to wonder whether an MP's words on the campaign trail bear any resemblance to his or her votes in practice.
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