On rationalizations

Glen Pearson offers an inside look at the excuses which Michael Ignatieff offered up to try to explain his decision to leave Stephen Harper in power. But however much Pearson and others try to play up Ignatieff's argument, the rationalization doesn't stand up to even slight scrutiny.

Let's start with what Ignatieff recognized to be the upsides of expressing non-confidence in the Harper Cons:

He argued that if he brought down the government by voting down the budget, certain short-term goals would be achieved. We would be government. He would be Prime Minister. We would be able to more correctly invest those kind of monies. All of this is true.

Consider this the starting point: Ignatieff rightly recognized that in addition to meeting the Libs' political goals, a change in government would also have led to better management and a more effective stimulus package. Which means that in voting with the Cons, the Libs would be punishing vulnerable Canadians for their party's unwillingness to bring about positive change.

So what could possibly justify pushing ahead with that strategy?

Then he challenged us to think of a larger dynamic, one that eventually won the day. A coalition, he offered, would be the final nail in the coffin for any hopes of national unity. The West would want out. Quebec would be an unknown factor. And Canadians as a whole, excepting those constituency groups that would have been served by the coalition, would be ushered into an era of great national uncertainty again. The markets, so requiring of stability right now, would respond with alarm and alacrity. His arguments continued for a time yet.

Now, part of the problem with Ignatieff's position is implicit in his concern about a division between "those constituency groups that would have been served by the coalition" and - well, everybody else. Surely as the Prime Minister in charge of the coalition, Ignatieff would have been in a position to resolve not to resort to Con-style divide-and-conquer politics as the national response to an economic crisis. And the fact that Ignatieff doesn't think he could have governed in the national interest under a coalition should provide reason for suspicion about how he'd plan to exercise power in the future.

Aside from that warped view of the coalition, though, the underlying theme of Ignatieff's position positively begs to be refuted.

First, there's the national unity canard which the Cons have played up from day one of the coalition. But there are a couple of serious problems with the argument.

For all the Con-led bleating about anger in the West, the reality is that when the coalition issue first emerged in the public eye, even Con strongholds featured more active support for the coalition than for continued Harper government. And there's been no indication of any real growth in the ever-marginal Western separatist movement as a result of the coalition.

Instead, the only evidence to suggest such a threat has been a self-serving assertion from the Cons and their supporters. And it's hard to see how the prospect of a coalition government would offer any substantial change in the factors which would seemingly give rise to such a movement compared to events which have already happened - i.e. Con sweeps or near-sweeps in Western provinces which are still insufficient to result in the party forming government.

In contrast, there's exactly one province which has seriously threatened separation in the past. And it's Harper's attacks on Quebec which both boosted the political fortunes of the PQ provincially, and led the Bloc to start re-emphasizing separatism in light of the Libs' willingness to leave Harper in power.

Which means that to the extent national unity based on separatist movements could be a concern, Ignatieff's decision to keep Harper in power only exacerbated the dangers. And the fact that Ignatieff could present the reaction of the province which has most broadly supported the coalition as an "unknown factor" to justify killing it off should highlight just how disingenuous his argument was.

So much for how Ignatieff helped to reignite the risk of Quebec separation. But what about unity and stability in a broader social sense, based on possible disruption in Canada as it stands rather than the threat of regional separation?

Ignatieff's argument seems to be predicated on the idea that if the Cons and their supporters weren't likely to favour a coalition, then the result could be some enduring dispute which ought to be avoided. But again, there's absolutely no reason to think that the Cons' reaction to the current coalition will be any different from their response to any other legitimate process which might remove them from power.

In effect, Ignatieff's argument is that as long as the Cons hold Canada hostage by threatening to throw wrenches into the national machinery if they're removed from office, the country is best served by letting them have their way. And it's not hard to see how making that view part of the Libs' guiding philosophy could have disastrous results for them and for the country at large.

Finally, there's the question of political and economic stability. There, one has to compare the results of a coalition with the path actually pursued by Ignatieff.

After all, a coalition government would on its face have been able to offer political stability for at least a year and a half. And whatever risk there might be of the coalition crumbling before that point would have been counterbalanced by the formal agreement among the current opposition parties.

In contrast, Ignatieff's amendment to the budget serves only to create even more confidence showdowns under the current Parliament: in addition to the Cons likely reverting to form in trying to pass their own hard-right agenda once the budget has passed, they'll also be able to test the Libs' willingness to vote them down several more times over the next year. And for the confidence votes to come, there won't be any credible threat of a coalition to keep the Cons in line.

Needless to say, the political uncertainty which the Libs have continued doesn't figure to be a plus for the markets, for investors or for anybody else. Which means that Ignatieff's decision results in the Libs trading a temporary illusion of stability for continued brinksmanship and uncertainty during the time when the economy actually needs to recover.

Now, it seems doubtful that Pearson or anybody else within the Libs who supported the coalition would have avoided considering those same issues over the course of the last couple of months. But the fact that the Libs were willing to take a warmed-over serving of stale Con talking points as their justification to avoid offering Canadians better government when they need it most can only signal that they're not about to offer any meaningful change from where Harper is currently taking the country.