In assessing Deb Higgins' likely performance as premier, the elephant in the room is naturally her track record as Labour Minister. As I've mentioned in my earlier posts, the premier's job necessarily includes both deciding among competing options, and working with stakeholders to implement the best one possition.
Of course, Higgins' public profile prior to the leadership race was based on her work on available hours legislation for part-time workers. And unfortunately, that sequence of events stands out as a textbook example of how not to shepherd an idea from near-implementation into reality. With only one step between already-passed legislation and proclamation, Higgins got caught on the defensive in the face of apparently-unexpected opposition, then wound up alienating supporters as well by giving in to business pressure.
The good news for Higgins supporters is that from her leadership campaign so far, it looks exceedingly unlikely that Higgins would repeat that same type of mistake. Instead, the main question surrounding Higgins now is whether her desire to avoid the same type of situation would cause her to adopt an overly cautious stance rather than leading toward substantial policy innovation and development.
Despite her need to make up ground on Dwain Lingenfelter's front-running campaign, Higgins' policy proposals have been the least ambitious offered by any of the candidates. I've noted before the incremental nature of most of her ideas - but on further review, it's even more striking how her ideas which aren't a matter of pure incremental change on current practice are almost without exception drawn from recent NDP reports or in practice elsewhere in Canada rather than personal vision.
On the bright side, such a strategy might succeed in minimizing possible opposition to those ideas. And to the extent Higgins is able to meet some of the targets within her proposals, that would undoubtedly be a positive outcome for the province.
But the cautious strategy also means that a Higgins government would figure to operate purely within the province's current political window rather than making a substantial effort to shift the terms of the debate. And particularly after a decade and a half of government that was criticized from within for managing rather than leading (and concurrent loss of interest in the party), there's plenty of reason to doubt that NDP members will want to go down that same road again.
Showing posts with label leadership 2009 projections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label leadership 2009 projections. Show all posts
Saturday, May 23, 2009
Friday, May 22, 2009
Leadership 2009 - Dwain Lingenfelter Government Projection
In his opposition projection, I noted that the combination of his political history and the leadership campaign itself leave fairly little room for doubt as to how Dwain Lingenfelter would handle the job of leader of the opposition. But notwithstanding the fact that his long political career includes experience in positions all the way up to deputy premier, his possible path in government may actually be one of the great unknowns associated with Lingenfelter.
On the plus side, the same factors which figure to be strengths in opposition as well would be all the more important in government. To start with, while the experience factor has probably been overstated in a number of areas, it figures to be relatively significant in terms of finding the balance as to what's possible within an NDP government. And that advantage is supplemented by the fact that as the lone candidate with strong business connections to go with his links to labour and other stakeholders, Lingenfelter would seem to have far less work to do than the other candidates in terms of building rapport with the groups who might potentially get in the way of policy priorities.
But then, what priorities would Lingenfelter seek to pursue? His leadership campaign policies include a downright fascinating mishmash of proposals consistent with national and global progressive trends with ones grounded largely in Saskatchewan's history, and of concrete commitments with promises to consult toward developing detailed policies later - all mixed in with large quantities of criticism of the Wall government.
That leaves voters in the leadership campaign likely to find something they'll agree with in Lingenfelter's current platform. But there's not much of a common theme apparent to Lingenfelter's policies to date, and it also seems entirely likely that a general election strategy will look substantially different from Lingenfelter's focus for a leadership campaign. Which means that there's plenty of uncertainty as to what Lingenfelter would do when it comes time to decide which priorities to push.
The most obvious risk from that starting point is that once in power, Lingenfelter would push both the party and the province to the right. But there's at least as significant a danger that the absence of a unifying vision would lead Lingenfelter into an everything-as-top-priority strategy which would ultimately figure to satisfy nobody.
In sum, Lingenfelter is as strong a bet as any of the candidates to successfully implement whatever he puts his mind to in government. But there's far more room for doubt as what he'll seek to accomplish - which may be the last thing the Saskatchewan NDP wants after 16 years in power where the party's social democratic vision was all too often an afterthought.
On the plus side, the same factors which figure to be strengths in opposition as well would be all the more important in government. To start with, while the experience factor has probably been overstated in a number of areas, it figures to be relatively significant in terms of finding the balance as to what's possible within an NDP government. And that advantage is supplemented by the fact that as the lone candidate with strong business connections to go with his links to labour and other stakeholders, Lingenfelter would seem to have far less work to do than the other candidates in terms of building rapport with the groups who might potentially get in the way of policy priorities.
