The Candidate
At a time when the Saskatchewan NDP was going through its lowest levels of enthusiasm in ages, Yens Pedersen was one party member who stepped up. In the 2007 election, he ran against a well-known municipal figure and nearly holding a Regina South seat which figured to be a tough battle for the NDP. At the 2008 convention he took over the party's presidency, only to step down in the fall when he started talking publicly about making the leadership his next goal.
In fact, Pedersen was the one eventual candidate who spoke publicly about the race before the new year, and became the second one in the contest in January 2009. But in retrospect, one has to wonder whether Pedersen nonetheless waited too long to get into the race.
The Strategy
While each of the other candidates apparently waited to have a solid base of organizational support before entering the race (even if Ryan Meili's didn't include much of the party establishment), all indications seem to be that Pedersen took the plunge in large part based on the hope that support would soon follow. Which might not have proved to be a disadvantage if he'd been alone in the race to try to build support as the only "anybody but Lingenfelter" candidate.
Instead, though, Pedersen's entry into the race was followed in short order by Higgins and Meili - both of whom were able to bring high-profile endorsements with them in relatively short order. And that's left Pedersen looking particularly lonely for lack of any endorsements that he's seen fit to highlight.
Not that Pedersen hasn't managed to make his presence felt in the race - by raising issues, inserting himself into the media narrative on others, and connecting with a substantial number of supporters. And he's consistently held his own when the candidates have shared the same stage.
But in the absence of others willing to lend their reputations to his campaign, Pedersen has been left with the steepest hill of any of the candidates. And while Pedersen has done his best to seek out voter pools that the others may have missed, there isn't much reason to think he's going to be able to make the climb on his own.
The Result
So what can Pedersen do to win? At this point, the answer looks to be that there isn't much of a path to victory that doesn't involve a total collapse or two among the other candidates.
That will leave Pedersen with a choice as to how to handle the rest of the campaign. On the one hand, he can try to make high-controversy, potentially high-reward moves to get his name into the public eye - even if that means alienating other factions within the party. But it's hard to see that being a winning move - and it may only serve to make it more difficult to capitalize even if another candidate does stumble and create an opening.
Which means that the better option for Pedersen looks to be to build as much support as he can around the margins without making enemies for himself out of the current contest. And if that leads to his taking a cabinet position under another leader grateful for his contributions to the party and to the race, then Pedersen may have an easier time attracting followers if be makes another run for the leadership in the future.
Showing posts with label candidate checkpoints. Show all posts
Showing posts with label candidate checkpoints. Show all posts
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Ryan Meili Candidate Checkpoint - The Movement
The Candidate
At the start of the leadership race, Ryan Meili looked like an ideal candidate on paper. But regardless of what was on his resume, it was anybody's guess as to whether or not he'd be able to put together a successful campaign - and especially whether he'd manage to build support in a party where each of the other three candidates seemed to have some obvious connections.
Over the course of the campaign, Meili has managed to put those questions to rest, performing well enough on a personal level and on the debate circuit to bring in a substantial amount of support both within the NDP's inner circles and beyond.
That is, among those who have had a chance to meet or see him personally. But judging from what little polling is available, Meili still has a ways to go in getting his name known beyond those who have taken an active interest in the campaign. Which is hardly a bad position to be in at this stage of the race - but means there's plenty of work left to do in advance of the June convention.
The Strategy
In principle, a substantial part of Meili's appeal rested on the potential to carry out an Obama-style campaign, as I and others suggested early in the campaign. But despite his adoption of "community organizer" language along with a few other echoes of Obama's campaign, it's probably fair to say that Meili's model is quite different from the one that propelled Obama into the White House.
A couple of the major differences may arise out of the types of party systems involved. Meili has apparently spent a greater proportion of his time and effort on specific policy development rather than general themes. And in a system of strict party discipline, he hasn't extended his message of positive politics to the point of talking up bipartisanship.
But more interesting is an organization difference that looks to be largely a function of the resources involved. Obama had a year and a half to build on a national foundation put in place by Tom Daschle, and was able to dedicate huge amounts of time and money to training an army of volunteers. Not to mention that he was already at least moderately well-known among U.S. Democrats for his 2004 convention speech and work in the Senate.
In contrast, Meili has had to start nearly from scratch with far less time to work with. In some respects, that may have limited how much he's been able to do - but if anything, it may also make the movement for renewal and change that he's been able to build into an even more authentic expression of support.
