On funding decisions

The Hill Times' report on the future of party financing in Canada is just one of a few recent pieces to miss the different effect of different changes on Canada's political parties. So let's quickly review what seems possible based on the actions which might be paired with a cut in per-vote funding.

To start with, as a result of the shift in positioning among the opposition parties, the effect of eliminating per-vote funding may itself be somewhat different from what's long been assumed. For the first time, the NDP stands to lose more in raw dollars than the Libs once per-vote funding is removed - a loss which might only amplified to the extent it prevents the NDP from developing an operation on the scale of the one the Libs have normally run. And while the NDP's increased caucus funding will help to fill the dollar gap, we'll have to wait to find out whether the NDP can parlay its new position as official opposition into a longer-term fund-raising advantage over the Libs (who seem to have done fairly well filling their coffers late in the election campaign once it became clear that focusing on votes wasn't going to accomplish much).

Meanwhile, the Greens saw a huge drop in their popular vote as a result of their successful focus on winning a single seat - meaning that the national party which may once have been most vulnerable to an end to per-vote funding has somewhat less to lose.

As a result, the landscape as to how an end to per-vote funding will affect Canada's opposition parties has changed dramatically based on how those votes actually played out on May 2. And the Cons will have some choices to make based on how they perceive the relative strength of their opponents.

Similarly, the talk of raising individual funding limits looks to be based mostly on a sense that times have changed since 2006 (when the Cons and NDP worked together on reducing the limit from $5,000 to roughly $1,100, based largely on the view that the Libs benefitted more than any other party from higher-dollar donors).

On the one hand, one wouldn't expect Harper to want to reverse course if he can avoid it, particularly since it would leave him vulnerable to NDP attacks on bringing bigger money back into politics.

But to the extent his future political strategy depends on trying to prevent any opposition from coalescing behind one party, Harper may well be tempted to raise the limit again in order to strengthen the Libs' position as compared to the NDP. And stronger competition from the NDP as an alternative government may also make it possible for the Cons to position themselves as the chief recipient of big-money donations.

Then there's one more possibility: Harper could look to reduce the federal political tax credit (which naturally figures to be more damaging for donors with less disposable income). If paired with an increase in (or elimination of) individual limits, that would have the effect of limiting receipts from the small-money donor bases of both the Cons and the NDP, while at the same time giving far more influence to big-money donations just at the time when Harper is best positioned to bring those in as the party which will hold power for the next four-plus years.

In sum, we should expect the Cons' decisions on party financing to be based on Harper's calculations as to his own party's advantage in the proportion of money raised through big versus small donations, as well as which of the NDP or Libs he fears most in elections to come. And we shouldn't assume that his past promises and actions won't be undone in the process.