Saturday Morning Links

Assorted content for your weekend reading.

- Bruce Johnstone and the Star-Phoenix editorial board both join the voices decrying the Cons' decision to throw parliamentary democracy under their omnibus budget bill. And Gerald Caplan points out the Harper Cons' more general tendency to silence dissenting views:

(T)here’s little doubt the government was deliberately crippling many of Canada’s best and brightest, including many groups who upheld the country’s good reputation abroad that the Harper government was cavalierly undermining. In any event, the groups weren’t targeted because of their actual achievements, which were often exemplary.

Something entirely different was going on here. In the words of Amnesty International Canada’s Alex Neve, this was part of the government’s systematic “campaign against advocacy and dissent,” a campaign that has only deepened since last year’s majority election. And the message Stephen Harper was sending home from Europe was that there’s more to come. Your government is after dissidents, folks.
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There is a fundamental issue of democracy here. There should be no illusions about the almost unlimited power of a majority government in Canada. Barack Obama, the most powerful man in the world, has nothing like the unilateral power of Stephen Harper. It may have taken a little longer for the Prime Minister to pass his omnibus “budget” than he liked, but pass it will, as will everything else he wants to do. None of the defunded organizations will get their money back. None of the silenced watchdogs will get their voices back. Environmental groups will soon feel the full wrath of this petrol-fixated government.

- In keeping with this week's theme of recognizing the consequences of reckless resource development, Nicholas Kusnetz reports on the damage a poorly-regulated oil sector is inflicting on North Dakota:

According to data obtained by ProPublica, oil companies in North Dakota reported more than 1,000 accidental releases of oil, drilling wastewater or other fluids in 2011, about as many as in the previous two years combined. Many more illicit releases went unreported, state regulators acknowledge, when companies dumped truckloads of toxic fluid along the road or drained waste pits illegally.

- It's certainly interesting to see a few leading proponents of sabermetrics speaking out about how the philosophy can be applied to politics. But the most important point to be made is likely that there's more at stake in political strategy than one-time wins and losses:

James likened the idea of trying to win an election through get-out-the-vote drives as "analogous to trying to win a pennant race by doing better in the close games." A team that won 75 games and lost 87 over the course of a season could get to 90 wins if they changed their win-loss record in one-run games from 26-29 to 41-14.

"It can happen," James said. "But it's a lousy strategy."

"When people disagree with you, what you ultimately have to do is persuade people to agree with you -- period," he added. "You can't ultimately dodge defeat by winning close elections."

- Finally, pogge notes that the Cons' strategy of devolving power away from Parliament toward ministers' office hasn't given them quite as much room to govern without accountability as they seem to have hoped. And Dean Del Mastro, Con ethics spokesperson, is in yet more trouble.

Saturday Morning Links

Assorted content to end your year.

- Paul Krugman once again laments the determination of anti-government fundamentalists to avoid learning the lessons that should have become glaringly obvious over 70 years ago:

In declaring Keynesian economics vindicated I am, of course, at odds with conventional wisdom. In Washington, in particular, the failure of the Obama stimulus package to produce an employment boom is generally seen as having proved that government spending can’t create jobs. But those of us who did the math realized, right from the beginning, that the Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (more than a third of which, by the way, took the relatively ineffective form of tax cuts) was much too small given the depth of the slump. And we also predicted the resulting political backlash.

So the real test of Keynesian economics hasn’t come from the half-hearted efforts of the U.S. federal government to boost the economy, which were largely offset by cuts at the state and local levels. It has, instead, come from European nations like Greece and Ireland that had to impose savage fiscal austerity as a condition for receiving emergency loans — and have suffered Depression-level economic slumps, with real G.D.P. in both countries down by double digits.
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We entered 2011 amid dire warnings about a Greek-style debt crisis that would happen as soon as the Federal Reserve stopped buying bonds, or the rating agencies ended our triple-A status, or the superdupercommittee failed to reach a deal, or something. But the Fed ended its bond-purchase program in June; Standard & Poor’s downgraded America in August; the supercommittee deadlocked in November; and U.S. borrowing costs just kept falling. In fact, at this point, inflation-protected U.S. bonds pay negative interest: investors are willing to pay America to hold their money.