The Result
But how far can that movement go in swaying relatively casual party members when it counts? That's the big remaining question which Meili's campaign will need to answer over the next month and a half. And the road may only get tougher from here on in.
While the Lingenfelter and Higgins campaigns will be able to spend their time trying to play up the relative merits of candidates who are relatively well known, Meili will still have to focus on introducing himself to members who haven't been following the race all that closely - and then persuade them to send their votes his way only after that task is carried out. Which means that there will be more work for Meili's volunteer-based organization to do over the next month.
And complicating matters even further, Meili can't count on a straightforward road through the convention even if he succeeds in his first goal of at least working his way ahead of Higgins. As I mentioned in my earlier post on Higgins' campaign, there would figure to be at least a reasonable number of Higgins first-ballot supporters who might switch to Lingenfelter on a later ballot. Which may mean that it won't be enough for Meili stay on the third ballot: instead, he'll likely need Lingenfelter's earlier-ballot support to top out the low 40s at most to push the odds into his favour by the end.
The bright side is that Meili may have already accomplished much of what I'd hoped to see done during the course of the leadership race: whatever the results in June, the movement that Meili has managed to build over the past few months has the potential to serve as the backbone of progressive politics in Saskatchewan for years to come. But it remains to be seen whether Meili will be able to overcome stalwarts past and present to win the leadership of the NDP now.
Edit: added tag.
At the start of the leadership race, Ryan Meili looked like an ideal candidate on paper. But regardless of what was on his resume, it was anybody's guess as to whether or not he'd be able to put together a successful campaign - and especially whether he'd manage to build support in a party where each of the other three candidates seemed to have some obvious connections.
Over the course of the campaign, Meili has managed to put those questions to rest, performing well enough on a personal level and on the debate circuit to bring in a substantial amount of support both within the NDP's inner circles and beyond.
That is, among those who have had a chance to meet or see him personally. But judging from what little polling is available, Meili still has a ways to go in getting his name known beyond those who have taken an active interest in the campaign. Which is hardly a bad position to be in at this stage of the race - but means there's plenty of work left to do in advance of the June convention.
The Strategy
In principle, a substantial part of Meili's appeal rested on the potential to carry out an Obama-style campaign, as I and others suggested early in the campaign. But despite his adoption of "community organizer" language along with a few other echoes of Obama's campaign, it's probably fair to say that Meili's model is quite different from the one that propelled Obama into the White House.
A couple of the major differences may arise out of the types of party systems involved. Meili has apparently spent a greater proportion of his time and effort on specific policy development rather than general themes. And in a system of strict party discipline, he hasn't extended his message of positive politics to the point of talking up bipartisanship.
But more interesting is an organization difference that looks to be largely a function of the resources involved. Obama had a year and a half to build on a national foundation put in place by Tom Daschle, and was able to dedicate huge amounts of time and money to training an army of volunteers. Not to mention that he was already at least moderately well-known among U.S. Democrats for his 2004 convention speech and work in the Senate.
In contrast, Meili has had to start nearly from scratch with far less time to work with. In some respects, that may have limited how much he's been able to do - but if anything, it may also make the movement for renewal and change that he's been able to build into an even more authentic expression of support.
The Result
But how far can that movement go in swaying relatively casual party members when it counts? That's the big remaining question which Meili's campaign will need to answer over the next month and a half. And the road may only get tougher from here on in.
While the Lingenfelter and Higgins campaigns will be able to spend their time trying to play up the relative merits of candidates who are relatively well known, Meili will still have to focus on introducing himself to members who haven't been following the race all that closely - and then persuade them to send their votes his way only after that task is carried out. Which means that there will be more work for Meili's volunteer-based organization to do over the next month.
And complicating matters even further, Meili can't count on a straightforward road through the convention even if he succeeds in his first goal of at least working his way ahead of Higgins. As I mentioned in my earlier post on Higgins' campaign, there would figure to be at least a reasonable number of Higgins first-ballot supporters who might switch to Lingenfelter on a later ballot. Which may mean that it won't be enough for Meili stay on the third ballot: instead, he'll likely need Lingenfelter's earlier-ballot support to top out the low 40s at most to push the odds into his favour by the end.
The bright side is that Meili may have already accomplished much of what I'd hoped to see done during the course of the leadership race: whatever the results in June, the movement that Meili has managed to build over the past few months has the potential to serve as the backbone of progressive politics in Saskatchewan for years to come. But it remains to be seen whether Meili will be able to overcome stalwarts past and present to win the leadership of the NDP now.