But then, what priorities would Lingenfelter seek to pursue? His leadership campaign policies include a downright fascinating mishmash of proposals consistent with national and global progressive trends with ones grounded largely in Saskatchewan's history, and of concrete commitments with promises to consult toward developing detailed policies later - all mixed in with large quantities of criticism of the Wall government.
That leaves voters in the leadership campaign likely to find something they'll agree with in Lingenfelter's current platform. But there's not much of a common theme apparent to Lingenfelter's policies to date, and it also seems entirely likely that a general election strategy will look substantially different from Lingenfelter's focus for a leadership campaign. Which means that there's plenty of uncertainty as to what Lingenfelter would do when it comes time to decide which priorities to push.
The most obvious risk from that starting point is that once in power, Lingenfelter would push both the party and the province to the right. But there's at least as significant a danger that the absence of a unifying vision would lead Lingenfelter into an everything-as-top-priority strategy which would ultimately figure to satisfy nobody.
In sum, Lingenfelter is as strong a bet as any of the candidates to successfully implement whatever he puts his mind to in government. But there's far more room for doubt as what he'll seek to accomplish - which may be the last thing the Saskatchewan NDP wants after 16 years in power where the party's social democratic vision was all too often an afterthought.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Leadership 2009 - Ryan Meili Government Projection
When I endorsed Ryan Meili in the leadership race, I did so based in large part on qualities which seem likely to make him extremely effective in government. But for completeness in the projection series, I'll expand a bit on the points made there as to what we might expect from Meili.
Here's the key paragraph from my earlier post:
As much as any political leader wants to be able to manage the public policy agenda and framework for political discussion, it's inevitable that at least some unfavourable issues will have to be dealt with during any term in office. There, Meili's handling of the Lingenfelter membership controversy looks to hint at a strong balance between recognizing principled concerns including a need for transparency, while at the same time not overreaching or inflaming the issues beyond what's called for in the circumstances.
Indeed, one might even say that another Obama parallel can be found in Meili's "no-drama" response to controversy - including both the Lingenfelter controversy, and the story of Meili's Quebec City protest which appeared early in the campaign but held a lifespan of approximately a day. And while the no-drama theme may not have been emphasized publicly as much as some other aspects of Obama's rise, it may well be one of the keys to his success both during the election campaign and during his time in office.
Another area worth considering is management style. Rather than following the all-too-common trend of politicians seeking to micromanage every political and policy move from their supporters, Meili has been comfortable delegating responsibilities within his leadership campaign. Which would figure to translate into a similar strategy with his government: while Meili would obviously set the broad direction, there's every indication that he'll be comfortable allowing cabinet members to exercise some real authority over their portfolios.
Finally, and at least tangentially related to both of the above considerations, I'll note one area where Meili hasn't yet been substantially tested during the course of the leadership race. One of the difficulties which Lorne Calvert faced during his tenure as party leader was the problem of managing challenges to his authority. And while Calvert managed to emerge from those with his leadership intact (in retrospect relying in substantial part on a no-drama strategy of his own), the question of how to manage the egos inevitably present within a successful political party is one which is bound to emerge at some point.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Meili hasn't faced that type of issue within his leadership campaign. And a combination of a loyal set of campaign supporters with a no-drama policy and enough freedom of action to pacify his more ambitious cabinet members would seem likely to minimize any of them that do come up in the future. But while there's plenty of reason for optimism as to how Meili would deal with internal challenges in the future, that looks to be largely uncharted territory.
Of course, if the greatest apparent concern with a candidate's prospect of success in government is that remote, it again speaks well to the likelihood that the NDP will be glad to give Meili the chance to take office. And that's why while the opposition projections might leave room for a matter of stylistic preference between the candidates as to who would perform best as opposition leader, the choice as to who's best suited for government seems to me to be a fairly clear one.
Here's the key paragraph from my earlier post:
(I)t takes a rare combination of creativity, judgment and accessibility to reach the best possible outcome on any policy question, due to both the difficulty of choosing between competing options and the importance of working with stakeholders to smooth out the path toward change. And all indications are that Meili has each of those elements in spades, making him the right person for the job of renewing the NDP and leading it into the future.In sum, then, Meili figures to do well in terms of both setting policy goals, and working with interested parties to make them a reality with genuine public support. Which seem to me to be the basic tasks of any premier from a policy implementation perspective. But then, there are a few other functions of a premier where Meili's campaign to date may offer signals about his likely actions in office.