The bottom line is that 2011 was a year in which our political elite obsessed over short-term deficits that aren’t actually a problem and, in the process, made the real problem — a depressed economy and mass unemployment — worse.

- Which serves as reason why Mike Moffatt's Keltner list for public policy proposals might be worth a look in evaluating the effect of gratuitous austerity.

- Romeo Dallaire is optimistic that the popular movements that emerged in 2011 are just starting to have their ultimate effect.

- Josh Dorner notes that "progressive" is by far the best-received political label in the U.S. - offering an opportunity to use the spillover effect of U.S. political attitudes to the advantage of the Canadian left for a change.

- Finally, David Berlin views Jack Layton's legacy as including both the building of a winning attitude within the NDP, and the transformation of that mindset into what may be the effective end of Quebec separatist sentiment.

Friday Afternoon Links

- Dan Gardner's column offers a useful reminder of the role of luck in sports and political outcomes alike. But there are a couple of points worth some additional discussion.

First off, it's worth keeping in mind that while actual results will indeed vary based in large part on random events, actors in both spheres do have opportunities available to help turn the odds in their favour. And considering the real-world ramifications of political success or failure, it's remarkable that it may be in sports that more of that analysis has taken place.

At the same time, it's also worth noting that the political sphere lends itself far more readily to spin.

While there's no denying the score at the end of a sporting event (even if the means of getting there may be in controversy), political events short of election results leave room for all parties to claim victories for themselves and defeat for their opponents - and indeed there's a strong incentive for parties to claim all events as evidence of their own merit and their opponents' weakness. So political actors have reason not to publicly acknowledge that luck is at play even when it does have a major impact on events.

- In light of the Harper Cons' unfortunate success in limiting the amount of reporting on climate change issues, I won't let this story pass without a link:

The Department of Finance recommended over the spring that Harper lead by example and get rid of tax incentives that encourage oil and gas production.

But documents obtained by The Canadian Press, to be released in conjunction with the final G20 communique on Sunday, show the prime minister opted instead to reiterate actions taken in the past rather than volunteer any additional gestures.
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"If Canada undertakes no reforms, it would eliminate the need to co-ordinate action internationally, though justifying inaction could be challenging if others are taking action," says the March memo to Flaherty.

Sadly, the Cons managed to avoid that need for justification by ensuring that climate change wouldn't form a meaningful part of the G8/G20 discussion as long as they had control of the agenda. But the more important question is whether Canadians want a government so devoted to inaction in the first place.

- Meanwhile, the Cons' commitment to evidence-free policy-making shouldn't come as much surprise - even if the latest steps to restrict the collection of useful information are worth pointing out.

- Finally, A Tiny Revolution highlights John Ralston Saul's insights into the actual meaning of money and debt. But it's truly sad that in the time since Saul wrote the quoted passage, we've seen more and more public policy dictated by exactly the same arbitrary forces that form the target of Saul's critique.

On correlations

In trying to figure out exactly what factors play the greatest role in determining a party's electoral prospects, one of the thorniest problems is the difficulty in separating outcomes from each other. Virtually any positive result (more money, more members, more votes, more public attention) can plausibly be painted as either a cause or an effect of any other - making it difficult to determine what a party should focus on first in trying to build itself up.

Which makes bluegreenblogger's efforts to separate out the correlations between various factors with voting outcomes into a highly interesting read, even if they're based on a limited sample (riding results for Ontario Greens in 2007):

Correlation between spending and % Vote: 0.76573958
Correlation Between 2007 EDA Assets and %vote: 0.53411402
Correlation between Transfers into campaign and % vote: 0.72692593
Correlation between campaign contributions and % vote: 0.27744132
Correlation between spending and total votes: 0.75095156
Correlation between EDA assets and total votes: 0.57536407
Correlation between transfers into campaign and total votes: 0.6979957
Correlation between campaign contributions and total votes: 0.3293264

What strikes me as noteworthy about bluegreenblogger's findings is the difference in correlation between the factors which seem to reflect strength within a riding, and those which are based solely on party spending choices.