Edit: added tag.
Deb Higgins Candidate Checkpoint - The Comeback
The Candidate
On paper, Deb Higgins figured to start the Saskatchewan NDP leadership race solidly in second place. While she couldn't match Dwain Lingenfelter's head start, she was the only other candidate to have caucus endorsers from the beginning. And all expectations were that the rest of her campaign would similarly be near the head of the pack.
But as the weeks went by, it seemed like Higgins' campaign was in hibernation. Her initial web page was severely lacking in both design and content, and for at least a couple of days it was replaced with error messages or placeholders. And she didn't unveil much by way of endorsements or policies for at least a month after entering the race, leading to some question about how seriously she was taking the leadership campaign.
While it took some time, though, Higgins has since worked her way back toward the front of the pack. And indeed from the chances I've seen to see the leaders, I've reached the surprising conclusion that the one contender with recent cabinet experience - who on paper should have had plenty of strengths to start with but proportionally less ability to improve - has actually done the most to boost her campaign and her standing over the last month-plus. Having taken awhile to start saying anything of substance in the campaign, Higgins didn't take a back seat to anybody in her policy strength at the Regina leaders' debate in particular.
The Strategy
But where does Higgins go from here? I've noted a couple of possible themes for her campaign going forward. First and foremost, she needs to broaden her support beyond the present caucus and her strong riding - and organized labour presents the most obvious opportunity for her to add followers to help persuade undecided members over the next month and a half.
Then there's her Link-tweaking strategy, which seems like it may have missed the mark in at least one respect. While Higgins may well have hoped to turn the race into a one-on-one confrontation between the two putative frontrunners, Lingenfelter has preferred to avoid any direct confrontation - which makes for a logical response, since it isn't in his interest to accept his weaknesses as the battleground for the contest.
That said, Higgins still figures to be able to get at least some more mileage out of a similar strategy. Even if Lingenfelter doesn't respond directly, Higgins can still see some obvious benefit in raising doubts about him. And she'll surely be happy if she can turn the race into the two-person battle at the top which it once figured to be.
The Result
Despite her slow start to the race, Higgins has a fairly clear potential path to victory. But it depends on her finding the right balance between a couple of conflicting goals.
On the one hand, she needs to dampen Lingenfelter's support enough to make sure that he doesn't win on the first ballot. Which in principle should mean that she'd be relatively happy to see strong showings by the other two candidates in the race, while having little reason to reinforce any of Lingenfelter's messages.
But the ascent of Ryan Meili has raised another problem for Higgins. As a result of the momentum that he was able to build while Higgins's campaign was largely silent, there looks to be a serious possibility that Higgins could finish behind Meili on an early ballot. And that's particularly so if Yens Pedersen gets eliminated on the first ballot and throws his support to the other youth/renewal candidate on the second.
Which means that Higgins needs the help of Meili and Pedersen to hold Lingenfelter short of a majority on the first ballot, while needing to simultaneously ensure that their combined support doesn't exceed her own. As a result, she'll have to guess just right as to how to weigh an experience-based message that might reinforce Lingenfelter's strengths and increase the risk of a first-ballot romp against a renewal-based one that undercuts Link and boosts the younger candidates.
Mind you, if Higgins can thread that needle to get to a final ballot against Lingenfelter, then she probably is the challenger best positioned to sweep the support of the candidates below her.
After all, it's relatively plausible that some Higgins supporters who value her experience and past involvement - or whose primary loyalty is based on their experience with her personally rather than the principles at play in the race - might list Lingenfelter as a second choice. In contrast, there figure to be few if any reasons why a member would support Meili or Pedersen first that would suggest a final-ballot vote for Lingenfelter over Higgins.
So Higgins still has a path to victory from here. But one has to wonder how many regrets there are in her camp about the fact that her initial disadvantages have made the terrain far less certain.
Edit: added label.
On paper, Deb Higgins figured to start the Saskatchewan NDP leadership race solidly in second place. While she couldn't match Dwain Lingenfelter's head start, she was the only other candidate to have caucus endorsers from the beginning. And all expectations were that the rest of her campaign would similarly be near the head of the pack.
But as the weeks went by, it seemed like Higgins' campaign was in hibernation. Her initial web page was severely lacking in both design and content, and for at least a couple of days it was replaced with error messages or placeholders. And she didn't unveil much by way of endorsements or policies for at least a month after entering the race, leading to some question about how seriously she was taking the leadership campaign.