As much as any political leader wants to be able to manage the public policy agenda and framework for political discussion, it's inevitable that at least some unfavourable issues will have to be dealt with during any term in office. There, Meili's handling of the Lingenfelter membership controversy looks to hint at a strong balance between recognizing principled concerns including a need for transparency, while at the same time not overreaching or inflaming the issues beyond what's called for in the circumstances.
Indeed, one might even say that another Obama parallel can be found in Meili's "no-drama" response to controversy - including both the Lingenfelter controversy, and the story of Meili's Quebec City protest which appeared early in the campaign but held a lifespan of approximately a day. And while the no-drama theme may not have been emphasized publicly as much as some other aspects of Obama's rise, it may well be one of the keys to his success both during the election campaign and during his time in office.
Another area worth considering is management style. Rather than following the all-too-common trend of politicians seeking to micromanage every political and policy move from their supporters, Meili has been comfortable delegating responsibilities within his leadership campaign. Which would figure to translate into a similar strategy with his government: while Meili would obviously set the broad direction, there's every indication that he'll be comfortable allowing cabinet members to exercise some real authority over their portfolios.
Finally, and at least tangentially related to both of the above considerations, I'll note one area where Meili hasn't yet been substantially tested during the course of the leadership race. One of the difficulties which Lorne Calvert faced during his tenure as party leader was the problem of managing challenges to his authority. And while Calvert managed to emerge from those with his leadership intact (in retrospect relying in substantial part on a no-drama strategy of his own), the question of how to manage the egos inevitably present within a successful political party is one which is bound to emerge at some point.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Meili hasn't faced that type of issue within his leadership campaign. And a combination of a loyal set of campaign supporters with a no-drama policy and enough freedom of action to pacify his more ambitious cabinet members would seem likely to minimize any of them that do come up in the future. But while there's plenty of reason for optimism as to how Meili would deal with internal challenges in the future, that looks to be largely uncharted territory.
Of course, if the greatest apparent concern with a candidate's prospect of success in government is that remote, it again speaks well to the likelihood that the NDP will be glad to give Meili the chance to take office. And that's why while the opposition projections might leave room for a matter of stylistic preference between the candidates as to who would perform best as opposition leader, the choice as to who's best suited for government seems to me to be a fairly clear one.
Leadership 2009 - Yens Pedersen Government Projection
Following up on my series of posts last week about what we might expect from the Saskatchewan NDP leadership candidates in opposition, let's take the next step and examine what their campaigns might say about their probable actions in power - starting this time with Yens Pedersen.
I noted in Pedersen's opposition projection that his leadership campaign has been based largely on responding in strong terms to existing issues, rather than choosing and emphasizing his own preferred themes.
But while I tend to figure that pattern would replicate itself in opposition, Pedersen's platform seems to me to signal a significantly different strategy in office. Rather than limiting his platform to incremental changes or broad themes, Pedersen has offered up plenty of significant substantive ideas. Which serves as a significant positive for those looking for a more activist government - but also raises questions about which priorities in his platform would come first, and how Pedersen would go about implementing them.
While the former may be difficult to answer based on his platform alone, Pedersen's consistent debate focus on Tommy Douglas' legacy and the renewal of social-democratic values - reflected as well in this blog post - suggest to me that we'd see an effort to move on a more egalitarian economic structure as Pedersen's first order of business. Which would surely be good news for NDP members who have seen the previous two administrations as too timid in the same area.
That leads into the question of how Pedersen would fare in doing so. All indications from the campaign are the Pedersen will have little difficulty in evaluating the options available to him and choosing a positive one to push forward with. But what's less clear is how Pedersen would fare in the process of consultation and persuasion necessary to make significant changes stick, which is always particularly difficult where there's bound to be a strong push on the opposite side.
Of course, Pedersen's willingness to stick to his positions would offer some chance of overcoming a strong counterattack from corporate interests. But in order to get anywhere near the type of changes Pedersen is proposing for the moment, he'd need to develop significantly in the area of persuading soft public support. And some more tendency to defuse issues than Pedersen has shown so far probably wouldn't hurt either.