After all, two of the factors discussed would seem to speak to the support within a riding association: the existing asset base and the contributions received during the campaign. But these are the two factors with a lower correlation to vote outcomes - suggesting a relative disconnect between the strength of a riding association and electoral outcomes.

In contrast, the strongest correlation is between the raw amount spent by a riding association and the votes received. And it's particularly interesting that even "transfers" from outside a riding into campaign coffers appear to relate more closely to the votes received than do contributions from a riding's members.

Of course, it's worth wondering to what extent the effect might differ between parties or election types - or indeed whether the cause and effect may lie outside the transfer numbers. But to the extent the Ontario Greens' experience is representative of political parties in general, it could be that anybody wishing to maximize the bang for their donation buck might be best advised to fund a party's central coffers to be distributed where the money can do the most good.

Numbers based

In the wake of the U.S. election, all of the Canadian parties are understandably looking to mimic Barack Obama's successful campaign - and indeed I've suggested several ways in which the NDP can do just that. But let's note Ezra Klein's take on the underlying philosophy that seems to have worked so well, as the specific tactical choices which have received most of the attention were built on a foundation of data-driven decision-making - or as Klein puts it in language that I've tried to tie into Canadian politics before, a "Sabermetrics campaign".

Of course, as in baseball, there's still plenty of room for argument as to what indicators are most important in evaluating the success of a political operation. But the Obama campaign may reflect the first step in a shift from general reliance on the hunches of grizzled political veterans to far more widespread efforts to ground political decisions in empirical data - much as the same has happened in baseball's front offices over the past decade. And this may be one more lesson from Obama which could easily translate into an advantage for the Canadian party which works hardest to follow suit.

On spent forces

The Pundits' Guide offers a breakdown of party and candidate spending in last year's set of byelections. And the contrast between the parties which appear to have maxed out their potential and those which have room to grow may offer some important signs as to who has the best chance to improve its standing in future elections:

Only Conservative Party candidates spent > 75% of the candidate spending limits in each of the 3 ridings, and in total its candidates spent some 95% of the limit.

The Bloc spent >75% in 2 of the 3 ridings (total spending of 86% of the candidate limits), while the Liberals and NDP clearly concentrated on Outremont.

In addition to the $254,876 that could be spent by candidates across the 3 ridings, a registered party fielding 3 candidates in that set of by-elections could itself spend an additional $171,997 in support of those campaigns. The amounts spent are reported in Part 3a of the Registered Parties annual returns (you can find the details here, at the Elections Canada site, for the 2007 By-Elections; select the party you're interested in from their drop-down list once you get there).

Again, the Conservative Party spent 92% of its party by-election spending limit. However, interestingly it split the spending mainly between Roberval – Lac-Saint-Jean and Saint-Hyacinthe – Bagot, the two seats where they wound up being more competitive.

The Liberal Party spent just under half (46%) of its party by-election spending limit; and all but $3800 or so of that was put into Outremont.

The NDP spent 12% of its by-election spending limit, split equally between the three ridings.

Neither the Bloc nor the Green Party reporting (sic) any party-level spending on the three by-election campaigns.

So what do those numbers say about the parties' positions in Quebec? First off, it's worth noting that the Cons' reasonably strong performances in the two ridings previously held by the Bloc were both based on pouring in significantly more money than the Bloc did. And in Outremont, the Cons managed to see a drop in their share of the vote despite spending nearly as much as the other main parties. Which suggests that the Cons may have relatively little room for growth - particularly in a general election setting where the Bloc is better able to balance out the expenditures involved.

In contrast, the returns offer up what strikes me as a surprising fact about Thomas Mulcair's win in Outremont, as it was apparently achieved even at a financial disadvantage against his main competition. While Mulcair spent slightly more than Jocelyn Coulon at the candidate level, the Libs managed to outspend the NDP by tens of thousands of dollars of party money even while losing what was supposed to be a safe riding.