While it took some time, though, Higgins has since worked her way back toward the front of the pack. And indeed from the chances I've seen to see the leaders, I've reached the surprising conclusion that the one contender with recent cabinet experience - who on paper should have had plenty of strengths to start with but proportionally less ability to improve - has actually done the most to boost her campaign and her standing over the last month-plus. Having taken awhile to start saying anything of substance in the campaign, Higgins didn't take a back seat to anybody in her policy strength at the Regina leaders' debate in particular.
The Strategy
But where does Higgins go from here? I've noted a couple of possible themes for her campaign going forward. First and foremost, she needs to broaden her support beyond the present caucus and her strong riding - and organized labour presents the most obvious opportunity for her to add followers to help persuade undecided members over the next month and a half.
Then there's her Link-tweaking strategy, which seems like it may have missed the mark in at least one respect. While Higgins may well have hoped to turn the race into a one-on-one confrontation between the two putative frontrunners, Lingenfelter has preferred to avoid any direct confrontation - which makes for a logical response, since it isn't in his interest to accept his weaknesses as the battleground for the contest.
That said, Higgins still figures to be able to get at least some more mileage out of a similar strategy. Even if Lingenfelter doesn't respond directly, Higgins can still see some obvious benefit in raising doubts about him. And she'll surely be happy if she can turn the race into the two-person battle at the top which it once figured to be.
The Result
Despite her slow start to the race, Higgins has a fairly clear potential path to victory. But it depends on her finding the right balance between a couple of conflicting goals.
On the one hand, she needs to dampen Lingenfelter's support enough to make sure that he doesn't win on the first ballot. Which in principle should mean that she'd be relatively happy to see strong showings by the other two candidates in the race, while having little reason to reinforce any of Lingenfelter's messages.
But the ascent of Ryan Meili has raised another problem for Higgins. As a result of the momentum that he was able to build while Higgins's campaign was largely silent, there looks to be a serious possibility that Higgins could finish behind Meili on an early ballot. And that's particularly so if Yens Pedersen gets eliminated on the first ballot and throws his support to the other youth/renewal candidate on the second.
Which means that Higgins needs the help of Meili and Pedersen to hold Lingenfelter short of a majority on the first ballot, while needing to simultaneously ensure that their combined support doesn't exceed her own. As a result, she'll have to guess just right as to how to weigh an experience-based message that might reinforce Lingenfelter's strengths and increase the risk of a first-ballot romp against a renewal-based one that undercuts Link and boosts the younger candidates.
Mind you, if Higgins can thread that needle to get to a final ballot against Lingenfelter, then she probably is the challenger best positioned to sweep the support of the candidates below her.
After all, it's relatively plausible that some Higgins supporters who value her experience and past involvement - or whose primary loyalty is based on their experience with her personally rather than the principles at play in the race - might list Lingenfelter as a second choice. In contrast, there figure to be few if any reasons why a member would support Meili or Pedersen first that would suggest a final-ballot vote for Lingenfelter over Higgins.
So Higgins still has a path to victory from here. But one has to wonder how many regrets there are in her camp about the fact that her initial disadvantages have made the terrain far less certain.
Edit: added label.
Dwain Lingenfelter Candidate Checkpoint: The Collective Memory
With the end of the official candidate debates and (more importantly) the passing of the deadline to sign up new members, the Saskatchewan NDP leadership race now figures to be entering a new phase. But before that starts in earnest, I'll take some time to discuss how the campaign so far has gone for each of the candidates from my standpoint - as well as to toss in some armchair prognostication about how the campaign figures to go from here.
Not surprisingly, we'll start with Dwain Lingenfelter.
The Candidate
Lingenfelter's front-runner status in the race was never an accident, and by most indications he's stayed out in front so far. Having apparently made his decision to enter the race based on the promise of a strong volunteer and fund-raising base, he's put those advantages to good use to stay at or near the head of the pack in virtually every poll, survey or other means of measuring support.
And his time in the private sector doesn't seem to have hurt Lingenfelter's political skills. As Jason noted, Lingenfelter's public speaking has stood out from the pack to go with a thorough command of the underlying policies. And there isn't much doubt that he's kept up his ability to work a room or drive a media narrative.
But there's one additional factor in play that might deserve more attention than it's received. Simply put, it's worth asking why it is that Lingenfelter didn't have to doubt that it would be possible to line up volunteer and fund-raising strength.