All in all, Pedersen looks to be one of the better options in the leadership race when it comes to seeking to lead the province in a progressive direction. But it's less certain that he'll actually be able to persuade the province to follow - which combined with his sometimes-combative style would likely make for a highly polarized stay in office.
I noted in Pedersen's opposition projection that his leadership campaign has been based largely on responding in strong terms to existing issues, rather than choosing and emphasizing his own preferred themes.
But while I tend to figure that pattern would replicate itself in opposition, Pedersen's platform seems to me to signal a significantly different strategy in office. Rather than limiting his platform to incremental changes or broad themes, Pedersen has offered up plenty of significant substantive ideas. Which serves as a significant positive for those looking for a more activist government - but also raises questions about which priorities in his platform would come first, and how Pedersen would go about implementing them.
While the former may be difficult to answer based on his platform alone, Pedersen's consistent debate focus on Tommy Douglas' legacy and the renewal of social-democratic values - reflected as well in this blog post - suggest to me that we'd see an effort to move on a more egalitarian economic structure as Pedersen's first order of business. Which would surely be good news for NDP members who have seen the previous two administrations as too timid in the same area.
That leads into the question of how Pedersen would fare in doing so. All indications from the campaign are the Pedersen will have little difficulty in evaluating the options available to him and choosing a positive one to push forward with. But what's less clear is how Pedersen would fare in the process of consultation and persuasion necessary to make significant changes stick, which is always particularly difficult where there's bound to be a strong push on the opposite side.
Of course, Pedersen's willingness to stick to his positions would offer some chance of overcoming a strong counterattack from corporate interests. But in order to get anywhere near the type of changes Pedersen is proposing for the moment, he'd need to develop significantly in the area of persuading soft public support. And some more tendency to defuse issues than Pedersen has shown so far probably wouldn't hurt either.
All in all, Pedersen looks to be one of the better options in the leadership race when it comes to seeking to lead the province in a progressive direction. But it's less certain that he'll actually be able to persuade the province to follow - which combined with his sometimes-combative style would likely make for a highly polarized stay in office.
Friday, May 15, 2009
Leadership 2009 - Yens Pedersen Opposition Projection
I noted in my post on Ryan Meili that there's a bit more guesswork involved in projecting the future of the candidates who haven't yet sat on opposition benches in the Legislature. But in Yens Pedersen's case, that may be made up for at least in part by the fact that he's largely built his leadership campaign around an opposition-style strategy. So what can that tell us about the aftermath of a Pedersen victory?
In the party-building department, Pedersen would figure to carry less of a support structure into the LO's office than any of his leadership competitors. While that would present some challenges, it may also raise some opportunities in allowing him to pick and choose the best of what each campaign has had to offer in the leadership race, rather than having a group of loyalists expecting to be rewarded for their efforts in the leadership campaign.
Unfortunately, though, Pedersen's oppositional style has also made him a target for criticism from within the Lingenfelter camp in particular. And with Pedersen apparently not backing down from his view that Lingenfelter should step down from the race even after the flak he's already taken for that position, there would seem to be a significant danger that a number of Lingenfelter's supporters would have trouble working with Pedersen at the end of the campaign.
Which could be particularly problematic since Pedersen might be the lone candidate without an obvious path into the Legislature. One option would be for him to try to claim Saskatoon-Riversdale - but given that Meili was organizing there even before the leadership race, that move could well create even more internal divisions.
More likely Pedersen would seek a seat in Regina. But unless John Nilson agreed to step down in Regina Lakeview, that would involve either convincing a Link supporter to make way for his greatest critic in the campaign, or replacing another young and strong caucus member.
Once he got into the Legislature, though, Pedersen's leadership campaign tactics would seem to have the potential to translate well into opposition.
Lacking the connections to raise many new issues for himself (though he's tried to do that as well), Pedersen has followed a largely reactive approach. But he's done an effective job of inserting himself into the narrative surrounding hot-button issues like nuclear power and the Lingenfelter membership controversy.
It's not hard to see how an opposition leader who responds quickly, forcefully and consistently to the Wall government's failings - rather than sticking mostly to a predetermined strategy ala Higgins, or adopting Lingenfelter's sometimes scattershot approach - could serve the NDP well in turning public opinion against the Sask Party, particularly if a scandal or two turns up over the next couple of years. And the combination of Pedersen's persistence and the full weight of the NDP's research resources might maximize the chances of making any such scandals stick to Wall and his government.