And that may be particularly significant based on the imminent by-election in neighbouring Westmount-Ville Marie. While the NDP once again faces the challenge of attacking a former Lib stronghold, the expense numbers suggest that the NDP actually has room to improve somewhat on its relative performance in Outremont - either if the NDP increases its own expenditures to match the Libs' level of spending, or if the Libs themselves can't afford to spend the kind of money they did in an effort to stop Mulcair.

No surprises

I, for one, couldn't be much less surprised to find out that one of the newest star American political analysts is also one of the leading figures in baseball's sabermetric movement. But is it too much to hope that the minds behind Hockey Analytics or Behind the Net could end up similarly revolutionizing the kind of information available in analyzing Canadian politics?

Political Sabermetrics III: Notes on Quebec

Much like in my previous post on the Atlantic provinces, let's take a quick look at some of the results from Quebec in the 2006 federal election which may come as somewhat of a surprise - as well as the party spending levels which helped to shape the results that developed.

- Let's start with Quebec's award for Largest Waste of Money, which goes to the Libs' John Khawand. In an effort to unseat the Bloc's Claude de Bellefeuille in Beauharnois—Salaberry, Khawand spent $80,757.87 - the fifth-highest reported total in Quebec, and trailing only Lib Liza Frulla for money put into a losing effort. But for that investment, Khawand finished a distant third...not only failing to take the seat from de Bellefeuille, but also finishing 11 points behind the low-budget ($7,922.81) Con campaign of David Couturier.

- That said, Khawand was far from the only candidate to spend a bundle to no avail...and while the Libs were the worst offenders in that category, the Bloc and Cons got into the act as well. Other candidates who finished third or worse while outspending all of their competition (at least based on the reports so far) included the Libs' Eric Cardinal in Drummond, Lib David Price in Compton—Stanstead, Lib Diane St. Jacques in Shefford, Lib Robert Fregeau in Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, Con Audrey Castonguay in Hochelaga (though the Libs' candidate's report isn't available), and Con Daniel Fournier in Outremont.

- Speaking of which, the Cons' reluctance to call a by-election in Outremont may have been based on more than just a desire to keep a likely opposition seat vacant, as the riding looks to be one of the Cons' more spectacular Quebec failures from 2006. Fournier outspent all of his rivals at $73,903.31, yet took under 13% of the vote to finish in fourth place. No wonder the Cons aren't eager to face the voters again - especially with the third-place finisher from 2006 looking to make a major step forward.

- Meanwhile, the title of best investment out of any Quebec candidate wasn't even close. Andre Arthur ensured himself plenty of public attention as the only independent candidate to win a race in 2006. But what's even more remarkable is that he won Portneuf—Jacques-Cartier while spending next to nothing - only $1,092.74, compared to the $47,506.77 spent by the Bloc's Guy Cote in trying to retain the seat. In contrast, better-funded independents in several ridings that I've reviewed so far haven't come close to Arthur's vote total.

- The lowest-budget riding in Quebec was Rivière-des-Mille-Îles, where nobody spent more than the $30,435.75 put in by Lib Fregeau. (The Greens' spending numbers aren't yet listed, but based on their spending elsewhere I'm pretty comfortable assuming they didn't lead the pack.) While the Bloc's Gilles Perron retained the riding with 53% of the vote, it seems entirely likely that there's a significant vacuum in election-time effort which could make the riding ripe for the picking - assuming that other parties don't also react to the lack of spending by flooding in.

- Turning to a party-by-party review, the Cons' resource management in Quebec seems to have been remarkably poor. The Cons spent a significant amount of money into Montreal with virtually nothing to show for it - managing to finish behind the Greens in one riding, and never coming within 11,000 votes of a seat. Meanwhile, a number of poorly-funded Cons managed to run a strong second around rural Quebec - suggesting that if the Cons had focused their money on what proved to be their most promising areas, they may have taken several more seats away from the Bloc.

Of course, that offers some opportunity for the Cons to expand their seat count in the next election. But it also suggests that the Cons' campaign wasn't anywhere near as flawless as reported - and that their vaunted election machine may have a long way to go in figuring out how to use the party's resources.