The answer may not be obvious to those of us who weren't paying close attention to politics during Lingenfelter's formative political years. But while the younger set within the NDP may tend to see support for Lingenfelter as a matter of bandwagon-jumping or crass calculation, there's no lack of people within the party who built strong loyalties to him personally during the course of the fight against the Devine government. And that factor may go a long way to explaining some of the more curious moves by Link's campaign.
The Strategy
As I've noted, Lingenfelter seems to have largely abandoned his early-campaign effort to play everything to everyone by talking up renewal strategies and youth involvement. Instead, his campaign has focused almost entirely on taking up immediate opposition to the Wall government, and in so doing he's frequently brought up past fights which most would have considered to be behind the province.
But then, the fights surely aren't forgotten by those who participated in them. Which means that there's sure to be some latent willingness to buy into much the same message now. And that figures to be a largely untapped resource, as the circumstances surrounding the last leadership campaign (held while the NDP was in government) didn't much allow for a similar strategy.
If Lingenfelter can tap into the same opposition mindset that built the party to its early-'90s apex - spread by his loyalists through a population that surely hasn't forgotten the era entirely - then he'd naturally serve as the face of the effort. And when one considers that the NDP of that time was five times the size of the party now, that strategy would provide Lingenfelter with an obvious path to take up the mantle of leadership without having to attack his opponents in the process.
The Result
The problem, though, is that such a strategy is fairly limiting for the rest of the campaign. While Lingenfelter can likely move first-ballot support toward himself by accessing fond memories of NDP strength past, it's hard to see how that kind of focus will win him any significant later-ballot support.
Which makes Lingenfelter's campaign into somewhat of an all-or-nothing effort at this point: he'll either manage to draw on enough of the NDP's collective memory to win on the first ballot, or he'll find out too late that there's more of an appetite to work toward the future than there is unmet demand to repeat the past.
Not surprisingly, we'll start with Dwain Lingenfelter.
The Candidate
Lingenfelter's front-runner status in the race was never an accident, and by most indications he's stayed out in front so far. Having apparently made his decision to enter the race based on the promise of a strong volunteer and fund-raising base, he's put those advantages to good use to stay at or near the head of the pack in virtually every poll, survey or other means of measuring support.
And his time in the private sector doesn't seem to have hurt Lingenfelter's political skills. As Jason noted, Lingenfelter's public speaking has stood out from the pack to go with a thorough command of the underlying policies. And there isn't much doubt that he's kept up his ability to work a room or drive a media narrative.
But there's one additional factor in play that might deserve more attention than it's received. Simply put, it's worth asking why it is that Lingenfelter didn't have to doubt that it would be possible to line up volunteer and fund-raising strength.
The answer may not be obvious to those of us who weren't paying close attention to politics during Lingenfelter's formative political years. But while the younger set within the NDP may tend to see support for Lingenfelter as a matter of bandwagon-jumping or crass calculation, there's no lack of people within the party who built strong loyalties to him personally during the course of the fight against the Devine government. And that factor may go a long way to explaining some of the more curious moves by Link's campaign.
The Strategy
As I've noted, Lingenfelter seems to have largely abandoned his early-campaign effort to play everything to everyone by talking up renewal strategies and youth involvement. Instead, his campaign has focused almost entirely on taking up immediate opposition to the Wall government, and in so doing he's frequently brought up past fights which most would have considered to be behind the province.
But then, the fights surely aren't forgotten by those who participated in them. Which means that there's sure to be some latent willingness to buy into much the same message now. And that figures to be a largely untapped resource, as the circumstances surrounding the last leadership campaign (held while the NDP was in government) didn't much allow for a similar strategy.
If Lingenfelter can tap into the same opposition mindset that built the party to its early-'90s apex - spread by his loyalists through a population that surely hasn't forgotten the era entirely - then he'd naturally serve as the face of the effort. And when one considers that the NDP of that time was five times the size of the party now, that strategy would provide Lingenfelter with an obvious path to take up the mantle of leadership without having to attack his opponents in the process.
The Result
The problem, though, is that such a strategy is fairly limiting for the rest of the campaign. While Lingenfelter can likely move first-ballot support toward himself by accessing fond memories of NDP strength past, it's hard to see how that kind of focus will win him any significant later-ballot support.
Which makes Lingenfelter's campaign into somewhat of an all-or-nothing effort at this point: he'll either manage to draw on enough of the NDP's collective memory to win on the first ballot, or he'll find out too late that there's more of an appetite to work toward the future than there is unmet demand to repeat the past.
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