In the party-building department, Pedersen would figure to carry less of a support structure into the LO's office than any of his leadership competitors. While that would present some challenges, it may also raise some opportunities in allowing him to pick and choose the best of what each campaign has had to offer in the leadership race, rather than having a group of loyalists expecting to be rewarded for their efforts in the leadership campaign.
Unfortunately, though, Pedersen's oppositional style has also made him a target for criticism from within the Lingenfelter camp in particular. And with Pedersen apparently not backing down from his view that Lingenfelter should step down from the race even after the flak he's already taken for that position, there would seem to be a significant danger that a number of Lingenfelter's supporters would have trouble working with Pedersen at the end of the campaign.
Which could be particularly problematic since Pedersen might be the lone candidate without an obvious path into the Legislature. One option would be for him to try to claim Saskatoon-Riversdale - but given that Meili was organizing there even before the leadership race, that move could well create even more internal divisions.
More likely Pedersen would seek a seat in Regina. But unless John Nilson agreed to step down in Regina Lakeview, that would involve either convincing a Link supporter to make way for his greatest critic in the campaign, or replacing another young and strong caucus member.
Once he got into the Legislature, though, Pedersen's leadership campaign tactics would seem to have the potential to translate well into opposition.
Lacking the connections to raise many new issues for himself (though he's tried to do that as well), Pedersen has followed a largely reactive approach. But he's done an effective job of inserting himself into the narrative surrounding hot-button issues like nuclear power and the Lingenfelter membership controversy.
It's not hard to see how an opposition leader who responds quickly, forcefully and consistently to the Wall government's failings - rather than sticking mostly to a predetermined strategy ala Higgins, or adopting Lingenfelter's sometimes scattershot approach - could serve the NDP well in turning public opinion against the Sask Party, particularly if a scandal or two turns up over the next couple of years. And the combination of Pedersen's persistence and the full weight of the NDP's research resources might maximize the chances of making any such scandals stick to Wall and his government.
Leadership 2009 - Ryan Meili Opposition Projection
While the opposition projections for Deb Higgins and Dwain Lingenfelter were assisted by the fact that both have actually spent time on opposition benches before, the task is somewhat tougher when it comes to the other two leadership contestants. That said, there are still some highly distinctive themes to be picked up from how Ryan Meili and Yens Pedersen have handled the leadership campaign. So let's look at Meili next.
When it comes to party-building, Meili's success in developing a relatively strong and widespread network over the few months of the leadership campaign would figure to offer a sound model to further build up the NDP over the next two years. And the fact that Meili has stayed positive in his dealings with the other leadership candidates would seemingly raise the likelihood that he'll be able to get the party's current supporters united behind him, rather than having to spend much time nursing wounds from the leadership race.
On the other hand, there could be some question as to whether a primarily volunteer-based model from the leadership race would require significant adaptation when applied to professional staff. And the task of keeping a full party's worth of ego and self-interest reined in toward the greater good may raise challenges which Meili has largely been able to avoid in the leadership race.
As for the task of opposing the Sask Party, Meili's first hurdle would be to find his way into the Legislature - though he wouldn't seem likely to have much trouble winning what otherwise figures to be a tough Saskatoon-Riversdale nomination race with the title of party leader to his name.
From there, while Meili would undoubtedly grow into the role of chief critic of the Sask Party, one would still expect him to keep the NDP's opposition tactics on the civil side. As in the leadership campaign, Meili would figure to focus on policy-based critiques in order to set up a broad clash of visions in 2011, while leaving the personal and political to his partymates to the extent they need to be dealt with.
As a result, Meili's opposition would figure to be the least focused on tearing down Wall personally. But while that likely runs against conventional wisdom, it might well make for the NDP's most viable strategy for 2011, particularly if the province is still on the upswing at that point. If the NDP can spend two years building up Meili's image and turning the next election into a question of whose hope best reflects the values of Saskatchewan's citizens, then it might well be able to win in 2011 despite Wall remaining personally popular and the mood in the province remaining optimistic - rather than counting on a "throw the bums out" attitude developing toward the Sask Party in a relatively short span of time.
