On ceasefires

Michael Byers' proposal for cooperation among the national opposition parties in the next federal election figures to be a major topic of conversation over the next little while. So let's take a closer look at what Byers suggests, as well as the impact it figures to have on the political scene.

To start off with, there seems to be little indication that Byers' suggestion is based on anything more than a personal idea. Significantly, he doesn't even begin to discuss the obvious practical hurdles associated with a plan - particularly the question of how (if it all) the plan could be approved within the NDP's existing structures which don't allow for the same degree of top-down control exercised by other parties' leaders. And aside from raising an issue as to how democratic such a proposal would be, that hints to me that Byers hasn't looked ahead as to whether the proposal could practically be implemented - nor discussed the idea in detail with anybody who has considered the question.

So what about the substance of his proposal? I've posted before about my take on what elements a deal for electoral cooperation would have to include for me to see it as a plus overall - and while Byers' plan comes somewhat closer to the mark than some others I've seen, it still seems to be lacking in a few key areas.

First and most fundamentally, there's little reason to think that an electoral ceasefire would actually hold much of a chance of success.

Byers bases his argument on the raw 2008 vote totals for the NDP and the Libs, without so much as recognizing the possibility that one party's votes wouldn't necessarily transfer en masse to the other. But even that would lead to a Parliament where the two parties' combined seats would fall short of a majority - leaving little prospect that a referendum on proportional representation would be allowed to take place without the Cons and Bloc voting down any new government.

And even that scenario is likely too generous an interpretation of the probable outcome. After all, the track record of multi-party deals suggests that any combined effort tends to add up to less than the sum of its parts - a problem which seems particularly obvious for NDP ridings under an agreement where a substantial number of Lib votes would bleed to the Cons. And there's equally some history of completely unforeseen consequences: see e.g. the B.C. effort by the two traditional parties to suppress the CCF, which instead led to the rise of Social Credit as it unraveled.

Meanwhile, there are also pitfalls in Byers' plan if it succeeds beyond anybody's expectations. Byers himself notes that there would be a chance of the Libs winning a majority government if a combined effort manages to turn the tide strongly enough against the Cons. But he doesn't note the obvious implication of that possibility: a Lib majority government would have absolutely no incentive to follow through on a promise to do anything about proportional representation, and the NDP would have no hammer at its disposal to force the issue. So Byers' plan falls short on the question of enforceability as well.

And as an added problem, the focus on 2008 results would lead to a complete lack of flexibility. To the extent both parties were to agree on a common goal of toppling the Cons, it would seem obvious that it's in nobody's interest for a party to be arbitrarily assigned a seat where it doesn't have the best chance of winning. But the allocation of seats based on past results combined with the elimination of any other opposition candidates would ensure that there would be no way to correct for any realization that a particular candidate or party actually doesn't have the better chance to defeat a Con opponent.

Finally, I'll note that there are serious questions to be raised about the timing of Byers' proposal. I could see a far better argument for the necessity of cooperation at what's seen to be a particularly crucial decision point in Canadian politics. But Ignatieff already broke an agreement with the NDP at the last one of those to leave the Con government in charge of dealing with Canada's recession. And the threat of a Harper majority isn't a particularly new one either, as it loomed as a distinct possibility through most of the 2008 campaign.

In sum, then, I'm not clear on what's changed since a year ago to justify a deal along the line of Byers' proposal. Which means that while he deserves credit for looking to spread a message of cooperation, there doesn't seem to be much prospect that his suggestion will find much traction.

Update: Pogge is much more succinct.

(Edit: fixed wording re: B.C. example.)