- For the Libs, it's clear that the party had a lot more money than public support near the end: while the party's spending totals were far beyond anybody else besides the Bloc, the funding simply wasn't enough to fight against the tide of voter dissatisfaction.

- The Bloc's spending numbers don't reveal much worthy of note: obviously the party didn't lack for ability to outspend its rivals in most ridings, and even the Bloc's money that didn't lead to seats tended to be relatively well-spent in seats where the party had a reasonable chance of winning.

- While I knew the NDP still had building to do in Quebec, I had wrongly assumed that it had been putting enough money into at least a few ridings to support a campaign capable of winning. Of the ridings disclosed so far, the party didn't spend more in any riding than the $28,015.97 invested in Pierre Laliberte's run in Hull-Aylmer. (By way of comparison, only Arthur and Perron managed to win seats while spending less.)

Of course, there's a flip side for the NDP in that there's plenty of room for growth. And indeed, there's probably a case to be made that the NDP's brand was at least as positive as the Libs' in Quebec in 2006. Comparing ridings where the two parties put in roughly equal investments (i.e. apparent non-priority ridings for both, primarily in Côte-Nord and Saguenay, Quebec City, Central Quebec, and Laurentides, Outaouais and Northern Quebec), the consistent pattern is one of the Libs' lead in votes (where one even existed) being significantly smaller than their advantage in spending. In 2006, the Libs' advantage in money and star power gave them a significant leg up - but with those gaps apparently narrowing, the NDP looks to be in great position to go toe-to-toe with the Libs.

- As for the Greens, I was surprised to note that even in the NDP's weakest area of the country, the Greens still couldn't top the Dippers' vote in a single riding - which now makes the five easternmost provinces where that holds true. And while the Greens' generally-lower investments surely played a part, the ridings where the NDP held its ground included several where the NDP itself spent nothing (or barely more than that)...hinting that the NDP's base level of support is simply higher across the board.

Political Sabermetrics II: Notes on Atlantic Canada

With the political scene quieting down for the summer, I'll be taking the opportunity to significantly bulk up my political sabermetrics series (with a little help from Elections Canada's financing database). For now, I'm only at the point of assembling the data needed for a more thorough analysis...but there are at least a few points worth noting based on the data from Atlantic Canada that I've put together so far.

- First, in what's both a cautionary note for the series generally and an important issue on its own, it seems that a surprising amount of candidate information isn't available on the Elections Canada reporting site. At least in the database I've worked from so far, data from the 2006 election is only available for roughly 1/2 to 2/3 of all candidates in each province I've looked at - which will leave plenty of holes in any attempt to connect funding to electoral results. And the issue doesn't seem to be one related to particular parties or candidate types: the missing information includes that from six sitting MPs representing all three national parties with a current place in Parliament. While some data may be missing, though, there's still more than enough to make for some interesting discussion.

- For example, the Atlantic award for Biggest Waste of Money goes to the Christian Heritage Party's Baird Judson, who managed to spend $5,346.77 in the Charlottetown riding to win a grand total of 97 votes. Despite his spending far more money than most small-party candidates, Judson's vote total was half the total of the Marijuana Party candidate in the riding, and indeed was the third-lowest of any candidate in the Atlantic provinces. The lowest vote total was that of Marxist-Leninist Charles Spurr in Dartmouth-Cole Harbour (56), with Labrador Green candidate Gail Zwicker not far behind at 82.

- But what about the Biggest Waste of Money, Substantial Political Party Division? Look no further than the Cons' Paul Francis, whose expenditures of 59,102.04 were the highest in Sackville-Eastern Shore. For that investment, Francis finished a distant third behind the NDP's Peter Stoffer (who cruised to victory with over 52% of the vote), as well as a Lib candidate who spent half as much as Francis.

- Leaving money out of the equation for a moment, the Greens did surprisingly poorly in terms of votes for a region where they seem to expect to elect their first-ever MP in the next general election. Despite the NDP's relatively weak presence in Newfoundland-Labrador and Prince Edward Island, the Greens didn't manage to beat out the NDP in a single Atlantic riding. And in two ridings, they dropped down to fifth place - falling behind the Christian Heritage Party's James Hnatiuk in South Shore-St. Margaret's, and independent Danny Gay in Miramichi.