Of course, the downside to running on one's own vision in opposition is that it gives the government something more concrete to attack outside its own ranks rather than having to campaign on its own record. Which means that the main question for NDP members in comparing Meili's opposition strategy to that of the other candidates may be whether they think they can sell the positives of the NDP's vision more easily than the negatives of Wall's government.
When it comes to party-building, Meili's success in developing a relatively strong and widespread network over the few months of the leadership campaign would figure to offer a sound model to further build up the NDP over the next two years. And the fact that Meili has stayed positive in his dealings with the other leadership candidates would seemingly raise the likelihood that he'll be able to get the party's current supporters united behind him, rather than having to spend much time nursing wounds from the leadership race.
On the other hand, there could be some question as to whether a primarily volunteer-based model from the leadership race would require significant adaptation when applied to professional staff. And the task of keeping a full party's worth of ego and self-interest reined in toward the greater good may raise challenges which Meili has largely been able to avoid in the leadership race.
As for the task of opposing the Sask Party, Meili's first hurdle would be to find his way into the Legislature - though he wouldn't seem likely to have much trouble winning what otherwise figures to be a tough Saskatoon-Riversdale nomination race with the title of party leader to his name.
From there, while Meili would undoubtedly grow into the role of chief critic of the Sask Party, one would still expect him to keep the NDP's opposition tactics on the civil side. As in the leadership campaign, Meili would figure to focus on policy-based critiques in order to set up a broad clash of visions in 2011, while leaving the personal and political to his partymates to the extent they need to be dealt with.
As a result, Meili's opposition would figure to be the least focused on tearing down Wall personally. But while that likely runs against conventional wisdom, it might well make for the NDP's most viable strategy for 2011, particularly if the province is still on the upswing at that point. If the NDP can spend two years building up Meili's image and turning the next election into a question of whose hope best reflects the values of Saskatchewan's citizens, then it might well be able to win in 2011 despite Wall remaining personally popular and the mood in the province remaining optimistic - rather than counting on a "throw the bums out" attitude developing toward the Sask Party in a relatively short span of time.
Of course, the downside to running on one's own vision in opposition is that it gives the government something more concrete to attack outside its own ranks rather than having to campaign on its own record. Which means that the main question for NDP members in comparing Meili's opposition strategy to that of the other candidates may be whether they think they can sell the positives of the NDP's vision more easily than the negatives of Wall's government.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Leadership 2009 - Dwain Lingenfelter Opposition Projection
For Dwain Lingenfelter's opposition projection, there's a little bit less guesswork involved than for the other candidates, as we've already seen some direct evidence as to how he plans to handle the Wall government. But there's still room for some further predictions based on how the leadership campaign has progressed.
On the party-building side, there's little doubt that Lingenfelter's support base would be kept at work trying to expand the NDP's reach. But there are still a couple of question as to what the NDP might look like a couple of years from now.
First off, it's not clear how much of Lingenfelter's early-campaign talk about party renewal will actually be put into practice, particularly when he's largely let it fall by the wayside since the leadership campaign started heating up. So while a Lingenfelter-led NDP would presumably see increased membership and a rebuilt traditional political machine, there's some uncertainty as to whether or not that machine will be modernized for a new era of politics.
Secondly, there's a huge question mark as to whether Lingenfelter will seek to engage party members who have been involved in other leadership camps, or whether he'll exert control over the party by surrounding himself only with leadership supporters. It would seem fairly obvious from my standpoint that the latter option would both reinforce the attacks which Lingenfelter surely knows will come from the Sask Party and constrict the enthusiasm of current NDP supporters to take up his side - but there's reason for concern that the view might look different from the front-runner's seat.
As for Lingenfelter's handling of the Sask Party, we know pretty well already what to expect. Lingenfelter's connections within the province will serve him well in gathering up every potentially embarrassing tidbit on Wall and company, and Lingenfelter himself has shown no hesitation in throwing those concerns at Wall with gusto. Which means that Lingenfelter's time in opposition would figure to involve a constant stream of well-publicized issues, potentially offering the NDP's best chance of putting a dent in Wall's image.
Of course, that strategy does carry some downsides as well. In particular, Lingenfelter has primarily zeroed in on personal and procedural issues which offer a steady diet of questions for easy public presentation, rather than emphasizing broad differences in vision and policy. But that message only figures to go so far if the province is still doing well generally by the time the 2011 election rolls around, as a two-year span doesn't offer a lot of time to build up government fatigue in the absence of any major scandals.
