On misdirection

As mentioned in this morning's post, let's take a look at the more substantive issue left to be resolved on Afghanistan - which the Libs have turned into an open one by agreeing to negotiate with the Cons rather than sticking to their longstanding position that combat should end in 2009.

The current conventional wisdom, which has spread further than I would have expected, is that the Libs can do nothing more now than try to negotiate with Deceivin' Stephen over the wording of a consensus motion. But has anybody stopped to ask just what they'd accomplish by doing so?

After all, the only real effect of the motion itself will be to determine whether or not Canada agrees to an extension to the end of 2011. From my standpoint, an extension obviously isn't the least bit desirable as an outcome - which is why I'd prefer to see the Libs stand up for their previous 2009 timeline, and spend more of their time attacking Harper for making the motion a matter of confidence, rather than looking for a way to give in.

But even assuming that's where the Libs will get to eventually, it seems to me that they're taking the worst possible route to get there.

After all, the precise wording of the motion the Cons use to extend a combat mission in Afghanistan will have little effect even in the short term, and certainly no ability to bind the future course of the mission. Even if the Libs somehow get Harper to agree to some weasel wording about making training more of a priority, the reality is that it'll still be Deceivin' Stephen in charge for at least the next year and a half (assuming the Libs' intention is indeed to put off facing voters as long as possible).

Needless to say, there's at best a remote possibility that Harper would choose to be bound by any statement of principle. And indeed based on the Cons' track record, there's no reason to think Harper would even start providing enough accurate information about the mission to allow the Libs to evaluate whether or not any change in focus had taken place.

Which means that the upside to negotiating with the Cons is purely symbolic. At best, maybe a few Libs will believe they've saved a small amount of face, but the ultimate outcome will be just the same as if the Cons' motion had passed word for word.

Meanwhile, the obvious downside is that the Libs would end up diverting their own attention, as well as the media's, away from the Cons' woeful record in government and toward an internal battle over the course of the negotiations. Which figures to offer Harper his best chance of boosting the Cons' relative position in the polls during the course of the spring session of Parliament.

Moreover, there's no particular reason to think Harper will do anything but string the Libs along, providing just enough encouragement to make them continue their infighting (with the media likely echoing a government position that the Libs perpetually have to give just a little bit more in order to achieve some consensus). And if Harper ultimately decides he wants an Afghanistan election, he'll still be able to unilaterally reject whatever the Libs come up with and declare that it's his way or the highway.

In sum, if the Libs' goal is to avoid a trip to the polls, the sensible course of action now would be simply to continue their strategy of holding fire by declaring that the Cons' motion as it stands doesn't justify an election, rather than gambling (against all evidence) that Deceivin' Stephen will treat negotiations as anything but an opportunity to exploit internal Lib divisions. Or if Dion instead has any interest in actually ending combat in Afghanistan, then it's long past time to start acting like a leader and aiming some pressure back onto the Cons.