- Meanwhile, the Greens' primary target riding looks to include one of the largest "could've beens" in the region. It's been often noted that the NDP's Alexis MacDonald finished a strong second behind Peter MacKay - but much less often discussed that MacDonald's campaign spent only $28,582.28, significantly less than a number of other NDP candidates who wound up with far less votes. I'll be hoping to learn more about the relationship between spending and political success as the series progresses, but it seems entirely possible that if MacDonald's campaign hadn't been outspent 2-to-1 by the Cons, MacKay wouldn't even be in Parliament to be considered Elizabeth May's preferred target.

- Finally, if you're looking for an incumbent who received a disturbingly easy ride, look no further than Con Greg Thompson in New Brunswick Southwest. Thompson only had to spend $32,170.17 to coast to victory with 54% of the vote - presumably thanks in large part to the fact that he faced both the worst-funded Lib in the whole region (Stan Smith at $21,541.46), and the worst-funded Dipper in the province (Andrew Graham at $3,438.46). This may offer an opportunity for any smaller party to win a disproportionate share of the vote by putting resources into a neglected riding - or it could be an aberration that other parties will make up for next time Canada goes to the polls.

There's plenty more to deal with even in the Atlantic region - and probably all the more to be discovered in the numbers across the country. And hopefully we'll be able to figure out both how political parties have chosen to spend their money in the past, and how they can do better with it in the future.

Political Sabermetrics Part 1: The Big Picture

Last weekend, I mentioned that I'll be taking a look at how Canadian political parties spend their money to see what role money plays in our political scene, and how parties can make better use of it. While most of that discussion will take place at the riding level, it's worth starting off with a look at the national scene to see both how money was spent in the 2006 election, and what kind of return parties received on it.

Let's start with a table of what strikes me as the most relevant data from the election, followed by some discussion of what it means. First off, the basic data from the 2006 election:

Party	Election Expenses	$ Reimbursed	Votes
Conservative Party of Canada	$18,019,179.28	$9,009,589.64	5,374,071
Liberal Party of Canada	$17,447,130.00	$8,719,845.00	4,479,415
New Democratic Party	$13,524,524.81	$6,735,433.46	2,589,597
Bloc Québécois	$4,527,629.97	$2,261,702.49	1,553,201
Green Party of Canada	$910,979.08	$455,489.54	665,940
Christian Heritage Party	$63,257.45	n/a	28,152
Progressive Canadian Party	$5,777.38	n/a	14,446

By way of explanation, the second column features each party's election expenses as declared in its Election Expenses Return (see row 10 of the PDFs at the link). For parties who receive a sufficient amount of a riding or national vote, the amount in the third column represents a roughly 50% reimbursement of its election expenses. To my knowledge this funding isn't yet available to smaller parties, unlike the $1.75/year/vote annual funding which now covers all registered parties.

Let's add in one more chart which helps to interpret the above numbers:

Party	Annual Funding	$/Vote
Conservative Party of Canada	$9,404,624.25	$3.35
Liberal Party of Canada	$7,838,976.25	$3.89
New Democratic Party	$4,531,794.75	$5.22
Bloc Québécois	$2,718,101.75	$2.92
Green Party of Canada	$1,165,395.00	$1.37
Christian Heritage Party	$49,266.00	$2.25
Progressive Canadian Party	$25,280.50	$0.40

The amount in the second column is determined by multiplying each party's vote total by $1.75. Keep in mind that while all of the other numbers in the table are of one-time application, this one determines federal party funding on an annual basis until the next federal election.

Finally, the third column reflects each party's 2006 election expenses divided by the number of votes received. Note that while parties will generally want to be efficient in allocating their money, that doesn't mean that a low number necessarily reflects good planning: indeed, it may be highly inefficient for a party to choose to spend a low amount of money if it could have won more votes (and resulting funding) by spending more.