Moreover, even if Lingenfelter succeeds in casting a cloud over the Sask Party, it's not hard to anticipate Wall responding by effectively encouraging a message of "they're all the same" which would favour the incumbents. And the Sask Party doesn't seem to be lacking for enthusiasm of its own in trying to tar Lingenfelter and the NDP with that narrative or worse - which makes sense since it largely reinforces the themes which worked for Wall in 2007.
So while Lingenfelter looks to be fairly well-positioned to hit the ground running and end Wall's extended honeymoon period, it's less clear that he'll be the candidate best positioned to present a strong alternative.
On the party-building side, there's little doubt that Lingenfelter's support base would be kept at work trying to expand the NDP's reach. But there are still a couple of question as to what the NDP might look like a couple of years from now.
First off, it's not clear how much of Lingenfelter's early-campaign talk about party renewal will actually be put into practice, particularly when he's largely let it fall by the wayside since the leadership campaign started heating up. So while a Lingenfelter-led NDP would presumably see increased membership and a rebuilt traditional political machine, there's some uncertainty as to whether or not that machine will be modernized for a new era of politics.
Secondly, there's a huge question mark as to whether Lingenfelter will seek to engage party members who have been involved in other leadership camps, or whether he'll exert control over the party by surrounding himself only with leadership supporters. It would seem fairly obvious from my standpoint that the latter option would both reinforce the attacks which Lingenfelter surely knows will come from the Sask Party and constrict the enthusiasm of current NDP supporters to take up his side - but there's reason for concern that the view might look different from the front-runner's seat.
As for Lingenfelter's handling of the Sask Party, we know pretty well already what to expect. Lingenfelter's connections within the province will serve him well in gathering up every potentially embarrassing tidbit on Wall and company, and Lingenfelter himself has shown no hesitation in throwing those concerns at Wall with gusto. Which means that Lingenfelter's time in opposition would figure to involve a constant stream of well-publicized issues, potentially offering the NDP's best chance of putting a dent in Wall's image.
Of course, that strategy does carry some downsides as well. In particular, Lingenfelter has primarily zeroed in on personal and procedural issues which offer a steady diet of questions for easy public presentation, rather than emphasizing broad differences in vision and policy. But that message only figures to go so far if the province is still doing well generally by the time the 2011 election rolls around, as a two-year span doesn't offer a lot of time to build up government fatigue in the absence of any major scandals.
Moreover, even if Lingenfelter succeeds in casting a cloud over the Sask Party, it's not hard to anticipate Wall responding by effectively encouraging a message of "they're all the same" which would favour the incumbents. And the Sask Party doesn't seem to be lacking for enthusiasm of its own in trying to tar Lingenfelter and the NDP with that narrative or worse - which makes sense since it largely reinforces the themes which worked for Wall in 2007.
So while Lingenfelter looks to be fairly well-positioned to hit the ground running and end Wall's extended honeymoon period, it's less clear that he'll be the candidate best positioned to present a strong alternative.
Leadership 2009 - Deb Higgins Opposition Projection
For obvious reasons, most of the discussion about the Saskatchewan NDP leadership race has focused on where the leadership candidates stand at the moment. But it's worth keeping in mind that the goal of the leadership race will ultimately be to elect a leader of the opposition for the next two-plus years, and hopefully (depending on their success in that role) a premier for years to come beginning in 2011. So let's cast an eye to the future and ask what the campaign so far can tell us about how the candidates would perform in those roles - starting with what we might expect from Deb Higgins as the leader of the opposition.
From my standpoint, the LO's role over the next two years will involve three main tasks: rebuilding the NDP internally, developing policy for the 2011 campaign, and opposing the Sask Party publicly. So how might we expect Higgins to handle those tasks?
On party renewal, Higgins (like all of the leadership candidates) has talked up the need for further growth and outreach. But it's worth noting that her actual campaign structure has been relatively top-heavy, with lots of caucus support but few shows of strength at the grassroots level. And her apparent strategy of presenting herself as the default alternative to Dwain Lingenfelter doesn't figure to change that much over the next month - meaning that Higgins may largely have to start from scratch on the party-building front.
On the bright side, Higgins can take pride in her own strong riding as evidence of her ability to maintain support. And one would figure that at least some substantial portion of the grassroots development in the other camps would be perfectly happy to shift allegiances to Higgins.