Note that I've included a couple of extra parties in the vote standings beyond the ones which contested all ridings nationally or regionally. My purpose in doing so is to provide some indication of how effective funding is for various party sizes...and I suspect I'll end up going back to add more parties to examine those implications in more detail.

So what can we learn from this chart? Let's stick with a couple of general observations for now.

First, the election funding system appears to offer enough money back to make elections at worst cost-neutral for Canadian political parties. Based on the combination of election-spending reimbursements and per-vote funding, every party listed would more than make up its election investment within two years of an election - and some within a matter of months.

Of course, parties would still want to pick up as many donations as possible for non-election spending. But while individual donations still have some significance, a party which spends money well during elections can bring enough money in to get by even if its outside fund-raising is unimpressive.

Second, let's note that there appear to be several possible strategic niches which a Canadian political party may pursue. It's possible for a smaller party to build itself up by spending little money and amassing resources over time. At very low levels of spending, it looks like virtually any additional financial input will turn out to be money well spent based on the per-vote funding. And at a relatively moderate spending level, a party can boost its financial returns again if it reaches the reimbursement thresholds (5% of the vote within a riding or 2% nationally).

In contrast, the cost appears to be significantly higher for the national parties which seriously contest seats. Any party looking to put itself in play for spots in Parliament can expect to spend a lot more money per vote in doing so - and indeed will likely have to spend at or near the overall limits (for a riding at least, and arguably nationally as well except for the Bloc) rather than seeking out the best possible financial return on investment.

I'll leave the discussion there for now. But there'll be lots more worth analyzing from both a systemic and a party level later on.

(Edit: split tables based on formatting.)

An introduction to political sabermetrics

Before I started blogging, a good chunk of my time online was spent at what was then Baseball Primer (now the blogs section of Baseball Think Factory). While I'm a fan of a lot of sports, baseball's sabermetric revolution made for a particularly interesting study: first a small group of fans led by Bill James and SABR, then the conventional wisdom within the sport, recognized that many of the existing means of evaluating the performance of both players and franchises could be improved by leaps and bounds through a better appreciation of how to interpret the game's statistics. (And it didn't hurt that the level of political discussion on that site was on par with any that I'd yet discovered - with at least one regular going on to be a contributor at a current political favourite.)

So what does this have to do with current Canadian politics? Over the past week, two posts have used calculations of each party's expenses per vote as a measure of how much growth potential they have in that riding - highlighting the potential to analyze Canadian politics based on a return-on-investment approach similar to the dollars-per-win type of analysis that's now in vogue in sports.

Let's note that even on a surface look, the claims currently being made don't reflect the numbers being used to support them. While moving from 4th to 2nd in total votes in the London North Centre by-election, the Greens simultaneously went from being the most efficient spenders per vote to the least efficient - meaning that Jim Harris' "we spend money better!" claim isn't supported by the evidence. Nor does there appear to be any other consistent party ranking based on this small sample: the Libs were the least efficient spenders in Central Nova, but the most efficient in the London North Centre by-election (and well ahead of the Cons in London North Centre in the general election as well).

In sum, the data now being cited doesn't support any generalizations as to who's likely to spend their money most effectively, and how other parties can improve their return. But while the current simplistic claims don't stand up, there seems to be plenty here worth analyzing.

What return do political parties normally receive on their riding investments? Is there a diminishing return on every dollar put into a riding? How do past investments - or any change in those investments - affect a party's vote outcomes in a riding? When is party money better spent on national advertising than on local organizing? And how does the vote-per-dollar calculation and resulting federal funding fit in with the core purpose of a party to win seats?

As is the case in baseball, there are still individual factors at play which can't be fully captured by the numbers. In what might make for an analogy to the importance of stadium adjustments in baseball, the effect of any riding expense presumably needs to be weighed against a party's national standing. And individual candidate personalities could make a huge difference on a single-riding level, but their effect may be impossible to measure with any precision.

That said, it's still worth trying to figure out what we can deduce about how Canadian parties are spending their money now, and how they can invest it better in the future. And over the next little while, I'll plan to do just that.