As for policy development and opposition strategy, we may be able to take some strong hints from how Higgins has designed her leadership platform. While she's shown a broad command of policy when speaking in the debates, her actual proposals on the NDP's core social justice issues have consisted mostly of incremental shifts in existing priorities, suggesting that she wouldn't present a particularly broad or distinctive vision for the NDP. But then, that doesn't seem to have been her intention in designing her platform.
As I've noted before, some of her policy proposals and messages have been neatly tailored to include subtle jabs at both Dwain Lingenfelter and Brad Wall. Which would seem to me to hint at what we could expect from Higgins in shaping the NDP's message as a party: a relatively narrow range of issues to be highlighted, but with those carefully selected to play into a potentially winning theme.
Higgins' success as leader of the opposition would then seem to be predicated on her identifying the right pressure points to begin with - with her proposed ban on out-of-province political funding looking to be an obvious theme with some potential to resonate, along with a strong anti-nuclear position. From there, the main task would be to keep tying other issues into the selected points of attack, and making sure that Wall can't find a way to wriggle his way out of his party's vulnerabilities.
That strategy under Higgins' leadership would figure to carry at least a fairly strong chance of success, particularly since she might also have less of a learning or readjustment curve than any of the other candidates. But it would also risk falling short if Higgins were to misread the strength of either the issues involved or the NDP's ability to push them, or if Wall were to defuse any particularly strong issues at the last minute to minimize the effect of Higgins' work.
In sum, then, Higgins would seem to be ready to start identifying and challenging the Sask Party's weak points from day one. But the question is whether that strategy will be either too limited to turn the tide against a government which is still seen positively a couple of years into its term, or too predictable to win out against a government which doesn't seem shy about going along with the political winds.
From my standpoint, the LO's role over the next two years will involve three main tasks: rebuilding the NDP internally, developing policy for the 2011 campaign, and opposing the Sask Party publicly. So how might we expect Higgins to handle those tasks?
On party renewal, Higgins (like all of the leadership candidates) has talked up the need for further growth and outreach. But it's worth noting that her actual campaign structure has been relatively top-heavy, with lots of caucus support but few shows of strength at the grassroots level. And her apparent strategy of presenting herself as the default alternative to Dwain Lingenfelter doesn't figure to change that much over the next month - meaning that Higgins may largely have to start from scratch on the party-building front.
On the bright side, Higgins can take pride in her own strong riding as evidence of her ability to maintain support. And one would figure that at least some substantial portion of the grassroots development in the other camps would be perfectly happy to shift allegiances to Higgins.
As for policy development and opposition strategy, we may be able to take some strong hints from how Higgins has designed her leadership platform. While she's shown a broad command of policy when speaking in the debates, her actual proposals on the NDP's core social justice issues have consisted mostly of incremental shifts in existing priorities, suggesting that she wouldn't present a particularly broad or distinctive vision for the NDP. But then, that doesn't seem to have been her intention in designing her platform.
As I've noted before, some of her policy proposals and messages have been neatly tailored to include subtle jabs at both Dwain Lingenfelter and Brad Wall. Which would seem to me to hint at what we could expect from Higgins in shaping the NDP's message as a party: a relatively narrow range of issues to be highlighted, but with those carefully selected to play into a potentially winning theme.
Higgins' success as leader of the opposition would then seem to be predicated on her identifying the right pressure points to begin with - with her proposed ban on out-of-province political funding looking to be an obvious theme with some potential to resonate, along with a strong anti-nuclear position. From there, the main task would be to keep tying other issues into the selected points of attack, and making sure that Wall can't find a way to wriggle his way out of his party's vulnerabilities.
That strategy under Higgins' leadership would figure to carry at least a fairly strong chance of success, particularly since she might also have less of a learning or readjustment curve than any of the other candidates. But it would also risk falling short if Higgins were to misread the strength of either the issues involved or the NDP's ability to push them, or if Wall were to defuse any particularly strong issues at the last minute to minimize the effect of Higgins' work.
In sum, then, Higgins would seem to be ready to start identifying and challenging the Sask Party's weak points from day one. But the question is whether that strategy will be either too limited to turn the tide against a government which is still seen positively a couple of years into its term, or too predictable to win out against a government which doesn't seem shy about going along with the political winds.
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